LyrArc Article Gist
King Salman appoints Mohamed bin Nayef, 55 years-old, as the deputy crown prince in Jan. 2015. The crown prince is Muqrin Abdulaziz, 69 years-old. Mohamed Bin Nayef is the son of the Interior Minister, who worked under his father from 1999 till he became the new Interior minister in 2012. Nayef has pursued an aggressive program to remove Al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia. By taking action against all dissent inside Saudi Arabia Nayef has also jailed human rights activists, including the flogging of a blogger critical of the government. The defense minister Prince Mohamed bin Salman, is a son of King Salman. King Salman was defense minister till he succeeded his half-brother Abdullah. Ali al-Naimi continues as Oil minister, a position he has held for decades. Saudi Arabia established a panel in 2006 to work with future kings after King Salman to appoint an heir to the throne. Even with the appointment of Nayef, a grandson of Saudi Arabia's founder, Abdulaziz ibn Saud, as deputy crown prince, the leadership of the country remains within a small number of princes of the royal family. Under the Obama administration the relations between U.S. and Saudi Arabia have become strained with president Obama's failure to intervene in Syria. The Saudi have pursued their own policies since then, in first Bahrain and then Egypt the Saudis supported the monarchy and the military respectively to maintain power in the face of the Arab Spring. The danger is that Saudi policies may be contrary to the U.S. position supporting freely elected governments and basic rights, particularly when it comes to suppression of all dissent including peaceful dissent and normal criticism of government, and yet with the rise of Islamic State the U.S. puts itself inadvertently behind these very policies. The Saudis would say this has happened because U.S. president Obama failed to support the effort for freedom in Syria and a transition in Libya and Iraq (with the added complication of Maliki's sectarian policies), creating a war torn neighborhood in which the Saudis had to act on their own. These are the hidden costs of the policy of the U.S. president for the U.S. and for the Middle East- more sectarianism with Shiites and Sunnis openly in conflict, reversal of hard won gains in Iraq, reversal of the Arab Spring except in Tunisia, war torn Libya and Iraq- with a withdrawal that never truly happened because it required a firmly guided transition period of support in the region with lower cost and involvement of an extended period leaving no room for reversal of gains. It leaves both the Saudis and the U.S. in a more precarious position than a decade ago.