LyrArc Article Gist
When asked what projects they wanted to see in Helmand province, ordinary Afghans said they wanted the repair of the main sluice gates that lead to the irrigation canals off the Helmand River. These were built with American aid in the 1950's, and its been 30 years since anyone did any work on that canal. See the link to India and irrigation, only 50% of the land is estimated by experts to be irrigated in India. WIthout irrigation, as the uncertain monsoon rains this year showed, India's agricultural heartland in the Punjab and Haryana would collapse. When other Afghans were asked they mentioned security, they did not want to see the Americans in tents, but in some sort of permanent presence. BUt considering the vast and undeveloped landscape of Afghanistan, one sees several differences from Iraq's insurgent dominated priovince near Baghdad. It has mountainous terrain, with no electricity, no roads, no water, totally desolate in most parts of Helmand and other provinces, and it is a vast country with illiterate people tired of war. Would America's 40,000 troops be enough, or would you need more and more. If McChrystal's strategy shown here is to occupy civilan areas and fight the Taliban, and the Taliban with the help of Pakistan's ISI dissident elements are getting more and more sophisticated with roadside bombs, there will be growing casualties. The Americans could hold their own if there was no outpouring of support because of unpopularity of the Afghan government, but throw that into the equation- something McChrystal has not thought through according to Dexter Filkins of the NYT- and things get muddied. And from his training as a Special Operations commander this is a problem McChrystal is not as well prepared to understand or tackle. Consider the implications if Afghanistan is not Iraq- where Shiites and Aytollah Sistani their spiritual leader formed a core of support that the US always had on its side once it supported a democratically elected government- and no core of support here in Afghanistan except an unpopular government. McChrystal may also not have factored in a key factor of the "allergy" of Afghans to foreign boots on the ground. With a largely illiterate police recruits and army recruits, would the idea of transferring the job become delayed and the American boots end up in an untenable position? See the link to Commander Adams and Khost province, where Adams points out its all about visible evidence of progress. For his 250 paratroopers of the 82nd Airborne this meant delivering on roads built in Khost province, and a spring water system for 12,000 villagers. Here Filkins starts with Afghan villagers asking for the repair of the canal leading to the Helmand river which has not been repaired since the 1950's. McChrystal could only say "it takes time." But the US has been in Afghistan for 8 years and as commader Adams says only fighting "one year wars." The other point Adams says is that an effort in Afghanistan only works by befriending the tribes, because its the tribes who will see that IED's are reported and any insurgents in the area are reported, and only they have the capabilities to do it, which no number of American troops can do. These are serious questions that need answers. See the groups for- Commander Adams, and for Dexter Filkins (the article on McChrystal's Long War), which touch on similiar development issues.