LyrArc Article Gist
Alexandra Stevenson provides this exceptional account summarizing the reasoning in the minds of Argentine negotiators and holdout bondholders over a debt dispute remaining from the 2001 Argentine debt crisis and default. Over a decade later the repercussions of Argentina's 2001 debt crisis and default are still taking new twists ant turns. Holdout bondholders won in U.S. courts and Judge Griesa ordered Argentina to make full payment demanded by holdout bondholders. Argentina responded by depositing $539 million in Bank of New York Mellon as instalment payment to exchange bondholders. Judge Griesa responded by ruling that if Bank of New York Mellon made the payment it would be in contempt of court. Griesa also called for court mediated negotiations between Argentina and the holdout bondholders to come up with an agreement. Argentina and hedge fund holdouts negotiated in July 2014 but talks faltered. Legal experts say that if Argentina makes an agreement with holdout bondholders led by NML Capital which is asking for $1.5 billion, the risk is that the exchange bondholders could also ask for better terms. After the 2001 crisis following which Argentina defaulted on its debt, agreements were reached for bondholders to be paid about 25 cents on the dollar. Not all bondholders agreed, the bondholders who agreed are called the exhange bondholders, and the ones holding out holdout bondholders. From the Argentine government's point of view the risk of reaching agreement with the holdouts suing Argentina is that the other holdout bondholders not represented in the lawsuit could also ask for the same terms, and Argentina would have to pay all the holdouts costing it $15 billion. Risks if Argentina allows it to go into default are that exchange bondholders would come together to pressure the Argentine government to make a full payment of their discounted bonds quickly. This would cost Argentina payment of as much as $28.7 billion, according to JPMorgan estimates, under the right to "accelerate" payment if Argentina is considered as having missed a July 30, 2014 payment deadline. Legal experts say Argentina has to weigh this risk, which may or may not occur depending on the exchange bondholders taking such action, against the risk of having to pay out $15 billion to all the holdouts. Paying all holdouts would be politically very unpopular in Argentina, posing political risks for the socialist Peronist Kirchner government, already facing difficulties with the trade unions and the stronger opposition from centrist parties in Buenos Aires province. Default would affect Argentine access to capital markets, which is already highly restricted. Yet because Argentina has made the payment to Bank of New York Mellon, blocked by Judge Griesa, the nature of this default would be different. A worse case scenario for Argentina's Kirchner government is reopening negotiations with exchange bondholders for higher payment on debt than the 25 cents on the dollar already agreed to. Argentina faces an acute cash shortage with international reserves of only about $29.5 billion in May 2014, and a slowing agricultural export dependent economy. This is why the prospect of a technical default is being treated with relative calm in Buenos Aires....

LyrArc Article Gist
Speaking at a banking conference, advisors including the head of Russia's largest retail bank Sberbank, German Gref, minister of the economy, Aleksei Ulyukayev, and head of the central bank , Elvira Nabiullina, express deep concern about the economic prospects in 2015. Foreign investment is down from about $90 billion in the 1st quarter of 2013 to a negligible amount in the 3rd quarter of 2014. Capital outflows following the Ukraine crisis are estimated at about $110 billion by former finance minister Alexsei Kudrin. The ruble dropped to its lowest level against the dollar since the 1990's. And the sharp decline in oil prices with Brent crude at about $90 is another risk factor as 50% of the budget comes from oil and gas revenues and 60% of exports are still oil and gas, with no serious or effective effort to diversify under the Putin adminstration. Putin told the banking conference that a deficit free budget and reserves of $460 billion are "fundamental factors supporting stability." Advisors and leading bankers remain unconvinced. The problem is that even at the beginning of 2014 before the Ukraine crisis foreign investment had slowed to a trickle, similiar to what India experienced in 2013. The central bank head says her effort to open up the bond markets in Russia to foreign investors is now in vain because there are few foreign investors. Instead of reversing the situation as is happening in India with the new Modi administration, policy under Putin and the Ukraine conflict may have scared investors away with the increasing western sanctions and stagflation (estimated 8% inflation and about 0.5% growth in 2014). The head of Sberbank Mr. Gref told the banking conference- "The Soviet Union broke apart because of the mind boggling incompetence of the Soviet leadership. They did not respect the laws of economic development." The problem with sovereign reserves is that it can protect a sovereign currency such the Russian ruble or the Brazilian cruzeiro to some extent, but today's vibrant economies need foreign investment and foreign technology for growth. Even a country such as China with a trillion dollars in reserves needs the reserves in its special case because of its billion plus aging population, and is no exception to these laws of economic development about the need for foreign technology and foreign investment. ...