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Tim Pawlenty, former Republican governor of Minnesota, and co-chair of the Romney campaign, becomes the head of the lobbying organization for U.S. banks, Financial Services Roundtable. He succeeds Steve Bartlett. During his brief presidential run in 2012, Pawlenty raised $5 million in donations from banks. Sorkin talks to Bartlett about the appointment and Pawlenty's criticism of banks during the bailout. Bartlett says that in Washington what you say and think depends on the position you are in.

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James Pressley reviews Simon Johnson and James Kwak's new book - "13 Bankers: The Wall Street Takeover and the Next Financial Meltdown. " He suggests reading the first and last chapter for what the authors recommend, limiting banks to no more than 4% of GDP in assets or $570 billion maximum, and investment banks to 2% of GDP or $285 billion. Pressley agrees that incremental steps are not going to change the situation. And the authors have thought this thing through, with Simon Johnson, a former chief economist at the IMF and writer of the Economix columns in the New York Times on the current crisis in Greece, Portugal and Spain. Some of their analysis on that crisis has been borne out by developments, as Greece lurched towards default with the slow response of Germany enlarging the dimensions of the crisis, and requiring a larger bailout for Greece of $160 billion in late April.

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The SEC requirement that companies disclose the ratio between median worker pay and the pay of senior executives. The SEC says it is putting out the rule as part of implementing Dodd-Frank legislation to control excessive executive pay. Companies will be allowed to survey a fraction of their workforce as appropriate for companies with global operations. Executive pay will include pension benefits and stock options under the new rule. A WSJ chart using information from the University of Southern California and the Bureau of Labor Statistics, shows the ratio between what CEO's on average make and rank and file workers make remained at about 30 times in the post war period till about 1970, a period of rapid growth in the U.S. economy. By 1980 this climbed to about 60 times and exceeded 100 times by 1990. The period of stratospheric growth for CEO pay and extreme widening of the gap then occurs between 1990 and 2000. By 2000 the dot com boom- telecom boom and the internet- creates a surge in executive pay reaching over 500 times. This drops to about 280 times in 2008 and picks up again to reach about 320 times in 2011. Many of the poor business practices, the excessive leveraging and risktaking in the financial industry, take place against this background of excessive pay for senior executives. Some of that risk was passed on to others through such methods as securitization in the period leading to the 2008 financial crisis, so that executives were compensated with higher pay for taking excessive risk that they personally or their companies did not assume. Dodd-Frank legislation following the 2008 financial crisis sought to correct this imbalance by having pay information disclosed. The excessive pay has also coincided with an increase in the frequency of boom-bust cycles in the economy. The busts prompted the needs for intervention by the U.S. central bank, the Federal Reserve, to drop interest rates more than would otherwise have happened during this decade, culminating in the huge bond purchases and monetary easing by the Bernanke Fed. The SEC under Mary Jo White is mindful of these distortions in the economy as a result of misallocation of resources based on excessive executive pay, and the need to take action before the next crisis. ...

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The truth is very different from the rhetoric coming from the Obama administration about helping Main Street America and ordinary workers against "fat-cat bankers," says Goldfarb. Under the Obama administration banks have grown larger and gained more influence over administration decisions. No conditions were made part of the agreement that would require banks to lend a portion of the money handed out to the banks to ordinary borrowers. And not much of significance was done to help homeowners under water, which would enable a faster recovery. In this respect the policies slanted in favor of banks of the Obama administration worsened the prospects of an economic recovery. Experts from Reagan advisor Martin Feldstein- who as early as 2008 advocated serious help to homeowners under water to reduce principal and interest- to the FDIC's Sheila Bair and Princeton Prof. Krugman, across the ideological spectrum, perceived this being in the national interest. Feldstein's first op-ed on his plan appeared in the Wall Street Journal on 3/7/2008, followed by ones on 4/15/2008, 10/4/2008, 1/20/2010/ 10/12/2011 in WSJ, and a oped on 10/30/2008 in the Washington Post, repeating the call for siginificant debt reduction to homeowners. Banks had extraordinary influence on successive administrations in the U.S., both Republican and Democratic- the Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations- so that policy actions could be distorted from what would otherwise take place. A study by two University of Michigan professors shows that banks did not increase lending after receiving government money. Instead taxpayer money was used to invest in risky securities for profits from short term price movements, resulting in gains of about 10% in investment returns. Ran Duchin, one of the two professors, says helping ordinary borrowers was not the most profitable use of capital for banks. Without the necessary conditions from the Obama administration, the banks depolyed capital in ways that did not help the economy. Similiarly when banks needed to be restructured no preparatory action was taken because of resistance within the administration- a request by President Obama to Treasury Secretary Geithner for preparing a plan for the restructuring of Citigroup was ignored, according to a report by Goldfarb and Wallsten on 9/17/2011 in the Washington Post....

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In private conversations, Paul Volcker has advised administration officials, that in implementing the Volcker Rule, regulators should follow the practice in money laundering laws. There the government bans a certain behaviour, and then the burden is on the banks to screen for red flags and to ensure compliance. His advice is to ban banks from trading with their own funds if they benefit from any kind of government guarantee. Banks would be required to police their own actions, and the Fed examiners ensuring they are in compliance. The recently passed regulatory reform bill left a lot to the regulators, who have to fill in the blanks. Volcker's concern is that narrow rules would invite gamesmanship from the banks to evade the intent of the law. At one Congressional hearing Volcker suggested a Potter Stewart type of approach- Stewart as Supreme Court Justice said about pornography: "I know it when I see it." For Volcker bankers know what proprietary trading is and is not, and he does not want to let bankers tell anybody anything different. Thw new Financial oversight Stability Council is charged with the task of coming up with a course of action by January 2011, and then writing the rules by October 2011. The fear among a group of 18 senators is that bankers will weaken the Volcker rule protections. A letter pointing this out was sent by the group to the Oversight Council last week....

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AIG and GE Capital are designated "systemically important" financial institutions by the U.S. Treasury in 2013.

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Jon Hilsenrath of WSJ provides an illuminating account of how Daniel Tarullo as head of the Large Institution Supervision Coordination Committee has changed the way bank supervision and rules are set for U.S. banks since the days of the 2008 financial crisis. Tarullo started the effort under Ben Bernanke and continues this in 2014-2015 under Fed chairwoman Janet Yellen. The New York Fed is seen as ineffective in bank supervision and the supervisory role is now entirely performed under the leadership of Tarullo, assisted by Kenneth Gibson and Timothy Clark. The trio are some of the great unsung heroes of the effort to put the U.S. financial system and the economy on a safer footing.

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Issuance of junk bonds in 2012 reached $274 billion in 2012, an increase of 55% over 2011, according to Dealogic. This is double the levels observed before the financial crisis of 2008. Yields on low rated junk bonds have declined to about 6% as prices move up. Also observed is an increase in covenant lite corporate loans. These types of loans relax lending standards- this increased from $8.5 billion in 2010 to $36.5 billion 2011, and $58 billion in 2012, according to Dealogic. This has drawn the attention of Fed Governors Jeremy Stein and Richard Fisher of the Dallas Fed, who have raised a warning about the rapid increase in credit and financial risks.

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Nocera points out that in a larger sense pay czar Feinberg hasn't accomplished his goal- to change the ethos of the pay culture at banks and companies. $200 million to be paid out at AIG is in contracts for March 2010, and 14 of the highest Citigroup executives still will make $5 million to $9 million each, and Ken Lewis wil still get $70 million in retirement pay, and nothing that Feinberg can do about it. A lot of it has been shoved under the rug. As far as shifting compensation to stock instead of salary, Goldman and Morgan Stanley have already done that and that is a change that is already happening at these banks. But executive compensation will nevertheless be out of proportion and the public angry. Nell Minnow, the co-founder of the Corporate Library, says the only way is to throw the bums out, meaning the board members on the compensation committees. But this is up to shareholders and the job maybe to make it possible for shareholders to do so easily.

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The American Treasury Secretary who handled the 2008 financial crisis, Henry Paulson, gives the new US financial reform legislation an incomplete grade. His main concern is that the too-big-to fail risk in the US banking system continues, and without clear rules a lot depends on the regulators. He does not see higher capital requirements doing much to ease that problem, and sees another crisis in a few years as inevitable. Former SEC chief, Harvey Pitt, gives it an F for failure or an I for Incomplete. He sees it as a boon for lawyers, because it is not clearly written and leaves so many loopholes, to a degree that is simply astounding. He says it does nothing in the way of preventing another crisis. Does nothing for transparency, nothing for monitoring and action by regulators, all factors that led to the crisis of 2008. Nouriel Roubini gives it a C+, because it does little to fix the reasons why securitization failed and caused the crisis, and in this way will keep credit creation and expansion in a weak state. He sees this financial reform bill as a failed effort that is laying the ground for the next crisis, with little action in the "too-big-to-fail" area, a huge dilution of what former Fed Chairman paul Volcker had advocated in the Volcker rule, and no real impact on the risky trading of derivatives. Bill Gross of PIMCO gives his frank assessment in no uncertain terms. A D+ for this bill. It shows how lobbyists for the banks still control Congress he says. It would have been better to let Paul Volcker take charge completely, than to have the lobbyists dilute the critical reform proposals. Simon Johnson gives it the lowest passing grade at MIT, a B. The only large change he says, is the Kanjorski Amendment, which give federal regulators the authority to breakup the large banks. But he cautions that it may require another crisis for the regulators and Congress to "get it," and do what they should be doing....

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Britain's banks still owe the government 100 billion pounds ($158 billion) from the bailouts that followed the 2008 financial crisis. The incentivizing of risk by pay structures and bonuses was seen as a big part of the problem. LIBOR manipulation abuses by banks are still on regulators minds. The Financial Conduct Authority and the Bank of England's Prudential Regulation Authority, have set new rules to correct the problem. Earlier EU rules limited bonuses to 100% of salary. The new FCA rules require a 3 year period for traders and risk managers have to wait 5 years for performance awards in full. Top executives have a ten year wait to be certain claw back provisions do not go into effect. Andrey Bailey at the PRA says the rule is designed so "that people in positions of responsibility are rewarded for behaviour which fosters a culture of effective risk management and thus promotes the safety and soundness of individual institutions. "

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Some insights into the thinking of Robert Rubin from an interview by Ken Brown and David Enrich with the former Treasury Secretary in the Clinton administration about the 2008 financial crisis. As Justice John Paul Stevens. the longest serving Supreme Court justice on the bench once said, those who administer the judicial system form the backbone of the law. In a like manner those who administer the financial and economic system form its backbone, which is why Rubin faces some tough questions in this interview. At the time he was Treasury Secretary, the NYT magazine ran a story on Robert Rubin, as the kind of person who liked to put things down rationally on a note pad, and think things through on the basis of this rational analysis. This is how he approached the Mexican financial crisis of 1994 and the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Here is some of that note pad Rubin, in the context of CDO's and risk taking, with something gone awry. Risks that according to this NYT report Rubin encouraged at Citigroup in 2004 and 2005, on the basis of the idea that Citi's competitors were taking on more risk and making bigger profits. His note pad approach appears to have led to conclusions by Rubin that considering the additional profits that could be made by Citi by ramping up the risk taking in 2004 and 2005 and afterwards like its competitors, it could lead to losses if things went wrong, but these losses would'nt come close to wiping out the profits made during the good times. The cyclical downturn he expected to see in 2004 and 2005 when he is reported to have added his voice to others that the bank take on more risk, was a cyclical downturn of the type he had seen during the 1994 Mexican devaluation and the 1997 Asian financial crisis. He had no idea that it would be a cyclical undervaluing of risk added on to a housing bubble, and to a triple A ratings issuance that was misguided. Rubin says here that there was hardly anyone who saw that low-probability event as a possibility. Was the housing bubble a low probability event, and were the issuance of ratings by the credit ratings agencies compromised by the drive for more business a normal pattern, or would some digging up of facts and some innate skepticism of the prevailing current in favor of one's own instincts that something was overdone missed in the notepad analysis of a supposedly rational approach? Or was there a feeling that somehow the U.S. with its long tradition of technology, its work ethic and sophisticated financial system was somehow immune to something as severe as what the Asian countries were experiencing in 1997, or what happened in the 1930's. Asked about his view of what happened Rubin says that looking back there was an enormous amount that needs to be learned. Rubin is also in a quandary when he has to respond to the public concerns about excessive executive compensation. Rubin made $115 million in pay since 1999, excluding stock options, while under his purview as the highest ranking board member Citigroup let some of the problems that it faces now accumulate. As Citigroup faces $20 billion in losses in 2008, a bear raid on its stock by short sellers who ironically were able to do this because of some of the lax regulation set in motion in the Rubin Greenspan years leading to the suspension of the Uptick rule, and the $45 billion government bailout last week. Rubin may have helped Citi but in a different sort of way. He was able to persuade Treasury- Treasury Secretary Paulson was a fellow executive at former employer Goldman Sachs- through the days before the bailout, ensuring government help was on its way. Citigroup shares had dropped to $3.77 a share in the third week of November 2008, losing 50% of their value in one week, as the discussions took place. ...

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Sanford Weill built Citigroup into a mega bank through repeated acquisitions. He was the strongest voice for the repeal of the Depression era Glass Steagall Act banning banks from risk taking activities in investment banking. The Glass Steagall Act was repealed in 1999, and repeal legislation was given the name of "Citigroup Authorization Act." On July 23, 2012, Weill told CNBC: "I am suggesting that they (the big banks) be broken up so that the taxpayer will never be at risk, the depositors won't be at risk... Mistakes were made." Weill said that the housing bubble and the financial crisis has proved that the repeal was a mistake.