LyrArc Article Gist
Germany went through a period of stagnant growth and persistently high unemployment leading to reforms of the welfare system and entitlements under the Schroeder administration. The reforms led to lower unemployment benefits and an effort to get the unemployed take up jobs. Instead of unemployment benefits that amounted to half the salary indefinitely, unemployment benefits ended in 12 months under the reforms, and workers were forced to take up jobs or dig into their savings. The cuts to benefits led to more of the unemployed taking jobs that were not their first choice with lower incomes. Unions agreed to defer wage demands and wages remained relatively flat for a long period. The "kurzarbeit" system of government subsidizing employers to retain workers during economic downturns, helped cushion the workforce from ups and downs in the economy. Unemployment which was in double digits a decade ago, is now 6.1%. The system still preserved some other aspects of generous benefits- parental leave of 14 months at two-thirds salary, vacation time and publicly sponsored health insurance. Recent changes include raising the retirement age to 67 from 65. The Organization of Economc Cooperation and Development estimates that the 200,000 jobs saved in Germany during the recession of 2008-2009 cost the government $7 billion. Government funds helped companies retain workers by paying a portion of worker salaries and averting layoffs.This comes to $35,000 per job. Compare this with the $38.9 billion allocated to a loan program at the Energy Department under the U.S. stimulus. 8050 jobs were created under this program according to the Washington Post- for the money spent so far in Sept 2011- 2 years into the loan program, of $19.3 billion. This comes to $2.4 million in government guaranteed loans per job. The Energy Department says that 33,000 jobs were saved under the $5.9 billion that was given to the auto industry under this program for investments in manufacturing to improve fuel efficiency. This comes to $178,000 per job. The Energy Department and Congress estimated a 5%-10% loss on the $38.6 billion loan program for loans that go sour, such as the Solyndra solar company $535 million loan. This comes to $1.9 billion at 5% loss and $3.8 billion for a 10% loss. The purpose of these figures is to show the cost of programs when the programs fail to achieve job goals or produce too little for the investment. The $3.8 billion loss under the program is over half the $7 billon Germany invested for the 200,000 jobs saved as estimated by the OECD. That ranks as a far superior investment than the Energy Department program. For the U.S. there are aspects of German reforms such as "kurzarbeit" that bear emulation, with serious questions about the effective use of the U.S. stimulus funds. For the rest of Europe the stingier unemployment benefits, raising the retirement age to 67, and other reforms send a different message. From the average German the message is: we made the tough changes, the rest of Europe cannot expect Germans to pay higher taxes while they put off similiar changes. Italy needs to change its retirement age, just as the Germans have done. As Chancellor Merkel puts it: "People in countries like Greece, Spain, Portugal shouldn't be able to retire earlier than in Germany. It's important for everybody to put in effort to make it roughly equal. Germany will only help when others really make an effort." Which is why Greece, Spain, Italy, even France are faced with making serious changes. This isn't stalling when it comes to euro bonds, from the German perspective. And it isn't about the lack of committment to the idea of a European Union, as all major political parties in Germany, the CDP, the SDP and the Greens, all strongly support the idea of a European Union. ...

LyrArc Article Gist
John Taylor looks one step ahead of the March 2012 Greece bailout and sets up the most plausible scenario for the future. He says the risks of contagion were always exaggerated from the beginning- a planned default or restructuring of debt such as happened in Argentina in 2001, does not have the contagion risks associated with a chaotic and unplanned default as in Russia in 1998. Predicability in policy makes a huge difference, says Taylor. The European banks which stood to lose from writedowns exaggerated the fears of contagion- a process that always occurs for people who are adversely affected by writedowns- resulting in top officials in the European Union delaying the unavoidable serious restructuring. It was not until Chancellor Merkel handed Charles Dallara, who negotiated for the European banks, a note stating a demand for 50% bondholder writedown, on October 27, 2011, at EU headquarters in Brussels, did any serious writedown of debt begin. Merkel told Dallara: "this is my last offer." The July 2011 summit by contrast had only a 10% bondholder writedown in the agreement, when insolvency not illiquidity was the real issue. Walker Forelle and Meichtry, give a detailed account of what happened in the Wall Street Journal, Dec. 30, 2011. The important thing for Greece, says Taylor, is for what the IMF calls "growth enhancing structural reforms" - greater reliance on private markets, incentives, rule of law. He says this bailout won't work because IMF growth forecasts do not reflect the rapid shrinking of the Greek economy. Antonis Samaras, leader of the major opposition party, is in favor of pro-growth measures and has stated his desire to change the agreement. The 130 billion euro bailout provides 90 billion euros for recapitalizing Greece's banks, and financing the budget. This puts Greece in a situation where the political leaders win voter support by discarding the conditions from the Northern EU nations and come with a plan that is better suited for Greece. The EU in this scenario would cut off further bailout funds to Greece. Taylor sees this as the better outcome for Greece than the current situation, which leaves Greece no hope for growth, and also for the EU by getting out of bailouts that have little prospect of working. It would be difficult but doable for Greece says Taylor, because interest payments would be low and Greek banks would be recapitalized after the current March 2012 bailout. ...