LyrArc Article Gist
Krugman points to the connection between the failure to achieve debt reduction through debt forgiveness and the sluggish economic growth in the eurozone and U.S., five years after the global banking and financial crisis of 2009 and four years after the beginning of the eurozone debt crisis in 2010. In the U.S. debt reduction for homeowners was delayed with a wave of foreclosures, and in Europe austerity budgets were the norm as Germany pushed hard for austerity policies. In 2014 small relaxation of austerity to give relief to voters took place in Greece, France, Italy and Spain, with austerity budgets still in place. Growth also slowed in Germany to slight contraction in the third quarter and no growth in the fourth quarter of 2014. This is leading to the formulation of new policy to address growth challenges in the eurozone. Debt to GDP is growing in eurozone countries and Britain because of lack of growth, even though spending cuts have been made, showing the need for rethinking policy. ...

LyrArc Article Gist
Applebaum talks to two researchers at the University of Chicago and Princeton, Prof. Sufi and Prof. Mian, on the record of U.S. president Obama and Fed chairman Bernanke in helping homeowners facing foreclosure and underwater borrowers, comparing that record with their record in helping the banks. The issue is relevant as the policy and handling of homeowners had to be part of an overall effective plan for recovery in the U.S. economy, because ultimately without the U.S. consumer any recovery would be weak in the long run- a situation the U.S. faces in early 2014. The response to the issue of irresponsible homeowners borrowing beyond the limit without an equally robust response to irresponsible bank management that allowed wildly excessive leveraging of assets, and successful aggressive lobbying by banks in a shortsighted policy of going through with a wave of foreclosures; besides creating questions of fairness and equitable handling of the problem, also had major ramifications for the future of the U.S. and global economic growth. Here Christina Romer and other administration advisors say Bernanke was right in tackling the problem from the perspective of the banks needing to be recapitalized. Thoughtful advisors looking at the entire problem, Martin Feldstein and Sheila Bair strongly pushed for providing the same help to homeowners without getting caught up in the issue of who was responsible home buyers or the banks, and looking at the interests of the U.S. economy and the U.S. people. Proposals by Feldstein and Bair were equally robust in helping banks as they were in helping homeowners, only the banks understood their interests narrowly and had more access to policymakers in the Bush, as well as the Obama administration, Paulson as well as Geithner. This leaves us with the ultimate irony of the Obama administration pushing for the minimum wage, even to the point of electoral posture, when lasting damage had been inflicted on homeowners from the weaker portions of America's middle class by a policy that went against what two respected financial and economic experts from the Reagan period, Sheila and Bair had strongly advocated. See links and groups on Feldstein and Bair. Applebaum has followed most aspects of this problem closely and continues to provide exceptional reporting including the piece on the thinking of new Fed chairman, Janet Yellen. Private enterprise rules that require management at banks just as for other companies to take responsibility for failures, and be replaced with new management, was largely avoided leading to a fundamental failure in how a free market economy such as the U.S. and western European economies are supposed to function. Rules aggressively pushed by Geithner's mentor Treasury Secretary Rubin for a vigorous cleanup at banks in South Korea during a similiar situation in 1997, were not followed in any way here, also setting wrong precedents for the long run. ...

LyrArc Article Gist
Raghuram Rajan, Professor of Finance at the Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, was appointed chief economist at the IMF in 2003. He presented a paper, titled "Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier," at the annual Jackson Hole meeting of economists and central bankers for 2005. Rajan says he had planned to write about how financial developments during Greenspan's 18 year old tenure had made things safer, but the more he looked the more evidence came up that the risk reward relationships in a normal functioning financial market had been terribly distorted. Market participants were being rewarded for wins but were not being asked to take on commensurate risks and impacts on their bonuses and rewards. He also cautioned about the use of credit default swaps which acted as insurance against bond defaults, and said insurers were generating big returns on this but with the appearance of little risk- even though the pain could be immense in a default. Banks were carrying credit securties on their books that posed risks to the whole financial system if things went wrong with the credit securities. Reaction from the gathering was unfavorable. Lawrence Summers, a former Treasury Secretary said, "the basic, slightly lead eyed premise of the paper was misguided."...

LyrArc Article Gist
U.S. Federal Reserve governor Daniel Tarullo tells the Council on Foreign Relations that so much remains to be done four years after the financial crisis. The law firm of Davis Polk says 67 percent of deadlines were missed for new rules required to be set in place by the Dodd-Frank legislation, including the Volcker Rule. Tarullo said: "It is sobering to recognize that more than four years after the failure of Bear Stearns began the acute phase of the financial crisis, so much remains to be done." Tarullo fears that crucial momentum may be lost because of the long delays stemming from resistance by the banks. Tarullo met with bank CEO's in April 2012. Banks have protested that Fed stress tests have not revealed the parameters for the testing. Tarullo's response given at a recent Fed conference in Chicago were that this would let banks game the exercize by running the Federal Reserve model and not improving risk management and capital planning, making this a mechanical compliance exercize. Banks have particularly opposed a requirement that limits the risk in business between two banks to 10% of their credit risk....