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The Journal editorial points out that the refusal to seriously look at the restructuring of Greece's debt is moving from the amusing to the dangerous. Greek 2 year bonds yield 20%, and credit default swaps are priced as though a default is likely. EU denials continue, but Greek, German EU and IMF officials are conceding in private the need to look at this option. The EU thinking was that openly discussing debt restructuring would lead to capital flight, and better to muddle through than to have Greek and European banks take losses and need further bailouts. The editorial emphasizes the importance of Greece restructuring its debt in an orderly fashion. Financial markets have already priced in the likelihood of debt restructuring. Better to conduct serious stress tests with sovereign default scenarios and let investors, taxpayers and governments respond in an orderly way to this situation. The worst possible situation is a Lehman Brothers type panic. The lack of clarity was the biggest problem with Lehman, and the resulting uncertainty led to the financial panic....

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IMF forecasts for Greece's growth rate are proving too optimistic. The IMF forecast is for zero growth in 2013, and increases of 2.3% and 2.9% in 2014 and 2015. Even in its pessimistic projections the IMF forecasts a 1% downturn in 2013 and growth of 1.3% and 1.9% in 2014 and 2015. The government sector was a large part of the economy. Now that this is shrinking, the export sector which only represents 20% of GDP is too small to generate needed growth. Greece also lacks the competitiveness and the large foreign enterprises that operate in Ireland, making growth less likely. A major problem is also the 40 billion euros Greeks have withdrawn from their banks in recent years. Even the figure of 120% of GDP that is expected in 2020 under the March 2012, 130 billion euro bailout is a very hypothetical figure, having no sound basis. Landon Thomas cites a confidential study the IMF had circulated in February 2012, showing the long term prospect for Greek debt if growth does not materialize because of lack of competitiveness. It would increase the debt to GDP ratio to 178% by 2015, and leave it at the current level of 160% of GDP in 2020. Some experts say the whole debt sustainability analysis makes no sense, with the question being insolvency in the case of Greece, not illiquidity. And requiring a focus to bring debt to manageable level to create prospects for growth. The Wall Street Journal emphasizes this in its editorial on Feb. 29, 2012....

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Moody's Investor's Service downgrades China's credit rating to A1 from Aa3. Moody's predicts a slowdown in growth for China. GDP growth for 1st quarter 2017 was 6.9%. Total debt has grown from 149% of gross domestic product in 2008, to 213% in 2013, and is now 253%, according to JP Morgan. The problem is that ever higher levels of credit have supported growth and more of this is coming from the shadow banking sector. Higher levels of debt in future years from the already high levels will weigh heavily on growth, leading to an eventual slowdown in the economy's growth rate.

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Estimates of the exposure of European banks to Greece's sovereign debt shows BNP Paribas has 5.01 billion euros in exposure to Greek debt, Societe Generale 4.23 billion euros, Deutsche Bank 3.02 billion euros, and HSBC 1.94 billion euros, Credit Agricole 0.85 billion euros, Unicredit 0.80 billion euros, Santander 0.51 billion euros. The exposure of French, German, Italian and Spanish banks in Greece is a critical difficulty in resolving the crisis, as the banks are still in a fragile condition after the global financial crisis of 2008. With the debate on resolution of the crisis focusing on how a three way distribution of the burden should take place between austerity cuts, bondholder and creditors, and taxpayers in Germany and other EU countries, negotiations are finally taking place between each European government and the banks of that country. Three countries where such talks are taking place are Germany, France and the Netherlands. Finance ministry officials in Germany and France met with representatives of the banks and insurers in their country to arrange for the banks to voluntarily take losses on their holdings. The respective holdings of Greece's government debt according to the Bank for International Settlements are: French banks $14 billion, German banks $22.65 billion. Overall exposure to Greece is higher for French banks- at $56.7 billion for French banks and $33.97 billion for German banks. This opens the door to a Brady Plan type solution for the financial crisis in EU countries Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain....

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With yields on ten year Greek bonds reaching new highs, the Economist says it is time to go to Plan B. The German government wants to see something different from a continuation of the 2010 plan and merely loaning more funds to Greece. One option is for Greece to pledge privatization proceeds as collateral for new loans. Another option is the restructuring of Greece's debt, even though the German government is reluctant to impose losses on holders of Greek bonds. But Trichet and the ECB are opposed to any restructuring. ECB officials fear this could cause a crisis like that caused by the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008. And privately ECB officials say they could go so far as to refuse to accept Greek bonds as collateral for ECB loans if a restructuring goes through. The contagion from a Greece default could affect Ireland, Portugal, and impact the European banking system and the ECB's own balance sheet. Yet a sounder plan would be for European governments to come up with the funds to recapitalize hard hit banks, knowing that Greece will never be able to pay back its loans under the current plan. The IMF and the German government should push for an orderly restructuring of Greece's debt as the only workable solution, says the Economist....

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E.U. leaders reached a new agreement for solving the debt crisis in Greece and the broader eurozone debt crisis. This time an effort was made to come up with a solution that had some chance of working unlike earlier efforts. Earlier efforts that concentrated on austerity and burdened Greece and other countries in the debt crisis with higher interest rates came under severe criticism as unworkable. The result was higher unemployment, a shrinking economy, higher debt to GDP ratios, and contagion effects. The new plan commits to getting Greece on the path to growth. The European Financial Stability Facility will have powers to buy Greek bonds at their value in the secondary markets which means Greece would owe less to the EFSF, bringing down Greek debt. Greek debt maturities are to be extended over many years and interest rates lowered, with similiar actions for Portugal and Ireland. And private bondholders were given the option of taking 20% less on their bonds or extending the maturities of the bonds at lower interest rates. In return the bonds would have guarantees for repayment by the E.U. so that the private creditors would limit their losses. The draft document of the agreement says all the E.U. countries would commit to fiscal discipline....

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Martin Feldstein points out why the recent agreement for a "fiscal compact" is no more than an empty statement about fixing the eurozone's finances. In this respect it is no different than the Stability and Growth Pact it replaces, with serious weaknesses. Feldstein cites the weaknesses in the language of the agreement. Each eurozone country is required to limit its"cyclically adjusted" budget deficit to 0.5% of GDP and bring its debt down to 60% of GDP. Compliance will be performed by the European Court of Justice and fines imposed. In practice the questions loom large- for a country like Spain with a 23% unemployment rate, isn't all of the 6% budget deficit cyclical? Again the agreement says deficits are calculated "net of one-off and temporary measures." Under this provision a lot of the stimulus programs would be considered in the category of "one-off." Other language lets eurozone countries frame budgets based on "exceptional circumstances" and "periods of severe economic downturn." Italy has declining economic growth, does it make sense to have a large budget surplus in that situation to lower debt to GDP, and how does that goal relate to "exceptional circumstances."...

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Hannes Swoboda of Austria, a member of the European parliament, and president of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European parliament, makes the case for investment in growth and employment as the only way forward for Europe. Tax revenues generated from growth and employment would help reduce deficits, in addition to taxes such as a financial transactions tax.

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All sides had to make concessions to reach a new agreement on a restructuring of Greece's debt, and new terms for loans to Ireland and Portugal. The agreement was reached after negotiations between France, Germany, the ECB, and eurozone countries with a declaration issued on July 21, 2011. The powers and financing of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) were expanded to be the main mechanism for channeling EU funding to reduce the burden of Greece's debt. Germany will provide new funding and be open to additional commitments, something German chancellor Angela Merkel had resisted since the beginning of the crisis in 2010. Earlier funding had come with high interest rates and only when the situation had reached a crisis, with Germany insisting on the punitive rates and conditions as a way to discourage countries from taking advantage of cheap borrowing. In exchange for commitment of German funds Ms Merkel had insisted that banks and private creditors share in the losses. Private bondholders resisted but finally agreed to take a loss of 20% of principal on a small portion of the bonds. Their larger concession was to take lower interest rates and extend the maturities to 15 years and 30 years on new bonds which are guaranteed by the EU. The specific terms of the agreement are as follows: The EFSF and the IMF will lend Greece 109 billion euros over 3 years at 3.5%. Private creditors including German and French banks will "voluntarily" turn in their old bonds for new ones that mature over 15-30 year periods. These new bonds include 15 and 30 year Greek bonds with varying coupons. Some of the bonds would have a 20% discount on principal. EU leaders say the private sector contribution amounts to 37 billion euros through 2014 and 106 billion euros through 2019. Another part of the program is for the EFSF to buy back some of the Greek bonds on the secondary markets, which would mean Greece would now owe a smaller amount to the EFSF on these bonds. The EFSF will now have additional financial support from Germany and other EU countries and be authorized to provide aid to countries before a crisis situation arises. It would also have power to buy Greek bonds at prices on secondary markets to reduce the Greek debt burden. Ireland and Portugal are also assisted in the agreement. The interest rate for EU aid to Ireland and Portugal is taken down to 3.5%. Ireland is paying about 6% on the EU portion of its 67.5 billon euros bailout and efforts to reduce the rate were resisted earlier. The main theme behind these concessions and provisions is to give Greece, (and Ireland and Portugal) a chance to grow. High interest rates came under strong criticism because it only increased the size of the debt burden of these countries with a shrinking economy and high unemployment. The failure to come together behind a broad and sensible agreement with all parties making serious concessions, the EU, the ECB and the political leadership in these countries especially Greece, was undermining confidence in the euro and the eurozone itself. By mid-July Italy and Spain were feeling the effects of contagion in the financial markets, U.S. debt ceiling negotiations were unsettling global financial markets, the pressure was intense to come up with the workable agreement achieved on July 21, 2011. ...

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A behind the scenes account of the chain of events after the meeting of French President Sarkozy and German Chancellor Merkel at the seaside resort of Deauville, France, on October 18, 2010. Based on interviews with EU officials this account shows how these events are leading to closer union of the 16 nations of the European Union. At the seaside meeting Sarkozy met privately with Merkel. Merkel offered to take back the German demand for automatic penalties for nations failing debt guidelines. She insisted that bondholders should bear losses if a member nation of the EU defaults. The French president agreed to accept the German condition knowing that Germany was reluctant to support the bailout fund beyond 2013, and German public opinion was souring on the bailout. The European Central Bank president, Trichet, was furious that the two leaders were undercutting his efforts to create confidence in the euro. Trichet told Sarkozy, he must not understand how serious the situation was. Sarkozy told Trichet, "you must be talking to the bankers," "we are responsible to the citizens." Weeks of negotiating between the ECB and the Irish government followed, leading to the bailout of Ireland. The contagion effects on Portugal and Spain created more tensions for the euro. Merkel softened the German position and the EU leaders meeting in December 2010 moved in the direction of a closer union. Bondholders would still take losses but only if one of the EU member states were to become insolvent. And after months of discussion and debate the EU leaders realized that the only way forward for the European experiment was to build a closer financial union. Germany's future, Merkel told the German parliament, was in Europe....

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Gross exposure for derivatives, credit default swaps and other financial instruments tied to a default in five EU countries- Greece, Portugal, Spain, Ireland, Italy- is about $616 billion according to information from Markit, the Bank for International Settlements and and data firms. Christopher Whalen, editor of the Institutional Risk Analyst, says the financial industry is not cooperating to provide the information needed to understand the true extent of the exposure and the risks involved. This is why the Europeans are afraid of a default, he says, they have no idea what to expect out there. Darrell Duffie, Prof. at the Stanford School of Business, says this raises questions whether regulators know what contagion might occur among swaps holders.