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Washington Post Original article ›
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Lakhdar Brahimi who was special representative of the UN secretary general for Afghainistan from October 2001 to December 2004 and was present when under UN auspices Afghan political representatives met to build anew after the US defeated the Taliban. He says it was a mistake then no to try to atract those in the Taliban movement and other political groups in Afhanistan that could have been brought into the new political setup and administration to build a broader base of support. And the Taliban did not surrender to anyone when it was defeated so the same mebers of that movement could simply resurface. Also no peace can be achieved in Afghanistan without the cooperation and support of Pakistan its neighbor and with tribes. sharing land on both sides of the border. Brahimi says he bitterly regrets not having advocated more strongly 2 suggestions made by the UN in early 2002. The first to reach out to those members of the Taliban who were willing to join the political process and second to deploy the ISAF outside of Kabul with increased strength. He also believes the war that happened in Iraq after the Afghan peace effort may have falso fundamentally altered the views of people in the countryside and in border areas of neigboring Pakistan about perceptions of the US and NATO....
Economist Original article ›
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The Economist points out (in this cover issue on India-Pakistan relations) several fundamental facts. The first is that the current state of relations betweeen India and Pakistan hurts Pakistan the most. It makes a much smaller country and smaller economy bear the burden of defense against a large neighbor- defense takes up much needed allocation of funds for infrastructure and development, education and healthcare. It also weakens democratic institutions and their development by an overdependence on the military for governance. Poor India-Pakistan relations have significant adverse effects on the U.S. In fighting the Taliban U.S. forces are fighting a force that Pakistan's military helped create and support from its early beginnings as a way to counter Indian influence. With an Indian-Pakistani peace settlement of issues in Kashmir and other outstanding issues the U.S. would be in a significantly better position to disengage from the region, especially when the entire Middle East is moving in a new direction in 2011. Consider the difficulties in establishing peace in Northern Ireland, and between Turkey and Greece, and the difficulties of establishing peace between India and Pakistan cannot be considered even more difficult. Pakistan and India muddle along- neither side is doing much to take the initiative. For the U.S. disengagement from South Asia can be best achieved by pushing for a settlement between the two countries. Pakistan and India have much to gain from a settlement. Considering the progress made in Ireland, such places as Yugoslavia, and in Turkish-Greek relations, there is a lot more that can be done and should be done to bring India and Pakistan together. In Ireland diplomatic efforts were made by U.S. envoy George Mitchell, and in Yugoslavia U.S. envoy Holbrooke made diplomatic efforts towards the Dayton accords. Greek-Turkish relations have advanced to the point where Erdogan and Papandreou, the Greek and Turkish prime ministers, discuss solutions to the Greek debt crisis. This includes options to reduce Greece's defense expenditures in the light of Turkey's new foreign policies. The lack of such efforts to break the deadlock between India and Pakistan by the U.S,. the U.K. and other countries involved in the NATO mission in Afghanistan, the emphasis on a military solution supported first by Gen. McChrystal, and then by by Gen. Petraeus, all show a lack of understanding of the real issues that need to be tackled- issues relating to a peace settlement between India and Pakistan....
Economist Original article ›
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The Economist points to ways in which the effort in Afghanistan might see success. More troops on the ground to avoid civilian casualties from air attacks and bombings which can antagonizepeople and create more young militants exposed to religious extremist propaganda, huge investment in development, piecemeal arrangements with the local tribes and powerbrokers including the Taliban, help to Pakistan and concentrating its mind on the effort in its frontier areas so close to its capital Islamabad. At the same time building support inside Pakistan for a liberal state that remains Islamic but keeps religion out of the state, and builds alasting peace in South Asia without getting mired in conflicts like Kashmir which it calls "intractable disputes" that may be bypassed for an overall peace.

Time to Go

New York Times Original article ›
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Garrison Keillor asks the President to "lets start making our way out of Afghanistan," in his own inimitable style. He also quotes U.S. Marine Officer Matthew Hoh, who resigned his Foreign Service post- "American families must be reassured their dead have sascrificed for apurpose worthy of futures lost, love vanished, and promised dreams unkept. I have lost confidence such assurances can be made any more." And Keillor summarizes Hoh's reasons and does it so well- that our presence among the Pastun people, the people in the villages, the rural religious people, is only wosening the conflict, the role of the Taliban and Al Quaeda is not the main thing here, the real issues are tribal and cultural. The last phrase deserves repetition- the real issues are tribal and cultural, which no foreign nation can overcome.
New York Times Original article ›
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As the US gets serious about defeating the Taliban and Al Quaeda militants in Afghanistan and in Pakistan's border areas in Waziristan and the Northwest Frontier Province, and as Pakistan's army and government are at loggerheads and are also each in its own way unable or unwilling to take action against these militants operating out of or near the border areas between Afghanistan and Pakistan, it appears that the situation will result in the US having to make some tough decisions including going ahead anyway regardless of agreement with Pakistan. At the same time Defense Secretary Gates is saying that he wnats to see the Afghan army numbers to be doubled from the present 65,000 to be able to spread out across the country and not just be stuck in the urban areas. Any success the US and NATO see in Afghanistan would stem from some of these tough decisions including some tough decisions of a different nature that deal with Afghan government provincial officials tacit involvement in the opium growing areas. Like Iraq this will be a tough one for the US and the Europeans to sort out and make take a lot of patience and effort and some disappointments on the road before serious and lasting results that do not compromise basic American and European goals and intentions. With these goals and intentions the American and the Europeans seek to leave behind a peaceful modernizing state keeping its own faith and traditions with tolerance for others, at the same time that it respects women and economic development and modern education in science and technology that would make this development possible. And these goals would have to be applied as the vital test for the whole region Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India and for the basis of all policy towards the region, foreign policy, economc policy, development policy and regional issue policy like that of Kashmir. ...
Economist Original article ›
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The Pakistan army and its anti India mindset is at the root of the problem Pakistan faces. The army has factions that support the Taliban. Its intelligence agency, the ISI, helped create the Taliban as a way to get strategic depth (as they called it) in Afghanistan, for it sees as a necessary perpetual conflict with India. And the failure in Pakistan, the crisis of Pakistan, lies in the failure of elected politicians, the failure of the army, to provide responsible government and peaceful relations with India and with Afghanistan. By pursuing a Hindu-Muslim conflict agenda, and a anti-foreigner agenda for Afghanistan, Pakistan has ended up undermining its own government, institutions, and sovereignty over tribal areas and the North West Frontier Province. The US by getting involved in the Hindu-Muslim conflict agenda, and the anti-foreigner agenda during the Cold War, by supplying weapons and aid for this to successive Pakistani military governments, now finds itself as the foreigner in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Pakistan army's anti-foreigner agenda, now that the Americans are the foreigners, is not something that even the army or the civilian governments can control. The only thing the army knows, and its raison-de-etre, is the protection of the state of Pakistan and an antiIndian, Hindu-Muslim conflict agenda. After 60 years of doing this since its founding the Pakistan army knows no other way. Failure to do what it is doing would remove it from its critical role as the most important institution in Pakistan, and relegate its officers and the army to a smaller role, with smaller committments of resources, a smaller army, and the loss of its privileged role in Pakistani society. This is the answer to Holbrooke's question to Pakistani businessmen, and civilian leaders, in Lahore recently, what is the crisis of Pakistan? And these businessmen and civilian leaders also touched on the army's role. For America as it sees the need to build a new economic partnership with Asia that would help revive economic growth, there is the need for deep soul searching. The Pakistan military sucks up resources that are so badly needed elsewhere, for the kind of construction the Obama administration sees for America, of roads, bridges, schools, new energy infrastructure. How can what is good and planned for America not be whats good for South Asia, for India, Pakistan, SriLanka and the entire region? The resources that are sucked up by the Pakistan military and its actions to foster aconflict atmosphere merely adds to the way resources are sucked for the military in India, when they are badly needed for development, economic growth, and the same kind of infrastructure building and education that the Obama administration plans for the US. Without correcting this flaw in its policies in South Asia the Obama administration cannot create a partnership with Asian countries that could play a critical role in America's own economic growth....
WSJ Original article ›
Wall Street Journal Original article ›
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This article by Saeed Shah and Syed Hasan describes the Taliban factions from the tribal areas that control parts of Karachi, Pakistan's main commercial city on the Arabian Sea. It provides a detailed map showing the outlying areas around the city centre, especially the shantytown areas and the areas with Pashtun majority population controlled by Taliban with roots in the tribal areas. The Taliban charge taxes and adminster law in the areas they control. A major operation was launched since Sept. 2013 by the Sharif government to free this key city of Pakistan from Taliban control and the wave of kidnappings, extortion and other violence from Taliban members. About 168 police officers have been killed in the efforts to control the city, but areas under Taliban control are still hard to patrol by government police and special Ranger force. Karachi anxiously awaits the result of peace talks of the Sharif government with Taliban. If the talks fail and an operation is launched against Taliban in tribal areas the repercussions will be felt in Karachi. Shah and Hasan provide a excellent picture of the tribal loyalties, religious extremism and entrenched culture of violent activity that extends from the border tribal regions of Pakistan into the commercial centres such as Karachi that is a vexing problem for the Sharif administration, police, business and ordinary citizens....
New York Times Original article ›
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Because of anti Bush and anti american feeling every crank politicain or simply gangs fighting turf wars and even bandits or thieves can call themselves Taliban. Also the Wahabist religion of militants is not the religion in the Sind and Punjab 2 main provinces of Pakistan. And some of these areas like the Northwest frontier province and the areas bordering Afghanistan like Afghanistan itself have an independent streak and don't take well to any foreigner be it the Russians, the Pakistanis (Punjabis and Sindhis) and to the Americans or going back to the colonial era the British. Its convenient and a easy label for a lazy media that hasnt done its homework, and for politicians who lack the education and disposition to do their own homework or a cultural barrier that makes this difficult to call all this one label Taliban, or some other label, but its dangerous as the manner of dealing with this may be quite different given a correct understanding of whats happening. When turned over to the American people living in a modern world or to modern world Europeans for response to these labels there is only the gut instinct of them versus us the core feeling of something different and alien which is hostile. As this writer points out the Pakistani people themselves by and large are simply like people everywhere, may just be looking for better lives like the rest of us, and are not keen on the militants though they may carry anti Bush feelings. And the Pakistani people resentment for the USA not because of some innate or inherent hostility but because they feel left out of the modern world and its benefits of development like infrastructure, hospitals and basic services, just like most of the developing countries, which have alternated between hostility and friendship towards the USA, just as the USA has alternated between truly benevolent policy towards the developing world and policy thats more in tune to a prior colonial period of its partners in Europe like the British and the French. And in this sense the Pakistani people desire for economic progress may not be automatically construed as expressed through the politicians as they are corrupt and selfserving. Its a complex state of affairs sure but its not made easier but made more complicated by lazy man's labels without understanding the situation on the ground first hand and doing one's homework. ...
New York Times Original article ›
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When asked what projects they wanted to see in Helmand province, ordinary Afghans said they wanted the repair of the main sluice gates that lead to the irrigation canals off the Helmand River. These were built with American aid in the 1950's, and its been 30 years since anyone did any work on that canal. See the link to India and irrigation, only 50% of the land is estimated by experts to be irrigated in India. WIthout irrigation, as the uncertain monsoon rains this year showed, India's agricultural heartland in the Punjab and Haryana would collapse. When other Afghans were asked they mentioned security, they did not want to see the Americans in tents, but in some sort of permanent presence. BUt considering the vast and undeveloped landscape of Afghanistan, one sees several differences from Iraq's insurgent dominated priovince near Baghdad. It has mountainous terrain, with no electricity, no roads, no water, totally desolate in most parts of Helmand and other provinces, and it is a vast country with illiterate people tired of war. Would America's 40,000 troops be enough, or would you need more and more. If McChrystal's strategy shown here is to occupy civilan areas and fight the Taliban, and the Taliban with the help of Pakistan's ISI dissident elements are getting more and more sophisticated with roadside bombs, there will be growing casualties. The Americans could hold their own if there was no outpouring of support because of unpopularity of the Afghan government, but throw that into the equation- something McChrystal has not thought through according to Dexter Filkins of the NYT- and things get muddied. And from his training as a Special Operations commander this is a problem McChrystal is not as well prepared to understand or tackle. Consider the implications if Afghanistan is not Iraq- where Shiites and Aytollah Sistani their spiritual leader formed a core of support that the US always had on its side once it supported a democratically elected government- and no core of support here in Afghanistan except an unpopular government. McChrystal may also not have factored in a key factor of the "allergy" of Afghans to foreign boots on the ground. With a largely illiterate police recruits and army recruits, would the idea of transferring the job become delayed and the American boots end up in an untenable position? See the link to Commander Adams and Khost province, where Adams points out its all about visible evidence of progress. For his 250 paratroopers of the 82nd Airborne this meant delivering on roads built in Khost province, and a spring water system for 12,000 villagers. Here Filkins starts with Afghan villagers asking for the repair of the canal leading to the Helmand river which has not been repaired since the 1950's. McChrystal could only say "it takes time." But the US has been in Afghistan for 8 years and as commader Adams says only fighting "one year wars." The other point Adams says is that an effort in Afghanistan only works by befriending the tribes, because its the tribes who will see that IED's are reported and any insurgents in the area are reported, and only they have the capabilities to do it, which no number of American troops can do. These are serious questions that need answers. See the groups for- Commander Adams, and for Dexter Filkins (the article on McChrystal's Long War), which touch on similiar development issues....
New York Times Original article ›
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A UN Report shows that opium poopy cultivation is growing in Afghanistan and an enormous crop close to last year's record harvest is expected this year. 90% of the world's opium is grown in Afghanistan but it gets so little media attention compared to daily reports of injuries in the war such as on CBC for Canadian soldiers in the war zones and in other reports in American media. Of this about 52% of Afghan opium is grown in Helmand province which is largely controlled by the Taliban who finance their war with tax revenues from the opium farmers. The UN report also shows that most of the increased cultivation is happening in the south and west of the country worst hit by the insurgents. Areas where there is poor security or where there is not much help with seeds irrigation and other help for farming, are the ones that are mostly engaged in increased opium cultivation and areas where there is security and help with seeds and irrigation are the ones that don't cultivate opium. Looking at this state of affairs one would think that Western Europe and the USA which the UN report says must brace themselves for huge influx of this stuff, would rather than families and schools dealing with the problem at home in very difficult circumstances with high teenage use, would find it easier to finance seeds, fertilizer and irrigation and building of infrastructure in the country. However this shift to other farming would be possible if there is security and this requires a new policy in South Asia which reverses decades of policy that aggravated tensions in the region by not having a clear unambiguous direction of supporting peaceful economic development in the region which includes Pakistan and India and Afghanistan and Iran. Policy changed somewhat but a definite steering moving decisively in that direction needed to take place as first British policy in the pre1947 era and then American and British policy in the post 1947 period supported increased tensions in the area. Afghanistan thus ceased to exist as a country devoted to its own economic development but a place where the western powers engaged the soviet union, and then a place where Pakistan's military's policy of strategic depth against India led to the creation and support of the Taliban. By reversing this policy decisively and with direction as clear as daylight the western countries would instead of fighting these insurgents have Indians and Pakistanis work together alongside western country economic experts and agricultural experts to bring the infrastructure, electricity, irrigation, seeds, and fertilizer to these farmers across the whole of Afghanistan. Security would be mainly the responsibility of Indians, Pakistanis and Afghanis, and local leaders and people from the villages as westerners are easy targets of hostile action in a country used to fighting foreigners especially Europeans. That this may ventually happen but is slow to happen today can be attributed to how slow the process of sensible change is, how most people accept the way things are, which itself is a result of earlier policies which are themselves a result of still earlier policies. Thus pre-1947 British policy for Hindu and Muslim areas, is followed by America's Dulles policies turning India and Pakistan into aspects of the Cold War, followed by Reagan policy turning Afghanistan into aspects of the Cold War in reaction to Brezhnev's soviet policy in Kabuli affairs as a tit for tat, and this followed by the Bush policy reacting to the emergence of Saudi discontented volunteers in the Reagan supported Afghan war after Bin Laden's 9/11 attack in New York City. In the background a series of Indian leaders and Pakistan military leaders gave up any sensible steering in the direction of economic development by falling into the Cold war between 2 western factions or into a religious Hindu-Muslim strife war legacy from the earlier periods. What it means is that its hard in the human world we live in to to do anything but react, or be caught in a trap of thinking just the way we have been taught to think, or have accepted things as they are without thinking, with its resultant misery and ignorance and for south asia entrenched poverty. Its only with some grace and the right conditions and after a great deal of suffering which is true for Afghanistan war ruined countryside, Pakistan's poor economic conditions, and India's huge number of poor and economically depressed majority of the population and true also for westerners facing failed policy and failure of vision as economic conditions deteriorate at home....
New York Times Original article ›
New York Times Original article ›
New York Times Original article ›
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Robert Pape of the University of Chicago political science department points out the facts that show an increase in suicide bombings and roadside bomb attacks witrh asharp escalation as the foreign troop presence increased. He quotes Gen McChrystal's own report, " the increase in firepower and force protection have severely damaged the International Security Assistance Force's legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan people." In this respect he says McChrystal's request is not bold enough because with further escalation on the ground even more troops than he has requested would be required. THe numbers he gives are- neglibible roadside bombings after 2001, then as US and foreign troops increased 782 in 2005,1,739 in 2006, 2000 in 2007 and 3200 in 2008, all focussed on western targets not Afghan forces. He says the approach of buying support is used by the Taliban, and the US needs to allocate more resources and money to this effort. The switch would be gradual to fewer ground troops as they are seen as foreign occupiers, and America would maintain its military presece but differently avoiding the large forces that would only increase resistance to foreign occupation as its perceived in Afghanistan....
Wall Street Journal Original article ›
WSJ Original article ›
Wall Street Journal Original article ›
New York Times Original article ›
Washington Post Original article ›
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Gates experience one rainy night in March, at Dover Air Force Base in Delaware, welcoming 4 dead soldiers who lost their lives to a roadside bomb on a rutted road near Jalalabad, Afghanistan, provides an insight into what he sees as important for the US military. One is to address the realities of the war that is facing the US in the now, not some theoretical conventional war as the Pentagon is overly focused on. This war is fought in insurgencies in Iraq and in the Pakistan-Afghanistan area. And even the takeover of nuclear weapons by Taliban, is not ruled out with the collapse of the government in Pakistan. So he sees reason for doing things quickly. At Dover that night, Gates expressed his anger to his staff, "find out why they had'nt gotten their goddamn MRAP's yet (Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles). Gates went into the 747 carrying the draped coffins, and knelt alone and prayed for 5 minutes. Gates was President of Texas A&M University, before he took the assignment at Defense during the last 2 years of the Bush administration. He knows the ways of the bureaucracy, and is a persistent and effective when faced with lack of cooperation and delays. When the field commanders in Afghanistan said they needed 40 Predator combat air patrols instead of the 12 they had, Gates went around the bureaucratic delays and had his task force set up and and doing problem solving down to details. They went about getting more flying time, and pilots, and control stations in the air force to support this. He keeps presentations limited to 45 minutes, and inists all slides be turned in the day before, for him to look over carefully. And he is decisive in making changes. The Army Secretary was asked to come to Washington immediately, and fired on the spot, not Gates says for the appalling conditions at Walter Reed Army Hospital, but for not acknowledging that problems existed and taking quick action to fix them. And Gates is using the 2010 Defense budget to steer away from large scale conventional weapons programs, and get more money for the immediate needs of the field commanders in the wars being fought today. He makes it clear in talking with lawmakers, that "listening to our troops and commanders, unvarnished and unscripted, has from the moment I took the job been the greatest single source of ideas on what the department needs to do." In doing this he has to face up to the bureaucracy and set ways of doing things at the Defense Department, things that were never questioned under his predecessor Rumsfeld. In 2008 the generals who run the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps formally "non-concurred" with the classified version of Gates's National Defense Strategy, which said it was necessary "to take additional acceptable risk" in the area of conventional war so that the military could improve its ability to fight irregular wars. Gates met with all the defense chiefs to listen to their objections, and decided to draw his own conclusion after thinking it over, that the reasons given "were non-compelling," considering the grave dangers that the military was facing in existing wars. Gates is convinced that its his job to give the troops in the field the equipment and resources they need, and he is not letting the military brass or officials block the way. He does not let the criticism affect him. Gates is very quiet when he listens to arguments presented on the other side that he does not share, responding in a thoughtful and controlled manner. Last week, Jaffe of the WPost says, Gates flew to Afghnistan to ask for the resignation of Gen McKiernan the field commander there, a man he had chosen 11 months earlier, but now felt was the wrong man for the job. During this trip he visited a new base being built in southern Afghanistan, and met four marines whose MRAP vehicle took the blast from a roadside bomb, all survived with minor scratches and injuries, and one broken arm. Gates was mightily pleased. ...
New York Times Original article ›
New York Times Original article ›
LyrArc Article Gist
A poll done by the International Republican Institute, a nonprofit affiliated with the Republican party, of 3500 people across Pakistan found a couple of important things. The Republican Institute's goal is to promote democracy in the developing world. 1. Popularity of President Zardari at 9% and Nawas Sharif's at 55%. The US resumed contacts with Sharif, and Sharif is seen as able to bring the Islamic moderates to the American side. 2. Economic issues are what concerns Pakistanis most. Refugees are approaching the 1 million number according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. 3. 81% said the country was going in the wrong direction, Zardari was never elected and is incompetent and this could be the reason. But military is still unpopular, 77% want democratic rule, possibly with Sharif or some sort of combination of Sharif, lawyers movement, and Islamic moderates in charge. 4. From alow of 9% in January 2008, now 37% are willing to work with the USA against extremism. Could Obama's election and US support of Pakistan's effort to heal itself be apart of this change of heart? 5. 45% support fighting extremists in the tribal areas and the Northwest Frontier Province. And 69% say having the Taliban and Al Quaeda operate in Pakistan is a serious problem. If these poll results accurately reflect shifting feeling in Pakistan, American help to help Pakistan pull itself up by its bootstraps economically and unify the country under a democratic administration of Islamic moderates and people from other areas like the lawyers movement, could work. It also improves the prospects of pulling out of Afghanistan after the situation improves, and setting up an administration that comprises Islamic moderates and tribal representatives that keeps out Al Quaeda, and works to rebuild Afghanistan after seemingly endless years of war. These efforts would require cooperation of Iran, India, Pakistan and the US, and assistance of countries like Turkey, in creating an atmosphere that promotes peaceful development in the entire region. ...
New York Times Original article ›
New York Times Original article ›
LyrArc Article Gist
Rehma Malik, Interior Minister of Pakistan, admits in a rare statement that militants were entrenched in the southern part of Punjab province, the most populated province of Pakistan. This happened as two mosques in Lahore were attacked. This showed that the problems are deep in the heart of the country. This complicates the situation in Afghanistan, as all the problems faced by the USA in that country somehow come back to Pakistan.
Wall Street Journal Original article ›
Wall Street Journal Original article ›

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