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John Carney of the WSJ looks at the financial transactions tax proposed by 2016 U.S. presidential candidate Bernie Sanders to pay for high college tution costs.

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Stewart points out that Japanese government efforts to prop up stock prices by buying stocks in 1992 failed after 2 years when the fundamentals did not support the government effort. Experts say that even if the stock prices recover in China in 2015 after government efforts to prop up prices, this will be temporary if the economic fundamentals do not support such high valuations. The Shanghai Stock Exchange has a P/E ratio of 37 and the Shenzen Stock Exchange has a P/E of 80, very high valuations. Earnings numbers from smaller companies in China are also unreliable increasing investor risk. Additional issues are the timing of the government's effort to promote a surge in the stock market in 2014-2015. It comes as real estate and housing prices are in a bubble and the economy is slowing rapidly.

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U.S. Fed governor, Daniel Tarullo, said in a recent speech that U.S. financial institutions could be required to meet stronger capital requirements than the Basel international standards. The Fed is considering requiring the riskiest financial institutions to put aside 8.4% to 14% of capital. The Basel standards require institutions to gradually increase the capital cushions to 7% by 2019 from about 2% at this time. Less risky institutions would would have a smaller increase over the Basel standards- about 20% compared to the 100% increase over Basel for the riskiest institutions. Speaking at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, Tarullo said- "The regulatory structure ...should discourage systemically consequential growth or mergers unless the benefits to society are clearly significant." Tarullo said no one wants to see another TARP. Banks would have to build up their capital reserves using common equity and not other forms of less reliable capital such as contingent capital, where banks convert debt instruments into equity in an emergency. Tarullo emphasized the need for the U.S. to move beyond the Basel requirements, known as Basel III, because they are narrowly designed for individual institutions and do not adequately address the systemic risk. When there is a high degree of risk correlation among many actors in fast moving markets additional risks are created which require stronger capital standards. Tarullo said systemically important institutions have "no incentive to carry enough capital to reduce the chances of such systemic losses."...

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China's handling of the surging stock market, and use of the market for debt ridden companies to reduce debt loads, is based on an erroneous assumption of how equity markets work. China's lack of experience with declining equity markets during China's experiment with its form of capitalism since 1990, is a serious handicap in 2015.

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The terms of the debt restructuring deal with the bond swap in Greece become clear on March 9, 2012. In the deal with private bondholders -using collective action clauses to force remaining bondholders into the deal- about 96% of the 206 billion euros of Greece's bonds will be exchanged. Private bondholders held out throughout most of 2011, delaying the inevitable as Greece's economic situation became increasingly hopeless. This created a logjam with the German government, which insisted on serious private sector participation and bondholder haircut as the cost of poor lending decisions of the French, German and other European banks that made loans to Greece out of proportion of the ability of Greece to payback loans. Charles Dallara of the Institute of International Finance, negotiating for European banks, offered a 10% average loss on the bonds in July 2009. It was not until German Chancellor Merkel told Dallara at a late night meeting on October 27, 2011: "this is my last offer," for a 50% loss on the face value of the bonds, was agreement reached. The Greek debt swap that now takes place will give private bondholders a loss of 53.5% from the face value of 200 billion euros of bonds that they hold. The new Greek bonds issued in place of the old bonds include short-term bonds issued by the eurozone rescue fund at 15% of the face value of the old bonds, and a series of Greek bonds with maturity ranging from 11-30 years valued at 31.5% of the face value of old bonds. That even this 53.5% bondholder loss will not be adequate, as Greece's economy looks irretrievably damaged as it spirals downwards, is shown by the value of these bonds already trading in a hypothetical "gray market." The new 30 year bond is quoted at 17 cents and the 11 year bond at 22 cents. The questions remain about the stalling by the banks in taking the losses earlier- was this the wisest move considering the losses beyond Greece as the eurozone economy as a whole has suffered from the prolonged negotiations stretching through 2011, lurching from one crisis to the next? Even if the stalling was designed to give time for banks to repair their balance sheets, was this the best strategy, considering the damage inflicted on European economic growth. John Taylor of Stanford points out that the European banks delayed the unavoidable serious debt restructuring for too long, when insolvency was the real issue not illiquidity, and exaggerated the effect of contagion from the beginning- in John Taylor, WSJ, 2/22/2012, A Better Grecian Bailout. And John Cochrane of the University of Chicago, points out that French and German governments if they bailout French and German banks should do so openly and frankly rather than cover this up as bailouts of countries, because this would lead to serious questions about the poor lending decisions of the European banks and government supervision of the banks- in Cochrane, WSJ, 12/2/2010, 'Contagion' and other Euro Myths. As early as Feb. 2010, Cochrane was suggesting the forced exchange of new bonds with long debt maturities for exisiting bonds with short debt maturities, as short term debt was the major issue here. ...

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Timothy Geithner as New York Fed Chairman was a key person in the rescue of Bear Stearns. In an interview with the WSJ he recounts events and defends his actions on March 14 in a conference call at 5am in the morning with Ben Bernanke, Kohn, and other regulators and staffers and Treasury Secretary Paulson. By 7 am a decision was made choosing from 2 options not to do it, let Bear Stearns fail, and Fed would make an infusion of liquidity into the banking system to reduce the impact, or make a loan to to give time for Bear Stearns to make a merger. Mr Bernanke did the head count and all top officials agreed to the loan option. At 7.30 the morning of March 14 about $80 billion in short term loans would come due. If Bear Stearns went into bankruptcy protection lenders would get back collateral instead of cash and might sell the collateral en masse and pull back trillions of dollars of similiar loans to other investment banks. Also Bear Stearns had trading positions with 5000 other firms so the ripples would extend throughout the banking system. At issue in a Bear Stearns collapse with no Fed loan- a full blown run on Bear Stearns had begun on March 13 with customers and lenders pulling out billions of dollars. The man- Geithner does not have a PhD in economics and has never been a banker or trader, the background of previous chairmen of the New York Fed. He joined Treasury Department in 1988 and was an assistant to first Treasury Secretary Rubin and then his successor Sommers. Geithner was active in the rescue of Mexico, Indonesia and Korea in the Asian and Latin American banking crises. He was appointed to his position at the New York Fed in 2003, so he has 15 years of experience dealing with international banking crises. The criticism- has come from a colleague at the Fed Vincent Reinhart on the oped pages of the Washington Post, and from former Fed chairman Paul Volcker in a speech to the New York Economic Club. Geithner has asked to speak at the same club to give his account and his defense of his action. Note that Bernanke and Paulson and Kohn were in on this decision and voted in favor of it and there appears to be a consensus that all in the conference call supported it. Geithner kind of put it all together and so he is defending it. Geithner's contribution- Geithner pulled in the other players in the financial markets into close communication with the Fed. He assembled an informal advisory group including Rubin, Summers, Greenspan, Volcker, former New York Fed Chairman Corrigan and investment banker Pete Peterson. He would also phone them individually asking : what should we think about an issue? What are the best 3 arguments for or against? What do smart people think? He also initiated a series of dinners at the NY Fed's executive dining room in which 5 or 6 senior executives from a major investment firm would meet his own top people. He also calls CEO's of important banks and investment firms every week in a crisis situation to ask- Whats changed? Whats better? Whats worse? What worries you? And after the credit crisis in August ,Geithner joined Bernanke in a small group that included Fed vice chairman Donald Kohn and Kevin Warsh, a Fed governor, investment banker and White House aide. ...

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The FDIC with help from the Treasury would bail out the creditors and the counter parties in the event a large financial institution fails. And then the FDIC would collect the money from some 120 banks. This is the idea behind a Geithner- Rep. Frank proposal. But critics point are skeptical whether the FDIC can collect the money from banks, which would be too weak themselves in a financial crisis. One critic said it allows the government to spend another $1 trillion to bailout banks, and then perhaps in one year or a hundred years collect that money back.

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New Feb. 2024 dated debt issued by Portugal offers investors a yield of 5.20%. In Jan. 2014 Portugal issued 5 year debt for 3.25 billion euros. Plans are to raise 11-13 billion euros through bond issuance in 2014 to build up cash reserves and prefund needs for 2015. Refinancing needs are about 10 billion euros annually according to Moody's. The debt level has reached 128% of GDP by Jan 2014 after GDP declines and aid to struggling companies.

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An assessment of the Dodd-Frank financial reform legislation by 2014.

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Experts view the behaviour of 10 year Treasury yields at different periods following the 2008 financial crisis. Twice in early 2010 and early 2011 there were signals that the economy was not so weak before faltering, each time 10 year Treasury yields went up to 3.75-4% before going down to the 2.24% level. This situation appears to be happening again in 2012 with rates dropping in the first quarter to between 1.82%- 2.11%. The yields on 10 year Treasury jumped again, this time to 2.39% on March 19, 2012, as the eurozone crisis fears and U.S. economic growth fears subsided for the time being.

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The 10 year Greece government bond yield was 9.183% on May 14, 2013, according to Tradeweb, declining from a high of about 30% during the peak of the eurozone financial crisis in 2011.