LyrArc Article Gist
A description of Ben Bernanke's style at the Fed and how its different from Greenspan's. Bernake has brought a more open and cooperative style with lots of questions asked of other experts of all ages and experience and in different parts of the world, with lots of discussion, testing assumptions, and looking for creative ways to and creative solutions to address the problems. Its more collaborative mode. As one Fed staffer puts its more like a seminar room at Princeton. Description from insiders on how the Fed met with advisors on August 9, a day after the ECB had acted on the mortgage crisis, and how the response by the Fed was developed on that day in a collaborative cooperative mode with a lot of participation and discussion on the Fed's next move, calming the markets and reassuring them while making sure that the Fed's actions were well thought out in all aspects for a series of moves over the next couple of months. Involvement of NY Fed's Geithner, of former Treasury Secretary Rubin and Wall Street bankers, sought out for advice by Bernanke....

LyrArc Article Gist
Simon Johnson reminds readers that in October 2008, Johnson, Peter Boone, and James Kwak, suggested that some European countries had given taxpayer-backed pledges to banks that had liabilities larger than their own gross domestic products. Their proposal included creation of a European Stability Fund with at least 2 trillion euros of credit lines guaranteed by all member nations, as well as Switzerland, Sweden, and the U.K., to buy time dealing with underlying insolvency in Ireland and other countries. Simon Johnson, is former chief economist of the IMF. He says the euro-zone only belatedly acted on this advice and the politicians never took responsibility for what they allowed to happen. The runaway financial globalization he says, was allowed to happen by US Treasury officials, but European banks were seriously involved in similar behaviour. These banks became too large relative to their economies, captured their regulators and acted recklessly. Europe's leaders haven't fully faced up to this and keep telling their voters that the problem is entirely because of US banks irresponsible behaviour. Ireland was the extreme example of this. And Johnson provides readers with the names of two books on the subject. David Lynch has "When the Luck of the Irish Ran Out," Fintan O'Toole has "Ship of Fools: How Stupidity and Corruption Killed the Celtic Tiger." Both laying out the intermingling of politicians, bankers and real-estate developers that resulted in the reckless growth and collapse of Ireland. In his own account in Atlantic magazine, May 2009, Johnson compared the US economc boom-bust-bailout cycle to what happened to Argentina, Russia and Indonesia. These were emerging middle class countries with crony capitalism, unsustainable debt and other problems. Johnson says, don't think these problems are limited to emerging markets. Its a global or general occurrence in which powerful people get together to build an economic model that brings growth based on debt. Under public pressure the German government keeps saying there must be burden sharing, that creditors must take losses also. Johnson says Angela Merkel and her colleagues have not thought through what signal this sends to the markets- which is to tell people to get out of Irish banks now. And the big German banks are telling the government they face big losses if Ireland or other European countries default. If the ECB can't pay, and the German taxpayer won't pay, Johnson asks, does the IMF have the resources to tackle Spain? If China offers to recapitalize the IMF with some of its $2.6 trillon in reserves, and becomes the largest shareholder, would the IMF headquarters be moved to Beijing as the Articles of Agreement require for the largest shareholder. ...

LyrArc Article Gist
Gikas Hardouvelis was finance minister during a crucial period of impementation of the 2012 bailout program for Greece from June 2013 to Jan. 2015. Here he outlines the mistakes he sees made by the IMF in not agreeing to the 7.2 billion payment to Greece in 2014, 4% of Greece GDP, with one third of that not a loan. At the fifth review of the 2012 bailout the EU commissioner for economic affiars, Pierre Muscovici , said Greece had completed its requirements and the 7.2 billion euro funding should be released. Yet he says the IMF to preserve leverage over a future Syriza administration in the 2015 elections decided to hold back. This made it harder for the Samaras administration to tell voters that it had completed the program a year earlier, and the lack of the funds hurt the Samaras administration as it erased signs of growth that had appeared in early 2014. Following this error he points to 4 mistakes made by the Syriza Tsipras government. The first was that it was bitterly opposed to the lenders (IMF, EU and ECB) and failed to focus on the economy. Hardouvelis points out that the maturity of the debt of 16.5 years and low interest rates meant that it was not the immediate issue facing Greece, and he calls it very manageable. This was not to say that it was important but with creditors worried about moral hazard, other issues could be taken up first. Another mistake was to allow a loss of liquidity to the private sector so that prospects of growth were erased. The new finance minister acted as if the $7.2 billion infusion was not important and let payments be delayed. Tsipras and Varoufakis let the uncertainty increase in the private sector, and let the economy decline all the way to the closing of the banks. How costly was this is evident from the IMF's own paper in Juy 2015 and the 3 page update of July 14, 2015, on the Greek debt, showing it cost Greece a total of 60 billion euros in additional financing needed and an additional 25 billion euros for the shock from the closing of the banking system. That 3 page IMF paper shows that within the space of one year a shocking amount of damage was done by Syriza left government- it says Greece went from being on track for reaching Debt to GDP of 105% by 2022 under the Samaras-Hardouvelis administration in July 2014, to 142% by June 2015, and with the closing of the banking system to 170% by July 2015. Some of this would have come from the IMF's own withholding of the 7.2 billion euro payment to the Samaras government. ...

LyrArc Article Gist
Criticism of the EU's handling of the Greece crisis by IMF officials in a report. The report says the actions taken for debt restructuring in 2012 should have come much earlier to reduce the debt burden and the size of austerity measures in Greece. Similiar criticism has been voiced by president Hollande of France and in editorials by the WSJ. President Samaras of Greece says the sharp cuts in spending reduced potential for growth in the economy.

LyrArc Article Gist
Antonis Samaras visits Bavaria and meets with Christian Social Union leader Horst Seehofer, who offers his support to Greece's recovery efforts and plans a return visit to Greece. After the meeting, Seehofer said "today, we've turned over a new leaf," and Samaras said "I've received a lot of appreciation for our efforts."

LyrArc Article Gist
Amazon's employee count more than triples in 3 years to 109,800, with 31,200 employees added in 2010. This outpaces growth in employees at Microsoft with 99,000 employees, Apple with 80,300, and Google with 46,400 employees. Amazon uses a highly structured process in which the perspectives on cultural fit of hundreds of "skilled evaluators" throughout the company are taken into account.

LyrArc Article Gist
Landon Thomas looks at the European Financial Stability Facility, the organization that was formed in May 2010 to be the mechanism for raising and channeling funds to troubled eurozone economies Ireland, Greece and Portugal. He describes its evolution, its new responsibilities under the July 2011 eurozone agreement, and the difficulties it might face. The credibility of the EFSF is critical to the solution being worked out by eurozone leaders. The EFSF is based in Luxembourg and is headed by Klaus Regling, a German economist and a top official in the European Commisson's financial division. The EFSF raises funds in the financial markets. With Germany as the largest backer the EFSF is able to raise funds at low interest rates such as 3.3% for 10 years at one recent offering. The fund has a triple-A rating. In June and July the stability fund raised 8 billion euros in two auctions. It plans to come to the market four times during the rest of 2011 for funds to support Ireland and Portugal. The EFSF will need new powers and structure to meet its new role as the principal mechanism for solving the crisis. It is now given the role of the buyer of last resort for the bonds of troubled eurozone economies. This means national parliaments in the eurozone will have to approve these new powers and resources. One concern in financial markets is how the EFSF would deal with the needs of Italy or Spain if one of the two economies runs into trouble. Italy and Spain consitute 30% of the EFSF's backing, if they were to run into problems, would the burden fall disproportionately on France and Germany? And because France may have public finance problems of its own with declining competitiveness, does this mean Germany would be the real backer in that situation....

LyrArc Article Gist
The inflation rate in the eurozone showed a decline of 0.2% in December 2014, showing the first signs of deflation. This is the first sign of deflation since 2009. The unemployment rate for the eurozone remained at 11.5% in November, with the rate in Germany improving to 6.4% in Dec. from 6.5% in Nov., but unemployment reaching 13.4% in Italy. Dutch finance minister Jeroen Dijsselbloem, points to low energy prices, and core inflation data showing that excluding energy and food prices the core inflation rate increased to 0.8% in Dec. 2014 compared to 0.7% in November 2014.

LyrArc Article Gist
Spain sold 4.5 billion euros of debt, on Jan 17, 2013. The average interest rate on 2 year bonds was 2.71%, down from 3.36% in Dec. 2012. The interest rate on the 10 year Spanish bond was at 5.03%.

LyrArc Article Gist
France's president Hollande says about Greece during a visit by Greek prime minister, Antonis Samaras, that the Greek government must move forward with economic reforms, "while making sure that it is tolerable for the population." He also said he was "saluting the Greek people for their painful efforts of the last two and a half years." Samaras says in an intervew: "Greece is like a swimmer who is underwater for a long distance and needs to come up from time to time for some air, we need to be able to take a breath."

LyrArc Article Gist
Italy's borrowing costs increased by one percentage point one week after the July 22, 2011 eurozone debt deal for Greece. The Italian Treasury sold 2.7 billon euros of 10 year bonds with a yield of 5.77%. The yield in late June for a similiar bond issue was 4.94%. Yields on Spain's 10 year bonds increased to 6%. German bonds are getting investors with a 10 year bond yield that has decreased to 2.62%, which means the gap between the German bonds and the bonds of southern European countries is widening.

LyrArc Article Gist
Examination report of Deutsche Bank's regulatory reporting by the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank of New York in 2014 shows serious regulatory reporting problems.

LyrArc Article Gist
The June 2012 referendum in Ireland on the EU Fiscal Treaty.

LyrArc Article Gist
Richard Portes of the London Business School provides two good reasons why the EU's decision to adopt the French Banking Federation's proposal for rollovers with 10% interest costs is a serious mistake. It doubles the interest costs from 4-6% to 10% with 2% Greek GDP growth and makes debt servicing untenable. Portes says the real Brady Plan from the 1980's included a 35-40% bondholders haircut. Deals of this type have a precedent- in Mexico in 1988 and in Argentina in 2001 such bond exchanges were soon followed by deals that placed bondholder haricuts on creditors. The lesson from Latin America in the 1980's, says Portes, is that the burdens of servicing a debt of such proportions under onerous conditions only extinguishes the enterprise, investment and productive capabilities of the particular country trying to service that debt, making the debt even less serviceable. See the Wall Street Journal's editorial on this deal which it calls "The French Deception." The terms sound like Greek to the editors leaving a sense that French banks are only saying "gimme." The only benefit achieved may be putting off the problem and avoiding contagion to Portugal and Spain. Yet this is not that much of a benefit when one realizes that the problem has not gone away, and is likely to look much worse six or nine months from now....