LyrArc Article Gist
Did U.S. Treaury Secretary, Timothy Geithner, ignore a key request by President Obama to present plans for the restructuring of Citigroup after the government bailout of Citigroup? Ron Suskind says this is what happened in his book on the Obama administration and how the White House operated to make key decisions. Ron Suskind, intervewed key members of the Obama White House economic policy team, Lawrence Summers, Christina Romer, Peter Orszag. In all Suskind conducted 700 hours of interviews for his new book in Sept 2011: "Confidence Men: Wall Street, Washington and the Education of a President." According to the book, in early 2009 after Obama authorized a series of stress tests for banks he told Geithner to develop a plan for restructuring Citigroup. A month later at a meeting not attended by Geithner Obama raised a question about the status of the plan. He was told by Romer that no restructuring plan had been developed for Citi. Suskind says Geithner disagreed about a plan to restructure Citi and decided to ignore the request. Geithner and the Treasury Department say Obama asked Geithner to develop a backup plan to overhaul banks if the government was forced to keep a big ownership stake in the companies, and "there was fortunately never a need to put them in place." Geithner told Suskind that he doesn't slow-walk the President on any matter. Other aspects of the operation of the economic policy team that Suskind covers are a series of memos from top aide Pete Rouse raising questions that ongoing communication between some members of the economic team and Summers was giving Summers power to shape policy. Summers, Director of the National Economic Council, is shown as trying to keep out the views of Romer and budget director Orszag from reaching the President without going through him. When Orszag gives a private report to the president on the deficit, Summers objects saying that this was immoral. Obama lacked the fresh ideas needed to tackle the problems created by the mortgage and banking crisis of 2008, when he used the Clinton administration economic policy team of the 1990's- Rubin, Bernanke, Summers and Geithner. Fresh approaches were needed two decades after Clinton's election in 1992, and the Bush administration that followed, as many of the problems developed during this period. The similiar embedded thinking was shared during the Clinton and Bush administrations and the economic advisors about dealings with the banking sector, but the situation for deficits, unemployment, housing, and the economy had completely changed requiring fresh approaches. ...

LyrArc Article Gist
Raghuram Rajan, Professor of Finance at the Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, was appointed chief economist at the IMF in 2003. He presented a paper, titled "Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier," at the annual Jackson Hole meeting of economists and central bankers for 2005. Rajan says he had planned to write about how financial developments during Greenspan's 18 year old tenure had made things safer, but the more he looked the more evidence came up that the risk reward relationships in a normal functioning financial market had been terribly distorted. Market participants were being rewarded for wins but were not being asked to take on commensurate risks and impacts on their bonuses and rewards. He also cautioned about the use of credit default swaps which acted as insurance against bond defaults, and said insurers were generating big returns on this but with the appearance of little risk- even though the pain could be immense in a default. Banks were carrying credit securties on their books that posed risks to the whole financial system if things went wrong with the credit securities. Reaction from the gathering was unfavorable. Lawrence Summers, a former Treasury Secretary said, "the basic, slightly lead eyed premise of the paper was misguided."...