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Glen Hubbard, who was Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors under President George W. Bush and is now Dean of Columbia University Business School, Hal Scott professor of International Fiancial Systems at Harvard Law School, and Luigi Zingales professor of finance at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business, say a different plan of action is needed from what the Obama administration is doing to tackle the banking crisis. They are really skeptical about the the Public Private Investment Program and other plans put forth upto now for several reasons. First, in every case they say there is a lot of carrot but very little stick, and this won't work. TARP program was mostly carrot, with Treasury getting back securities worth $78 billion less than the $254 billion invested, as pointed out by the Congressional Oversight Panel.The FDIC's guarantee of short term debt was worth $100 billion just for the original nine TARP participating banks, and the mortgage related asset guarantees offered Citibank and Bank of America were worth tens of billions. They see anew round of TARP injections with the conversion of the government's preferred stock into equity after release of the stress test results. Then there is PPIP the Public Private Investment Program, and its plans to subsidize the purchase of bank's"toxic assets" by hedge funds and other investors. They estimate the government will spend $2 for every $1 the private sector puts up. And even with this subsidy their thinking is that the probability of succes is low for the same reason that has prevailed since the earlier efforts by Treasury Secretary Paulson- there is just too big a gap between the bid and ask prices on the toxic assets, and add to that the reluctance of investors to partner with the government. Its time for more stick say these experts as the problem of toxic assets, and of credit and lending in the economy, will hang like a large shadow over the economy, as long as these tough problems are not wrestled with. This is the Hubbard-Scott-Luigi Plan: 1) The FDIC should announce that its guarantees of short term debt set to expire in October will not be renewed. Insolvent banks, defined not by stress tests but as those that cannot fund themselves in the private market, will be taken over by the FDIC under aclear and credible action plan. 2) The FDIC lacks the resources to run several large and complex banks which may become insolvent. And waving the idea of nationalization the creditors may try to get the government to bail them out. The authors of this plan say the FDIC should solit each bank into a "bad bank" and a "good bank." The "bad bank" would carry all the residential and commercial real estate loans and securitized mortgages as assets, and all the long term debt as liabilities. THe "bad bank" would obtain along term laon from the good bank to fund the assets of the bad bank. Al the remaining assets including the derivative contracts and the loan to the bad bank would be assets of the good bank. It would also have all the insured deposits and the FDIC guaranteed short term debt as liabilities. With the split accomplished the good bank can be released from FDIC receivership. 3) The long term debt holders would be compensated by receiving all the equity of the good bank. The old shareholders would get the equity in the bad bank. And in any restructuring bondholders should do better than equity holders. If banks are not really insolvent as some say and just facing temporary dislocations, then the bad bank will eventually surge in value, and the equity holders will do alright, and if not they will receive nothing as they should. 4) For this to work legislation needs to take effect before October for FDIC procedures for handling failed banks to be also applicable to bank holding companies. And this new legislation puts no new cost on the taxpayer....

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A study by Chris Whalen, managing director of Institutional Risk Analytics, of 7000 regional and community banks from data presented for the second quarter to the FDIC, shows that the bank's financial picture is deteriorating. Institutional Analytics put afailing grade on 1,882 banks as of June 30, 2009, up 16.5% from the end of March 2009. He says even the best run banks are feeling the bad effects of declining employment and asluggish economy. Whalen says this calls into question whether the stress tests for the "big banks" by the Obama adminsitration are adequate to control the crisis. Whalen says the asummption in those stress tests was that thes big banks had tohave enough capital and earnings to withstand a 9% loss rate, but what he is seeing in the industry is that we are already at a 9% loss rate , and the cycle has not peaked yet. He says any reduction in loss rates as assumed by the government may be shortlived as he sees things worsening in the fourth quarter of 2009. What about the good news that the big banks have raised capital in 2009. He says banks face operational problems, in addition to loan losses and low recovery rates on unloading assets they face rising expenses to carry these properties that generate little revenue. This cuts into earnings and what they can allocate to reserves. In this period banks are setting aside only half of what they would normally put in reserves to offset expected losses....

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The New York Times reports from the comments of current and former members of the Chase Chief Investment Office (CIO), that risk officers at Chase were ignored when they raised issues about the complex trades made by trader Iksil. Iksil's trades had the support of his manager Mr. Macris, and Ms. Drew who was in charge of CIO. The comments also indicate that at one point Mr. Macris brought in a Risk Officer with whom he had worked closely for many years. Risk Officers are supposed to be independent and their concerns seriously heard, with the authority to halt trades that pose excessive risks. Which made this kind of cozy behaviour in the CIO trading offices in London cause for alarm. These reports also say Mr. Braunstein, the new CFO at JP Morgan Chase, did not strengthen controls after he assumed office in 2010. Bank officials disputed this. The New York offices did not fully grasp the complex trades being made in the CIO London offices, and upper management let the CIO operate pretty much on its own, especially with CEO Jamie Dimon's confidence in Ms. Drew's management of the CIO. This led to another gap in the process of risk management. Dimon had other priorities and distractions, from problem mortgages coming with the acquisition of Washington Mutual, pushing back aginst financial regulation after the 2008 crisis, stress tests and others. At the same time the U.S. Federal Reserve, regulators, and Treasury's coordinated effort to merge failing banks with other larger banks- because of the lack of the process of unwinding failed banks provided later under Dodd-Frank legislation- created mega financial banks. Unlike what the U.S. under Treasury Secretary Rubin pushed for in the case of S. Korea during a banking crisis in 1997, Treasury under Geithner and Fed officials did not push for unwinding of failed financial institutions such as Countrywide and Washington Mutual in 2008-2009 Chase's own portfolio of assets under the CIO, increased by an astounding amount from $76 billion in 2007 to $356 billion in 2011. Even if Ms Drew had managed CIO well before, managing a portfolio of this size is most likely to have presented a whole set of new challenges and problems for which the CIO office was not prepared. Similiar concerns were raised by other Fed officials such as Fed governors, Hoenig and Fisher, who raised the issue that such mega-banks posed unacceptable risks and were too big to manage. Pressures to increase investing profits, growing complacency, relaxing risk management controls, led to the situation where a single trader Mr. Iksil, who had only joined the bank in 2007 according to other reports, could create large losses. This follows a situation at UBSin 2011, where a novice trader made bets that resulted in large losses....

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Sheila Bair, former head of the U.S. FDIC, points out flaws in the rules for capital adequacy ratios and risk weighted assets which allow banks to increase their capital adequacy ratios. The ratios show the financial strength of the banks and their ability to absorb losses, which makes their accurate calculation very important for the safety of the U.S. banking system, especially with large "too big to fail" banks. Bair says the 2013 U.S. Fed stress tests showed Bank of America as having a capital adequacy ratio of 11.4%, when it should actually be 7.8% without the risk weighted adjustment. The mortgage banking crisis showed how the risk wieighting can be flawed and give a distorted representation of the acutal risks facing the banks in its assets. For Morgan Stanley the 2013 stress tess by the U.S. Fed showed the capital adequacy ratio at 14%, taking out the risk weighting adjustment this drops to 7%. Bair says its not the idea of risk weighting that is the problem, but the way it is applied- for example considering sovereign government bonds in the eurozone as zero risk, or that only 20% of the accounting value of debt one banks buys from another bank is to be taken into account in setting the ratio. Go back to the drawing board she says, it makes no sense that Citibank debt be shown as having one fifth risk of IBM's. ...

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The European bank stress tests could trigger the restructuring of the troubled landesbank sector in Germany say German experts. The landesbanks do about 25% of the lending in Germany and are in severe financial stress. The landesbanks suffered hundreds of billions of losses in the US subprime mortgage securities. There has been no serious reform of the landesbanks. Even though the management of one of the landesbanks Bayerische Landesbank in Munich was under criminal investigation- the management made bad decisions that led to the losses in bad investments totalling 25% of the Bavarian state's yearly budget. A similiar problem is unfolding in Spain where the Spanish government has initiated action for the troubled cajas bank sector, the regional savings banks in Spain. In Spain the government and opposition came together to reach an agreemet to consolidate the cajas from 45 to about 20 and set aside a fund of 99 billion euros for this task. In Germany the landesbanks are controlled by German states and regional savings banks, so the German government has no direct control over this failing banking sector....