LyrArc Article Gist
The Public-Private Investment Program of the U.S. Treasury Department has not had a good start. With most banks passing the U.S.government's stress tests and raising $50 billion in the markets, PPIP which was intended to to help resolve the situation of all the toxic securites siting on the bank's books, has gone the way of all the prior efforts to solve this problem. Simply postponed this time hoping that the housing market recovers. With the Rogoff-Reinhardt study showing that it takes about 6 years or longer before housing recovers from such aserious crisis as this one, it would be 2012, before one sees an improvement. See the link to the Business Week analysis that shows housing markets in the USA having some aspect of normalcy in 2012. Yet even this analysis is using an optimistic scenario, because it assumes Moodys Economy.com estimates of economic growth for GDP of 4-5% in 2011- 2012. This assumes the consumer debt that has reached over 100% of GDP will be reversed quickly in 2010, and the the factory capacity utilization currently at 68% and expected to drop further in 2009- with more automobile manufacturing capacity remaining to be scrapped -will recover quickly in 2010-2011. This is unrealistic considering the combination of factors at work. Here Devin Leonard talks to PIMCO chief Bill Gross, who with Warren Buffett and PIMCO CEO Mohammed El-Erian, are key proponents of the PPIP program. Both El-Erian and Warren Buffett say they conceived independently of such a program, in which toxic securties are taken off bank's books with government help. As PIMCO is one of the largest traders of mortgage bonds in the country and has years of successful experience in dealing with mortgage bonds, the New York Fed under Geithner turned to PIMCO for advice in 2008. By this time PIMCO was under ownership of Allianz, a German insurer, which bought PIMCO for $3.3 billion in 2000, with $233 million and a $40 million retention bonus going to Bill Gross. Bill Gross describes how the program would function. PIMCO puts up $500 million, and Treasury matches this with $500 million. Analysts estimate that this partnership would be able to attract as much as $ 4 billion in low interest financing from Treasury and the Fed. Gross says that some of these securities pay as much as 14% interest, and even with a 70% default rate, this partnership could make $250 million a year on the $5 billion partnership, or a 5% return, with PIMCO making a 25% return on its original investment. This isn't exactly pro bono work as Buffett had originally suggested to Bill Gross in the midst of the crisis. But a more fundamental concern is that no one really knows exactly how much of toxic securties the banks have on their books, even though estimates have been made. If this is closer to $1 trillion, PIMCO's expertise and efforts will simply fall short of dealing with a problem of this size, and the window dressing of a problem of this magnitude could only hurt efforts for the eventual resolution of this problem. If housing does not recover as is expected till 2012 at the earliest, and the economy continues to deteriorate in unemployment and factory utilization, then the toxic securities on the bank's balance sheets may pose a bigger problem that will require serious action....

LyrArc Article Gist
Joe Nocera of the New York Times, says that it is the Attorney Generals of the 50 states in the USA, that have taken up the rights of homeowners, not the federal authorites. He points out that the Obama administration, the Treasury department and the federal agencies, have failed miserably in getting the banks and servicers to take loan modification seriously. It was the attorney generals of the states that were with homeowners from the beginning, to prevent predatory lending and outright fraud. Until they were stopped by federal bank regulators, who sided with the banks in court. The subprime lending crisis might never have ocurred, says Nocera, had the states not been obstructed in this way. As the subprime lending mounted, the state AG's were talking to people in their communities, and knew the reality on the ground. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Office of Thrift Supervision, two primary regulators of the banking industry, saw their role as protecting banks from consumers rather than protecting consumers. Professor Prentiss Cox, of the University of Minnesota Law School, who was an assistant attorney general in Minnesota in charge of consumer enforcement, says federal regulators should have been listening to us, instead of trying to shut us down....