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Former U.S. Federal Reserve chairpersons Volcker, Greenspan, Bernanke and Yellen, are together at the International House, on the campus of Columbia University, in April 2016, in a forum hosted by journalist Fareed Zakaria. The discussion covers topics related to the financial crisis of 2008 and its aftermath, with quantitative easing, Fed communication as policy tool, and the gradual increase in interest rates.

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The $25 billion mortgage settlement of Feb. 2012, between large U.S. banks and state attorneys general. $17 billion will go to homeowners. Experts say this is good for the banks because it reduces legal uncertainty, and for state attoneys general- it will not be enough to significantly impact the difficult situation in the U.S. housing market.

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John Taylor on the dangers of a loose U.S. monetary policy and the effects this had in fueling a housing bubble in Spain, Ireland and other EU countries. Taylor points to the bubble ocurring in emerging market economies from low interest rates. Taylor says the ECB's interest rate moves in 2003-2005 were affected by the Fed's low interest rates. He estimates the ECB set rates about two percentage points too low leading to housing bubbles in EU countries. A similiar process is taking place today with the Fed's near zero interest rate policy. Taylor points to interest rates in a group of 18 emerging market economies- including Brazil, China, India, Mexico and Turkey, which have held interest rates on average about 5 percentage points below widely used benchmarks fueling a doubling of global commodity prices between 2009-2011. The U.S. Fed's policies make it harder for central banks in emerging market economies to take aggresssive action against bubbles developing in these countries. Taylor says his does not mean that the Fed should not pay attention to the U.S. unemployment rate and long term unemployed, but should keep in mind the negative effects of slowing demand in emerging market economies and in the EU as a result of its monetary policy of keeping rates at near zero for long periods of time. This feeds back to the U.S. economy at a critical time....

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This New York Times editorial says the U.S. Obama administration and its Housing Secretary Donovan should stop pretending that its settlement is the best way to help homeowners under water. The editorial asks the serious question- how far would the $20 billion settlement the banks would provide under the deal help, when 14.6 million homeowners owe $753 billion more on their mortgages than the value of their homes? The Obama administration is pressuring New York Attorney General, Eric Schneiderman, to accept the settlement with the largest U.S. banks for questionable foreclosure practices, including robo-signing. It asks Schneiderman to resist these pressures and not support the settlement. Schneiderman has resisted this pressure because he and other prosecutors would be restricted from pursuing their investigations into wrongdoings in housing mortgages. The proposal from the Times to the Obama administration is to make principal reductions for underwater homeowners who are currrent in their payments through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The proposal to help homeowners uner water on their mortgages was first proposed by Martin Feldstein during the mortgage financial crisis in 2008-2009 with repeated op-eds in leading newspapers including the Wall Street Journal. Paul Krugman called attention to the failure of the Obama administration on this issue in recent op-eds. Peter Coy of Business Week pointed to some form of loan forgiveness as an essential part of restoring the economic health of the U.S. and Europe in the August issue of Bloomberg Business Week. Higher unemployment has made the foreclosure crisis worse, and has created a strong headwind for the U.S. economy by erasing chances of an early recovery in American housing markets. The Obama administration's Home Affordable Modification Program has been a dismal failure in helping homeowners facing foreclosure and was a huge missed opportunity to take the correct action early....

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Transcripts released for the U.S. Federal Reserve's Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) 2006 meetings show Fed chairman Bernanke and then New York Fed president Geithner ignored the risks of a hard landing from the mortgage and housing bubble. Geithner even went so far as to say about retiring chairman Greenspan, who also ignored the risks from the bubble and set the tone during his long period as chairman at the Fed: "I'd like the record to show that I think you're pretty terrific, too...And thinking about the probabilities, I think the risk that we decide in the future that you're even better than we think is higher than the alternative." In evaluating the risks facing the U.S. economy in December 2006, at the height of the bubble, Geithner stated: "The current weakness in the economy still seems principally to stem from the direct effects of the slowdown in housing on construction activity... The softer than expected recent numbers don't argue in our view, for a substantial reassessment of the risks in the outlook." The Fed chairman, Ben Bernanke, said at the first meeting in March 2006: " Strong fundamentals support a relatively soft landing in housing... I think we are unlikely to see growth being derailed by the housing market." When a Fed economist gave a presentation in March 2006 on the risks in Iceland, Bernanke said- "We'd like a full report on the Icelandic," at which point the rest of the group erupted with laughter. Iceland defaulted on its debts in 2008. Warnings about housing by Fed Governor Susan Bies were ignored by Bernanke and Geithner. Two highly leveraged Wall Street investment banks collapsed in 2008- Bear Stearns in March and Lehman in September- from the impact of the bursting of the bubble in housing and mortgages. When they collapsed these banks were leveraged at about 30 to 1, as most of the warning signs had been ignored by regulators including the Federal Reserve....

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There is strong cirticism from many quarters about low interest rates as a prime culprit in causing the bubble in housing prices. In comments before the American Economic Association, America's Fed Chairman Bernanke defended his role as Fed governor in 2003 when he along with Greenspan was an advocate of the decision to cut the Fed's target interest rate to 1%, and to leave it here for a year and raise it only slowly. Bernanke says countries like Britain, New Zealand, and Sweden had tighter monetary policy but there home prices rose more, and monetary policy explains only 5% of the variation in home prices. Analysis has shown he says that capital inflows such as those the U.S. received from China and other Asian countries explains 31% of the variation in home prices, supporting a contrasting theory that that its these global imbalances that drove the crisis. He also placed the primary fault for the housing bubble on relaxed lending standards and views that housing prices would rise forever. Alongside these comments Fed chairman Bernanke also said that bank supervisors and other financial regulators of which the Fed was one, has a better ability to contain the excesses that led to the economic crisis including housing bubble and other excesses, than the Fed as a monetary policy maker. By saying this Bernanke is acknowledging that the failure of regulation was a key part of what happened in the economic crisis. The failure to fix the regulatory system even now leads Bernanke to say that he is open to using monetary policy as a supplementary tool for addressing risks should another bubble develop, if the regulatory system isn't reformed. Still Bernanke and Greenspan were quite complacent at the time of the low interest rates and did not point out the dangers of global capital imbalances which were evident at the time, preferring to say that the United States could benefit from the inflows of capital from overseas without serious risks. And the Fed did not exercize its role of vigilance in alerting the country to excesses in the way the housing industry operated and in exercizing its own powers to that effect. Instead the Fed as regulator and in role as asafeguard for serious risks let itself become part of the cheering section as the worst excesses in housing were being exposed....

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Ruth Marcus looks at the assumptions behind Romney's tax plan and questions whether simplifying the tax system with lower rates would help create the climate for higher economic growth and lower unemployment. Much of the differences between Republicans and Democrats revolve around this assumption, a core belief on one side and skepticism on the other. An effort to obtain a bipartisan assessment was made with the Simpson-Bowles commission recommendations, which advised closing loopholes and reducing deductions. The work done by Martin Feldstein on the Romney Tax plan builds on this approach of limiting deductions, and reducing taxes across the board. An issue for Democrats is inequality. Lower wages to improve competitiveness in manufacturing industry is a trend in Republican and Democratic administrations, because of the effort to improve U.S. competitiveness against other trading nations and has played a large part in lowering incomes in manufacturing oriented midwest and eastern states. The other cause of increasing inequality is the housing crisis and the effects on the economy through foreclosures and unemployment. The housing crisis developed under a Republican administration, and the lack of effective measures to prevent foreclosures under the last 4 years of a Democratic administration worsened the economic condition of the middle class, and especially so for minorities. During the housing and foreclosure crisis the proposals put forward by Republicans Martin Feldstein, a Harvard economist, and Sheila Bair, head of the FDIC who calls herself a "populist from Kansas," for bold government help to homeowners under water would have helped the middle class financially, and especially minorities, far more than the efforts of the Democratic Obama administration, and under Feldstein's plan even turned aound the housing market and boosted a recovery. Trends in world trade and industry have large effects outside what administrations of either party can control, and a lot depends on the temperament, wisdom and leadership provided....

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WSJ reporters Corkery and Yoon give a remarkable account of the individual homeowners and investors inside one toxic subprime mortgage security from Countrywide Financial Corp. named CWABS- 2006-2007. There is Amanda Gavini of Fort Myers who continued making mortgage payments against the odds after a illness and death in the family. And a couple Donald Mudd- Patricia Starr who were approved by Countrywide for a $171,000 adjustable rate mortgage loan at 8% with a $10,000 down payment for a home in Port Charlotte, Florida. The approval came only 3 months after the couple emerged from personal bankruptcy in 2006, and by 2009 Mudd was missing payments. Other borrowers such as Mrs. Gavini in Florida took out two loans at 7% and 11% in 2006, have continued making payments and are still unable to refinance under the HAMP or HARP government programs. It is because of these homeowners who continue to make payments helping the security price recover, that one of PIMCO's funds which owns a stake in this security has made good returns. Hedge fund Marathon Asset has also made good returns on this security because of the U.S. government's Public Private Investment Program to help banks recover by providing government incentives for purchase of these securities from banks. This was a way to get banks holding these subprime securities to resume normal lending in financial markets....

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About 680,000 homeowners applied for the Home Affordability Modification Program, or HAMP, and had their loans modified so that their mortgage payments are reduced. This is only one in four of the 2.7 millon homeowners who tried to to join the program. This according to a Wall Street Journal analysis of data released by the Treasury Department. In 2009 the Obama administration launched the program to reverse the rising home foreclosures in the U.S., by reducing the monthly mortgage payments through lower interest rates and extending the term of loans. About $75 billion was estimated as the cost of the program at the time. Only $1 billion of this has been spent by the Obama administration. The program offered payments to 100 mortgage servicers as inducement to complete loan modifications. About half the applicants or 1.3 million were declared ineligible from the beginning, and the program used stricter qualification criteria than loan modification programs offered by individual banks. Applicants were rejected because the necessary paperwork was not submitted or it was lost by the mortgage company- 266,000 falling in this category. An additional 770,000 homeowners who started the program were later disqualified mostly for the paperwork and eligibility problems, with only a small number rejected for failing to make trial payments. Mortgages less than 31% of pretax income were considered affordable and considered ineligible-255,000 were in this category. Over 80% of homeowners in the southern states of Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas, Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, and Tennessee, received no loan modification....

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As the graph vivdly shows in 2005 and 2006 there is surge in subprime lending to Hispanics and blacks, with almost as many subprime loans to Hispanics and Black people as to whites. It slows down in 2007 by which time foreclosures were starting to take shape. WaMu, Countrywide, Ameriquest and other lenders who pushed subprime lending were backers of an initiative called Hogar which worked to spread lending to redline areas, in what an organization for responsible housing lending calls reverse redlining- in which high cost loans were pushed on those least able to sustain payments for a long time. Previously these areas did not get much lending because of the lack of good credit history.

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Professors Cole and Ohanian of the University of Pennsylvania and UCLA, provide a new interpretation of FDR's economic policies during the period 1932-1934 and the period 1937-1941, based on their research. This suggests conclusions different from that of Obama advisor, Christina Romer, and Fed chairman, Bernanke about that period. Changes in economic policies under the Roosevelt administration that helped bring wages in line with productivity, reduced strikes, and gradual elimination of the undistributed profits tax, improved incentives for business investment during 1938-1939. Cole and Ohanian, say that by 1941, before the U.S. entered the war, close to half of the increase in nonmilitary hours worked in the U.S. between 1939 and the peak of the war, had already been achieved. And this was primarily the result of the changes in FDR's policies in 1938. They say a similiar opportunity is presented by the proposals of the Bowles-Simpson commission on deficit reduction, by lowering the corporate income tax through simplification of the tax code and reducing or eliminating most tax expenditures. Improving the incentives for business to hire and invest through this and other steps is likely to do more for the economy than the steps tried so far since 2009....

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The median net worth of Hispanic and Black families has been severely affected by the recession. Because minorities hold a much larger part of their assets in household equity the foreclosure crisis and the recession have had a devastaing impact on both minority groups. The median net worth of Hispanic families dropped by two thirds and black families by half after the 2008 recession from the 2005 figures, and was around $6000 for 2009 for both groups, according to data from the Pew Research Center. The Pew report shows median net worth of a white family is 20 times that of a black family, and 18 times that of a Hispanic family, with the gap between these minorities and whites twice as large in 2009 compared to the period before the recession in 2005. This was even true for Asian American families, whose median net worth dropped by half from 2005 to 2009, to $78,000. The figure for whites dropped much less from $135,000 to $113,000 during the same period. Another significant finding is that within each group the share of the wealthiest 10% of the people increased between 2005 and 2009, for all households this went up from 49% to 56%, for Hispanics from 56% to 72%, for Blacks from 59% to 67%....

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The Home Affordable Refinance Program's (HARP) gradual success in 2012-2013 in reducing foreclosures, after struggling in 2010-2011. From about cumulative 1 million who refinanced loans under HARP for relief in home payments the numbers went up to close to 3 million by the end of 2013, according to the Federal Housing Finance Agency. Of this a major proportion were people who owed less than 105% of their home's value. The performance of the program improved with a revamp of HARP at the end of 2011.

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Applebaum describes how Obama as president took action on the stimulus after the 2008 financial crisis, but did not take the necessary action to stem foreclosures and aid a recovery in housing. This now appears to be one of the critical failures of his presidency.

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Edward DeMarco is head of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), which is the independent regulatory agency overseeing U.S. housing lenders Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The FHFA was formed in 2008 after merging two existing agencies. Later that year Fannie and Freddie were taken over by the government. FHFA head, DeMarco, is reluctant to help homeowners with underwater mortgages on their homes with reduced payments because this would mean losses to the taxpayer. He sees his mandate as protecting the taxpayer. Sheila Bair, former head of the FDIC, says she understands DeMarco's mandate is not to provide fiscal stimulus, and the Obama administration has been all over the place when it comes to providing homeowner assistance. The result is that there is little help by the U.S. government to homeowners with underwater mortgages since 2008, and this creates larger headwinds for the Federal Reserve Bank to provide momentum to the U.S. economy. Many experts see this as a serious problem and a well respected economist, Martin Feldstein, has made repeated proposals for structuring the help to homeowners since 2008. ...

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The truth is very different from the rhetoric coming from the Obama administration about helping Main Street America and ordinary workers against "fat-cat bankers," says Goldfarb. Under the Obama administration banks have grown larger and gained more influence over administration decisions. No conditions were made part of the agreement that would require banks to lend a portion of the money handed out to the banks to ordinary borrowers. And not much of significance was done to help homeowners under water, which would enable a faster recovery. In this respect the policies slanted in favor of banks of the Obama administration worsened the prospects of an economic recovery. Experts from Reagan advisor Martin Feldstein- who as early as 2008 advocated serious help to homeowners under water to reduce principal and interest- to the FDIC's Sheila Bair and Princeton Prof. Krugman, across the ideological spectrum, perceived this being in the national interest. Feldstein's first op-ed on his plan appeared in the Wall Street Journal on 3/7/2008, followed by ones on 4/15/2008, 10/4/2008, 1/20/2010/ 10/12/2011 in WSJ, and a oped on 10/30/2008 in the Washington Post, repeating the call for siginificant debt reduction to homeowners. Banks had extraordinary influence on successive administrations in the U.S., both Republican and Democratic- the Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations- so that policy actions could be distorted from what would otherwise take place. A study by two University of Michigan professors shows that banks did not increase lending after receiving government money. Instead taxpayer money was used to invest in risky securities for profits from short term price movements, resulting in gains of about 10% in investment returns. Ran Duchin, one of the two professors, says helping ordinary borrowers was not the most profitable use of capital for banks. Without the necessary conditions from the Obama administration, the banks depolyed capital in ways that did not help the economy. Similiarly when banks needed to be restructured no preparatory action was taken because of resistance within the administration- a request by President Obama to Treasury Secretary Geithner for preparing a plan for the restructuring of Citigroup was ignored, according to a report by Goldfarb and Wallsten on 9/17/2011 in the Washington Post....

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The home ownership rate for the U.S. in March 2012, is 65.4%, the same rate as in 1997 before the housing bubble, according to the U.S. Census Bureau. The irony of this is that the housing bubble was inflated by politicians in Congress and mortgage lenders and purchasers of mortgage securities. Fannie Mae and Countryside worked together ostensibly to promote home ownership while pursuing profits. In the case of politicians they pursued goals of raising employment and growth without understanding the risks of artificially inflating home ownership, and without consideration for incomes of subprime borrowers. A less benign view of the interests and goals of politicians comes from reflections on the impact of political lobbying by Fannie Mae and other housing lenders in the U.S. Congress. The consequences in terms of foreclosures have been devastating for minorities as well as other middle class homeowners. It has also damaged the U.S. banking system, credit growth in the economy and prospects for recovery, which will take years to correct. The federal government is also saddled with large losses at Fannie Mae because of its quasi government agency role. That role led to inflation of the bubble. Most of the consequences will be borne by middle and lower income households in the U.S. The pass-through effects in a global economy affect Europe, and emerging market countries. ...