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Irwin says about the revised Basel III rules in Jan. 2013- one hopes that Mervyn King of the Bank of England and Basel regulators are doing the right thing, striking the right balance between pushing for higher capital requirements and adjusting this to take into account the stalling economies of Europe and the U.S. Banks were given till 2019 to meet capital requirements. More assets are now eligible to meet capital requirements (including lower rated corporate bonds) under revised Basel III rules. The large legal settlements and speculative losses of large banks in Europe and the U.S. in 2012 put more pressure on banks with the risk of reduced lending.

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Sheila Bair, former head of the FDIC, says householders, business leaders, politicians and government leaders are all prone to looking at the short term, and refuse to make the short term sacrifices necessary to put the economy on a trajectory of long term growth. There is also a sense of short sightedness and resistance to any regulatory steps that would actually create a better framework for the financial industry for longer term growth. The financial industry opposes increases in capital requirements for reserves that would lead to a healthier balance sheet for the industry, and opposes any efforts to create amore stable financial system for the country that might sacrifice short term profits. She points to IBG-YBG sense that prevailed in the industry, I be gone- you be gone, leading to the mortgage crisis. The industry tolerated faulty ratings, faulty packaging of securities, and showed complete lack of attention to the long term consequences of such behaviour and excessive leveraging, as long as the short term profits could be made. To a large degree the situation remains the same today, says Bair. Bair and Feldstein were among the first to suggest the Obama administration tackle the huge number of bad mortgages, that were leading to a wave of foreclosures. Only if this problem was tackled head on could this be put behind and the economy be put on a path to steady growth. As it stands today the Obama administration has not tackled the problem, the financial industry still has bad mortgage debt on its books, foreclosures continue, housing prices face further declines, and this will hold back an economic recovery. She refers to the "rationalization" of the last crisis by leaders in the financial industry through the assertion that nobody saw the crisis coming, when she says some of us did see it coming, and a "rationalization" by the same leaders in saying they did nothing wrong. Bair says that the continuation of business practices that led to the financial crisis of 2008 create risks for a new crisis. And some people in government continue to support these same practices while claiming popular support. The President's focus every two years is on getting re-elected and raising funds for re-election, business is focussed on the short term, and this creates a pervasive sense of the short-term throughout out the system and society. ...

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Did U.S. Treaury Secretary, Timothy Geithner, ignore a key request by President Obama to present plans for the restructuring of Citigroup after the government bailout of Citigroup? Ron Suskind says this is what happened in his book on the Obama administration and how the White House operated to make key decisions. Ron Suskind, intervewed key members of the Obama White House economic policy team, Lawrence Summers, Christina Romer, Peter Orszag. In all Suskind conducted 700 hours of interviews for his new book in Sept 2011: "Confidence Men: Wall Street, Washington and the Education of a President." According to the book, in early 2009 after Obama authorized a series of stress tests for banks he told Geithner to develop a plan for restructuring Citigroup. A month later at a meeting not attended by Geithner Obama raised a question about the status of the plan. He was told by Romer that no restructuring plan had been developed for Citi. Suskind says Geithner disagreed about a plan to restructure Citi and decided to ignore the request. Geithner and the Treasury Department say Obama asked Geithner to develop a backup plan to overhaul banks if the government was forced to keep a big ownership stake in the companies, and "there was fortunately never a need to put them in place." Geithner told Suskind that he doesn't slow-walk the President on any matter. Other aspects of the operation of the economic policy team that Suskind covers are a series of memos from top aide Pete Rouse raising questions that ongoing communication between some members of the economic team and Summers was giving Summers power to shape policy. Summers, Director of the National Economic Council, is shown as trying to keep out the views of Romer and budget director Orszag from reaching the President without going through him. When Orszag gives a private report to the president on the deficit, Summers objects saying that this was immoral. Obama lacked the fresh ideas needed to tackle the problems created by the mortgage and banking crisis of 2008, when he used the Clinton administration economic policy team of the 1990's- Rubin, Bernanke, Summers and Geithner. Fresh approaches were needed two decades after Clinton's election in 1992, and the Bush administration that followed, as many of the problems developed during this period. The similiar embedded thinking was shared during the Clinton and Bush administrations and the economic advisors about dealings with the banking sector, but the situation for deficits, unemployment, housing, and the economy had completely changed requiring fresh approaches. ...

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JP Morgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon's confidence in Ina Drew was based on her hands on abilities, especially demonstrated during the 2008 financial crisis. Current and former bankers in this account by the Times Silver-Greenberg and Schwartz, say things changed in the years that followed. In 2010 Ina Drew was ill with Lyme's disease. The conflicts between the risk taking propensities of traders at the London trading desk under Mr. Macris, and the more risk conscious New York trading desk under Ms. Duersten, had already led to shouting matches under Ina Drew. After her illness and her absence from the office for long periods this spilled out into the open. In early 2011 Ms. Duersten left Chase after 16 years. Her replacement who would be new to Chase could not restrain the risk taking propensities of Mr. Macris and the London trading desk, the way Duersten and Ina Drew had done earlier. Macris and a trader reporting to him, Mr Iksil (referred to as the "London Whale" for his massive trading positions and bets), were free to operate without any restraint in this environment. Ina Drew returned in 2011, but she was not the same hands on person after the illness. She moved to the corporate offices on the 48th floor, instead of being on the floor above the New York trading desk. In 2008 she had held daily meetings with traders required to defend their trading positions. This did not happen in 2011. Jamie Dimon learned about the London Whale in the Wall Street Journal, April 6, 2012. Dimon's efforts in pushing back against stricter regulation, stress tests, and other issues were to lead to the CEO of the 2008 crisis becoming a much more distracted person in 2011. He was taken unawares by the breakdown in the relationship between the London and New York offices of the Chief Investment Office, the changed situation of Ms. Drew, and that risk management controls at the bank were not in place. Risk management overly depended on one person and the trust of the CEO in that person, and was not institutionalized. At the same time it should be noted that Jamie Dimon became CEO of Chase after the acquisition of Bank One in 2005, and Ina Drew was hired in that year, only three years before the crisis of 2008. The merger of other banks into JP Morgan Chase created a bank with $360 billion investment portfolio- even Ina Drew had never previously handled a portfolio of this size and the complex risks brought in with the Washington Mutual portfolio....

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Mistakes French bank Societe Generale made with acquiring a controlling stake in Greek bank Geniki. Credit Agricole bank had a similiar experience with its stake in Greek bank Emporiki. In 2010 Societe Generale was forced to set aside 400 million euros for bad loans. Credit Agricole had to remove the CEO and higher executives in 2009 before introducing good loan criteria at Emporiki. Today Emporiki has loan loss provisions of 12.5% of gross loans, and Geniki has 21%, according to analysts. Dirk Hoffmann-Becking, analyst at Bernstein Research, estimates that a default that took out 30% from the value of these Greek banks loan book and 70% from Greek government bonds would result in a loss of 3 quarters of earnings for Credit Agricole and for Societe Generale 1.5 quarters of earnings. This would mean that the French banks would take 3 quarters longer to get their capital reserve ratios to 9% for new Basel III regulations.

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The basic architecture to support the euro currency is being proposed in a seven page report prepared by presidents of the EU Council, the ECB, the EC and the Eurogroup. This includes deposit insurance to protect against a run on banks, a European bank supervisor with possibly the ECB in that role, and the European Financial Stability Facility, the eurozone rescue fund, acting as a backup if deposit and resolution funds need support. Currently the European Banking Authority setup after the 2008 crisis works with central banks of the individual countries to regulate the banks. In contrast to sanctions imposed for overspending under prior EU agreements the report says new powers would be transferred to a European Authority on the fiscal side so that overspending can be controlled at the European level and budget deficits are set at the European level.

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Selling of sovereign bonds by European banks to meet new requirements for adequate capital reserves by the European Banking Authority is having a Catch 22 effect, as this raises the yields at auctions of sovereign bonds of Italy, Spain and other countries.

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The New York Times reports from the comments of current and former members of the Chase Chief Investment Office (CIO), that risk officers at Chase were ignored when they raised issues about the complex trades made by trader Iksil. Iksil's trades had the support of his manager Mr. Macris, and Ms. Drew who was in charge of CIO. The comments also indicate that at one point Mr. Macris brought in a Risk Officer with whom he had worked closely for many years. Risk Officers are supposed to be independent and their concerns seriously heard, with the authority to halt trades that pose excessive risks. Which made this kind of cozy behaviour in the CIO trading offices in London cause for alarm. These reports also say Mr. Braunstein, the new CFO at JP Morgan Chase, did not strengthen controls after he assumed office in 2010. Bank officials disputed this. The New York offices did not fully grasp the complex trades being made in the CIO London offices, and upper management let the CIO operate pretty much on its own, especially with CEO Jamie Dimon's confidence in Ms. Drew's management of the CIO. This led to another gap in the process of risk management. Dimon had other priorities and distractions, from problem mortgages coming with the acquisition of Washington Mutual, pushing back aginst financial regulation after the 2008 crisis, stress tests and others. At the same time the U.S. Federal Reserve, regulators, and Treasury's coordinated effort to merge failing banks with other larger banks- because of the lack of the process of unwinding failed banks provided later under Dodd-Frank legislation- created mega financial banks. Unlike what the U.S. under Treasury Secretary Rubin pushed for in the case of S. Korea during a banking crisis in 1997, Treasury under Geithner and Fed officials did not push for unwinding of failed financial institutions such as Countrywide and Washington Mutual in 2008-2009 Chase's own portfolio of assets under the CIO, increased by an astounding amount from $76 billion in 2007 to $356 billion in 2011. Even if Ms Drew had managed CIO well before, managing a portfolio of this size is most likely to have presented a whole set of new challenges and problems for which the CIO office was not prepared. Similiar concerns were raised by other Fed officials such as Fed governors, Hoenig and Fisher, who raised the issue that such mega-banks posed unacceptable risks and were too big to manage. Pressures to increase investing profits, growing complacency, relaxing risk management controls, led to the situation where a single trader Mr. Iksil, who had only joined the bank in 2007 according to other reports, could create large losses. This follows a situation at UBSin 2011, where a novice trader made bets that resulted in large losses....