LyrArc Article Gist
During the election campaign Obama talked about sending at least 2 more combat brigades to Afghanistan. The Defense Department is already planning to send 20,000 additional troops in response to a request of General David McKiernan, top commander in Afghanistan,including 4 combat brigades and an aviation brigade with helicopters, increasing the American troop levels to 58,000, with an additional 30,000 NATO troops already there from other countries. The timeline for this is 12-18 months but with the escalating insurgent attacks in Afghanistan this will probably be done more quickly. Obama and some Democrats talked about Afghanistan as somehow being the good war and he vowed to defeat the Taliban and militants in Afghanistan. But Afghanistan is a different place and most military experts are suggesting that a good strategy will be needed, for example winning over the tribals and some of the militants, and not trying to win militarily. However with the deteriorating situation there the only way to win over tribals and militants may be to get the situation to where the NATO and US forces are in a strong situation. The two big handicaps in this are first history, where the terrain and rural distribution of the people make it difficult to exercize any control over the vast region of mountains and deserts. So throughout history no one has controlled this region and there is no history of centralized government, with different tribes controlling their regions. The other is the problem created by the corruption and lack of any popular support for the Karzai government, which is made worse by the involvement of its officials in the opium trade with opium growing booming in the southern part of Afghanistan. How does the US and NATO create an effective Afghan army and police under a state that does not enjoy any popular support. And yet the strategy that Gates. Petraeus and McKiernan are pursuing involves preparing the Afghan army and police for the task of controlling the vast mountainous region against a rural insurgency that knows its way in the mountains enjoys rural support because of the independent spirit of the Afghan people who find it easy to see the NATO forces as white foreigners in their country. The Afghan army is small for such a vast mountainous region, only 70,000 in a nation of 32 million people, and the police forces of 80,000 mostly corrupt and ineffectual. The present plan is to build the Afgan army to 134,000 still small for such a large region. The other problems stem from the Pushtun population in Pakistan that supports the rural insurgency in Afghanistan and the support of tribal people in the border areas of Pakistan. The picture tells the story, a small number of NATO soldiers in a remote ridge in Afghanistan. And the problems actually are across the whole of the far northern region of what was once British India, of Afghanistan and Pakistan, as the Pakistan government is quite fragile, having an army that operates as a power center of its own with little accountability to the central government. And years of war during the previous military government of Pakistan under Zia Ul Haq, in which Zia with the support of the Reagan administration supported another rural insurgency in Afghanistan that drove the soviets out of Afghanistan, and the subsequent sponsorship of the Taliban movement by the Pakistan military in Afghanistan, has created a situation in Pakistan where militants now operate freely and with impunity in Pakistan itself, disregarding both the Pakistan military and the Pakistan elected government's power structures....