LyrArc Article Gist
The Bush administration's and Paulson's thinking that letting the government buy parts of the banking system was unthinkable, as recently as late September, may have led to squandering of valuable time. Now Paulson is following Gordon Brown's lead in planning an injection of capital in banks in return for equity stakes, using much of the $700 billion Congress has authorized, and Paulson says the package that passed Congress gives Treasury all the authority it needs to do so. The failure to be open to this thinking earlier may have cost valuable time in addressing this crisis. And now there are second thoughts on whether it was wise to let Lehman fall into bankruptcy, because the Administration had not correctly anticipated or calculated the true cost of the Lehmann bankruptcy in terms of the way it created a crisis in the rest of the financial system. Paulson has still not taken Gordon Brown's lead in guaranteeing lending between the banks which the British are doing as part of their plan. Is the administration too slow in its response and a bit wrongheaded or stubborn headed as each step of the crisis has moved faster than its ability to respond, and its response being one step behind. Frederic Mishkin of Columbia University a former Fed Governor says, "if you delay and create uncertainty, the amount of money you have to put up goes up." It appears from Paulson's remarks over time first turning down proposals for capital injection into banks for equity stakes, and now in making that route central to his plan, that Paulson and Bernanke simply did not anticipate the shutting down of credit markets and the collapse of stock market prices that occurred, and they had no backup plan prepared for a situation such as this. And on top of this the backup plan they went out to sell to Congress turned out to be short on details and in this sense naive for the amount requested. And then by refusing to consider alternatives such as capital injection for equity stakes, it was wrong headed, if not closed minded. William Poole who retired in August as President of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, says that " I am not aware that Treasury presented any evidence on auctions that have been successful when they are used for assets that are so heterogenous", referring to the reverse auctions that would take weeks to set up and would be terribly complicated to buy up troubled assets, as part of the plan presented to Congress in but 3 pages. Now the plan appears to be to let Fannie and Freddie, which were given $100 billion by the Treasury as authorized by Congress, to move ahead with the purchase of troubled mortgage securities, something for which Fannie and Freddie have the capabilities. In the end the crisis in confidence and near panic generated in the markets and the climate of fear may go way beyond the actual losses incurred from debt securities, and some of this may be the result of a clumsy and poorly thought out approach by Bernanke and Paulson. The cost of fixing the problem will be higher and the recession more prolonged because of this. It is a situation of capable people blinded by ideological reasons to see what is happening and in Bernanke's case not making enough of a case to Treasury about his reservations and his own thinking that capital injection was the right approach, as people familiar with the early planning say Bernanke argued that it would be easier and more efficient to inject capital directly into banks.