LyrArc Article Gist
The Japanese yen surged in value following the 2008 financial crisis as it was seen as a safe haven. As a result the Korean won declined by 42% against the Japanese yen. This continued till 2012. Japanese companies had to compete overseas at 80 yen to the dollar and shifted operations overseas. Now with the policy of monetary expansion of the Japanese central bank the situation is reversed in December 2014. The Korean won is up 40% against the Japanese yen since 2012. The Japanese yen is now down to 118 to the dollar in Dec. 2014. Abenomics gets a new mandate with the snap election in Dec. 2014. Aaron Back says Samsung may have gained ground in televisions and smartphones but other areas in electronics such as chips, displays and image sensors remain competitive and responsive to price. In autos Hyundai market share has declined to 4.4% by Dec. 2014 from 5.1% in 2011, according to MotorIntelligence.com. So far Japanese companies have used the currency advantage to improve profits and come up with better products. By using profits to invest in new technology and productivity Japanese companies can provide more features at the same price points to gain market share without having to cut price. After years of declining margins in electronics, autos and other markets this appears to be the current strategy. Another reason for this is that Japanese companies have already shifted production overseas, the shift being higher for Honda than for Toyota. Technological improvements from investments in R&D in Japan can be transferred to manufacturing operations overseas just as Apple is doing with smartphones manufacturing in China. The currency shift also improves Japan's position relative to American and European competitors in international markets....

LyrArc Article Gist
Andy Grove of Intel teaches a class at Stanford- he taught aclass earlier this year- and talks about his experiences. Some see Grove's disciplined management style as areflection of his experience escaping the Nazis from Czechoslovakia. Dr Grove says it comes from his experience at the CIty COllege of New York He recounts this in one of his books, where aparticular Professor helped mentor him but who was in the beginning very tough on the young Grove. Grove says that what impressed him most in those early years at City College was the way hard work and talent were rewarded and where students challenged their Professors without any attention to rank. Interestingly this is still true at many universities, and meritocracy prevails there. The opposite is true when one thinks of this at many corporations which gradually fall into astultifying mode where senior managers are not challenged and politics prevails. GM is a good example. Grove says he experienced this at Fairchild -where he worked with computer chip pioneers Moore and Noyce -with its elitist, back-stabbing and lax corporate culture. Senior executives at Fairchild walked in whenever they felt like, and younger employees were penalized or fired for similiar behaviour. When he took charge at Intel Grove imposed a strict arrival time of 8 am with latecomers forced to sign asheet. He also did not go along with trends like flexi-time and teleworking. He became known as ablunt and demanding manager, but afairminded boss who rewarded good ideas whatever the source. Asked about the strict arrival time Grove says that people don't understand that he was never that disciplined himself and he was not even amorning person. His view is that he wanted to avoid what he saw as aoutrageous double standard at Fairchild. With a better culture he was able to attract the best talent to Intel, and he used the strong discipline to improve the lousy manufacturing at Intel. Three decisions shaped Intel. The first, is the recognition of the strategic inflection point when current strategy is no longer viable, because unanticipated external forces make an existing business strategy obsolete. This happened when Intel got clobbered by the Japanese in the memory chip field it had dominated. And at such moments there are internal forces and inhibitions to overcome that make starting over or doing something totally different extremely difficult. For Intel this was the habit forming tendencies from having done one thing so well- the companies roots and the founders and engineering staff's knowledge and preferences lay in memory chips- such that that it became an emotionally stormy thing to break from this past. Grove made a complete U turn to go in another direction which he describes so well in his book -Only the Paranoid Survive. Timing is critical, and instinct and judgement is all that you have got to rely on. Its like a group of hikers in the woods and after suspecting that they are on the wrong track one of them says, "Hey guys I think were lost." Grove even describes the scene with acomparison to a scene in the World War II movie Twelve O'Clock High, where a new commander is called in to straighten out an unruly and undisciplined squadron of fliers in sel-destruct mode. The commander on his way to take charge, stops his car, steps out smokes acigarette while gazing into the distance. Then he he throws the cigarette down, grinds it with his heel and tell his driver "Okay Sergeant, lets go." Grove says he related to this scene in this decision at Intel, with every fiber of his being experienced this crisis personally, and learned what it takes to claw your way through a strategic inflection point, inch by excruciating inch. He says it takes objectivity, the willingness to act on your convictions, and the passion mobilize people into supporting those convictions. The second and third decisions was less gruelling but also courageous. The Intel Inside advertising campaign meant building abrand with customers even though Intel had never done this before. The decision to not have secondary suppliers and press the issue of manufacturing quality within Intel till Intel got it right also had never been done before. Andy Grove's strategic inflection point is what GM missed and set the process in motion towards bankruptcy. See the links in Intelilinks. The management style is also relevant to that discussion. Grove also provides insights in the Cross-Industry Insight Mechanism. He sees strategic inflectionpoints in autos and health care industries. He says the auto industry is going to be increasingly divorced from oil and the next big company will come in the auto battery technology field. He also believes health care and the pharmaceutical industry can learn from chipmaking. The clinical trials in pharmaceuticals take way too long, are slow-moving and bureaucratic. The pharmaceutical firms can learn from the fast "knowledge turns" in chipmaking, so that cycles of learning are accelerated....