LyrArc Article Gist
This France24 report looks at the question of whether the policies of four term German chancellor Angela Merkel emboldened Russia under president Putin to launch the invasion of Ukraine. FR24's interview with the vice president of the German Marshall Fund and head of its Berlin office, Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff, shows there are many reasons why Merkel's policies were serious errors that ignored caution from past experience and from other western leaders in the US and Eastern Europe. Kleine-Brockhoff says that "Europe did not go wrong, Germany and France did. France and Germany tend to speak for the rest of Europe. Bit these mis-assessments were made in Paris and Berlin, not elsewhere. Eastern Europe didn't go wrong. Northern Europe did'nt go wrong."  Kleine-Brockhoff says the war in Ukraine calls for an urgent re-assessment of the German and French policy towards Russia. "Not only is the post Cold-War order crumbling before our eyes, so are the strategies employed by Germany and France." Under particular scrutiny comes Merkel's policy, and policy supported by Steinmeier of the SPD, that took German dependence on Russian energy supplies from 36% during the annexation of Crimea to 55% in March 2022 with the invasion of Ukraine. Germany's conservative Die Welt has this to say- "What Germany and Europe have experienced over the last days is nothing short of the reversal of the Merkel policies of guaranteeing peace and freedom through treaties with despots," describing Merkel's policies as "an error." About France Kleine-Brockhoff says there were lofty ambitions under Sarkozy and Macron of European strategic autonomy, which did not correspond to reality, to fantasies of European armies when there was nothing but NATO. It is not dialogue with Putin and Russia that was a problem, says Laure Delcour, international relations expert at the Sorbonne Nouvelle in Paris. Some form of dialogue is necessary she says, but the dialogue has to have clear objectives. We must not confuse cause with consequence, she says. We know  that NATO enlargement had a big impact on Russia's perceptions, but the real problem is how Russia responded to enlargement. "In this case the problem is the consequence."  ...

LyrArc Article Gist
Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff, a senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, leads the EuroFuture Project. Here he offers his ideas of the dilemmas facing German leaders in agreeing to letting the European Central Bank take a larger role of supporting the bonds of Italy, Portugal and Spain. He says Germans are seeing a contradiction between European demands for German leadership and not wanting to be led by Germany or perceiving Germany as a hegemon. Brockhoff says Germans have never in the postwar period wanted to or learned to exercize continental leadership. He recounts the postwar period when Germans were content with the deutsche mark, and limited their expression of national pride to the deutsche mark. Giving up the deutsche mark was part of the deal for reunification of the two Germanys, a surrender of economic sovereignty for the sake of a larger integration into Europe. He says that even though the arguments are framed in terms of orthodox economics, economic nationalists who never really wanted to give up the deutsche mark are the core of the opposition to the common issue of eurozone bonds. The German position is to go back to the framework of principles for economic and monetary union and tighten the rules for spending and taxes, something that is good in the long run, but does not work in the short run with shrinking economies from austerity programs and nervous markets. The Merkel government's resolution of this crisis is to set new fiscal rules for the eurozone, and either move in the direction of letting the ECB play a larger role, or support such a move. What is not clear is whether the government will survive the next election taking on this leadership role in Europe, or a revolt in the Christian Democratic party....