LyrArc Article Gist
Protests in India after fighting between Indian and Chinese troops in the Galwan Valley, Himalayan region of Ladakh bordering Aksai Chin in Tibet.

LyrArc Article Gist
India says China carefully prepared an attack on Indian soldiers in the Galwan Valley mountain ridges, at Ladakh's border with China. 20 Indian soldiers were killed and 76 injured. This report in the Guardian shows satellite images of the Galwan Valley taken by Planet Labs, an imaging company. The images show that days before the clash there was increased activity on the Chinese side, including the damming of a river and the movement of troops and machinery close to the disputed and poorly demarcated border. Australian Strategic Policy Institute says its analysis of satellite images shows PLA Chinese forces regularly crossing into Indian territory temporarily on routine patrol routes. Indian officials also say commanders from both sides met on 13 June and agreed to each retreat back 2 kilometres in the Galwan Valley and Pangong Lake area. For unknown reasons Chinese troops instead of retreating as agreed erected a tent on disputed territory close to Patrolling Point 14. India's 16 Bihar Regiment led by Col Santosh Babu, dismantled the structure in an attempt to push back the PLA troops. According to accounts given to the Hindu newspaper cited here in the Guardian, Babu and his troops later went to the Chinese side to challenge the refusal to retreat, they were ambushed by Chinese forces on the steep mountain precipice. Chinese PLA troops allegedly unblocked the dammed river, releasing a rush of water to destabilise Indian soldiers, and attacked with stones and makeshift spiked weapons. ...

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The Guardian provides this first account of what happened in the Galwan Valley border between India and China at the Line of Actual Control. It is described as the worst fighting in 60 years. On the high steep ridge lines above the rapidly moving Galwan River a patrol of Indian soldiers encountered Chinese troops in a steep section of a high mountainous region. They believed the PLA Chinese Army had withdrawn from the ridge in line with a June 6 disengagement agreement. The Indian government says that what happened afterwards was pre-meditated ambush by the PLA forces. In the fighting that ensued the Indian commanding officer was pushed from the narrow ridge falling to the gorge below. Reinforcements from the Indian side were called from a post 2 miles away and about 600 men were fighting in near total darkness in high mountain ridge with stones iron rods for upto 6 hours. Following a decades long tradition to avoid escalation of hostilities because of nuclear weapons of both countries the two sides have not used other weapons. Most deaths on both sides were from soldiers falling or being knocked from mountain ridges. The main problem in the conflict is the Line of Actual Control exists but since China's takeover of Tibet in 1950 there is no agreement that has set the official border. The British Simla agreement in 1912 set the border with Tibet in an agreement between Tibet and the British Empire in India, when Tibet was an independent country. China claims that historically going back to Ming and Qing dynasty Tibet was part of its region. For most of its history Tibet was an autonomous region with closer contacts with India because it is close to Nepal and Nepal is very near the Indian Bihar state border.  A new rail link from Raxaul, Bihar in India to Kathmandu is only 137 kilometres, and from Kathmandu to the Tibet border is only 205 kilometres. Fast rail or road links would put Tibet within a few hours by rail or road to Tibet from India. For the entire period the US exists as a nation about 250 years and from the first landing of the colonists on American shores about 1607 Tibet was a mountainous region that was so remote that few people even knew about the country's existence. Beijing and Shanghai are four thousand kilometres away, India much closer to Tibet through Kathmandu, Nepal and India sharing a common culture, and no one thought much about the mountainous borders at 15000- 20,000 feet in the western Himalayas, till China's takeover of Tibet in 1950. India had no clear idea what this meant in 1950- no clear border except for what was agreed between the Tibetan independent government  and the British in 1912 which was set under the British Empire- resulting in a fluid border. And China had no clear idea that this would put in a place it would not want to be thousands of miles from the Yangtse valley region home to most of China's population, in a remote mountain region at heights of 15,000 -20,000 feet, with little to gain. Throughout history since 1000 and earlier Tibet remained a region that acted as a buffer between China's western provinces and India, the high mountains at 15,000- 20,000 feet making it inaccessible. Which is why the Ganges plains and the Yangtse river valley plains contact was made more through the oceans than by land, and the areas developing distinctly different language and cultures. All this changed after 1954 when the Qinghai Tibet highway was built, the closest city on the Chinese side is Xining. Xining to Tibet is a distance of about 2000 kilometres at an average height of 4500 metres or about 14,000 feet.  ...

LyrArc Article Gist
A senior Indian diplomat, and former ambassador to China, Gautam Bambawale, says China's action in the June 15 clash at Galwan Valley was the worst violence since 1967. He sees it as a premeditated and well thought out action. His view is that India's relations with China will deteriorate further. That this was an action by the PLA to take territory to what it sees as the LAC or border. For small tactical gains he says "China has strategically lost India." This will impact trade and other relations going forward in his view.  Nothing of this sort was expected says Bambawale. All the agreements put in place since 1993, everything for tranquillity at the border, all the mechanisms, have now collapsed. Bambawale has provided a very lucid and clear account of the relations and the border issues. He goes on to say that Chinese observers have given reasons for the Galwan clash with PLA- that India should stay away from the US and other democracies such as the European Union. Some reflection shows that the opposite has happened. And further reflection would show that the same situation was repeated in the period of transfer from British Empire to Republican India, and from Nationalist China to Communist China from the period 1947 onwards. Different perceptions and different leaderships that gave the perception of gaps between the two countries. In the 1950's after the Korean War Chinese perceptions about India could have led to the incursions that brought China to the borders of India in 1950, similar perceptions of gaps in development and capabilities could have led to the conflict in 1962. From 1993 peace prevailed with India after China entered the World Trade Organization under president Clinton in 2001 following a 10 year effort. Because the focus in China was on development after a series of crises, internal sense of a widening technological gap with the US and Europe, disagreements with the Soviet Union, and the experiments with market economy, internal struggles for democracy. With that period coming to a close as the new trading relationship has led to working class losses in factory jobs in the US, China is faced with protecting its economy as it and the US look at changing supply channels and how it affects both countries. It is a critical time for China as it faces governments in US, France, UK and Canada determined to protect their own interests in manufacturing jobs, renewing supply channels, and in technological advancement. The response is similar to that in 1962 when seen from the Communist party perspective as a gap has opened up with India following China's progress in the 30 year trading relationship with the US and Europe. That gap and the difficult situation China faces today with the US and EU in trade and technology has brought forward the Galwan clash and future clashes in Ladakh and at the border.  As Mr. Jaishnkar, India's Minister of External Affairs as well as former ambassador to China,  has pointed out this is a very different aspirational India that China faces. The same kind of grassroots development that happened in China and rapid pooling of capital, human resources and technology inputs for development is taking place in India, and will continue for the next two decades, quickly bridging any gaps in modernization between the two countries. The difference between a youthful population in India and aging population in China and Japan, is likely to add another dimension. China's Buddhist culture that came from India is not likely to go away, more likely is that China will see a revival of Buddhist ideas of wellness and living more as culture than religion. The experience with British colonialism that prevailed both in India and China, and which from its base in India caused so much grief to China during the Opium wars will recede from memory. Extending borders from historical memory of Japanese incursions into border areas in Manchuria could have led leaders after 1950 in China to extend borders to remote areas in the Arunachal region of India and communist theory books may have created the perception of defensive moves. In the context of an aspirational India similar to China, and no real intention on the part of India to extend itself in any way to China's provinces in Sichuan, this extending of borders as a defensive move will be seen as stemming from memories of Japanese incursions in the 1930's, but simply costly and not relevant in any way to China's own aspirational development and progress. ...