LyrArc Article Gist
Wagoner became President at age 45, CEO at age 48. So you would think that young blood is coming in to GM, but that does not appear to be the case. At the Board level most of the Board members like George Fisher formerly of Motorola, have been around for a long time, and there does not appear to be new blood that would bring in fresh thinking. And serious decisions about investment in developing new technologies to develop fuel efficient cars, like hybrid technologies, electric and other alternative technologies, diesel technology, have been held up for years at General Motors. The way decisions are made on such issues with Board members voicing their opinions more than wrestling seriously with the issues, shows serious shortcomings of management and the Board. At key points of decision making the CEO and key members of his team had not prepared carefully, and Board members did not come up with serious thinking on the problems facing GM. It, appears that the investment in technologies to develop fuel efficient cars much earlier, long before they were finally being addressed in 2006, was a failure of Wagoner's management and of the Board. Management discussed this but continued to be mired in old ways of thinking that continuing with the status quo- cars with existing low fuel efficiency- would not expose GM to illwinds as preferences changed. Its clear from the description here of discussions within GM that the old thinking is quite entrenched at GM, and Wagoner just was not the kind of person who could vigorously articulate a new vision for GM. A couple of things are noteworthy in this account of management indecision at GM. When fuel prices began hurting sales of SUV's and large vehicles in 2005, efforts to get a decision on investments in new technologies for fuel efficiency for the whole product lineup failed at the Board level in an April 2005 meeting. One Board member saying at that meeting, that" do we want to lose another billion dollars in developing new technology for fuel efficient cars." And no one calling him to account that the remark still did not address the point that GM had to respond to the changing market and world oil dynamics, and not just hope for the best, as GM had aggressive competitors, and faced continually diminishing role in the market place for the entire decade of the 1990's. While April 2005 was already at the tail end of the previous era of gas guzzling cars and a decision then would still not have shown a forward looking vision of things, it was not until 10 months later that a decision was reached. And this almost from necessity, as oil prices jumped in 2006 after hurricane Katrina, and by this time President Bush was also calling for higher mandated fuel efficiency standards. The other noteworthy point here is that by making the changes so late in the game, GM had to compress the development cycle for new and some cases unknown technologies into short time frames. If the ingenuity of its engineers comes to its rescue it still faces another hurdle that of cost, because the technologies have to be perfected and improved, so that the costs are low enough for customers, and importantly comparable with what it is costing competitors to make the same fuel efficient technology engine or other part. Which is why one Honda executive remarked, "GM like everyone else is serious about this, because they have to be, but how many of their hybrids and how many Volts will they sell? Their technology is very expensive." Even if GM develops the Volt electric car by 2010, GM will need a whole range of fuel efficient technolgies to power its large product lineup. Its just to hard to avoid the conclusion that this is going to prove costly. All the dragging of feet and indecision, and failure to prepare GM for a different world in case something drastically different from what was expected happened, will prove very costly especially considering how aggressive and well financed some of the Japanese and German competitors are. It also hard to avoid the conclusion that there is too much bureaucracy at the large auto companies, and getting new blood and new ideas and fresh thinking is tough in a place where everybody agrees with everybody else, and there is uniformity of thinking. This makes it difficult for any original or wayward types to thrive. These bureaucracies look up to the top for direction. Initiative is discouraged on one hand, and at the same time even if a new direction is taken at the top. a lot of resistance can be expected to implementing it throughout the company without persistent persuasion and reminder of new facts and realities. This is true for both Wagoner and Mullaly as they face the skepticism of subordinates to new direction. Mullaly for instance has to remind his managers that large vehicles are only a small percentage of the entire global market, and if Toyota is making money in small cars so can Ford. See the link to this. Is Toyota immune from bureaucracy type behaviour throughout the company? Not really, Toyota's chairman emeritus came out of retirement in fact and went out of the way to caution its CEO and management about their complacency a year or so before. Shoichiro Toyoda personally intervened to caution against too much expansion in the US and climbing wage costs, and other risks they perceived such as the company managers in the USA appearing to be resting on their laurels. See the link to this. A lot of discussion is probably going on within these companies about the present state of affairs, and considerable anxiety for what the future will bring. It may be useful to ask the question is there something that makes it difficult for once successful organizations -now with entrenched bureaucracy and set ways -to put forward leaders with vision and foresight, till it becomes very late? The vision and foresight about where their markets and the world is heading, and the ability to move their organizations in that direction. Or to break out of old patterns of behaviour and thinking....
Wagoner became President at age 45, CEO at age 48. So you would think that young blood is coming in to GM, but that does not appear to be the case. At the Board level most of the Board members like George Fisher formerly of Motorola, have been around for a long time, and there does not appear to be new blood that would bring in fresh thinking. And serious decisions about investment in developing new technologies to develop fuel efficient cars, like hybrid technologies, electric and other alternative technologies, diesel technology, have been held up for years at General Motors. The way decisions are made on such issues with Board members voicing their opinions more than wrestling seriously with the issues, shows serious shortcomings of management and the Board. At key points of decision making the CEO and key members of his team had not prepared carefully, and Board members did not come up with serious thinking on the problems facing GM. It, appears that the investment in technologies to develop fuel efficient cars much earlier, long before they were finally being addressed in 2006, was a failure of Wagoner's management and of the Board. Management discussed this but continued to be mired in old ways of thinking that continuing with the status quo- cars with existing low fuel efficiency- would not expose GM to illwinds as preferences changed. Its clear from the description here of discussions within GM that the old thinking is quite entrenched at GM, and Wagoner just was not the kind of person who could vigorously articulate a new vision for GM. A couple of things are noteworthy in this account of management indecision at GM. When fuel prices began hurting sales of SUV's and large vehicles in 2005, efforts to get a decision on investments in new technologies for fuel efficiency for the whole product lineup failed at the Board level in an April 2005 meeting. One Board member saying at that meeting, that" do we want to lose another billion dollars in developing new technology for fuel efficient cars." And no one calling him to account that the remark still did not address the point that GM had to respond to the changing market and world oil dynamics, and not just hope for the best, as GM had aggressive competitors, and faced continually diminishing role in the market place for the entire decade of the 1990's. While April 2005 was already at the tail end of the previous era of gas guzzling cars and a decision then would still not have shown a forward looking vision of things, it was not until 10 months later that a decision was reached. And this almost from necessity, as oil prices jumped in 2006 after hurricane Katrina, and by this time President Bush was also calling for higher mandated fuel efficiency standards. The other noteworthy point here is that by making the changes so late in the game, GM had to compress the development cycle for new and some cases unknown technologies into short time frames. If the ingenuity of its engineers comes to its rescue it still faces another hurdle that of cost, because the technologies have to be perfected and improved, so that the costs are low enough for customers, and importantly comparable with what it is costing competitors to make the same fuel efficient technology engine or other part. Which is why one Honda executive remarked, "GM like everyone else is serious about this, because they have to be, but how many of their hybrids and how many Volts will they sell? Their technology is very expensive." Even if GM develops the Volt electric car by 2010, GM will need a whole range of fuel efficient technolgies to power its large product lineup. Its just to hard to avoid the conclusion that this is going to prove costly. All the dragging of feet and indecision, and failure to prepare GM for a different world in case something drastically different from what was expected happened, will prove very costly especially considering how aggressive and well financed some of the Japanese and German competitors are. It also hard to avoid the conclusion that there is too much bureaucracy at the large auto companies, and getting new blood and new ideas and fresh thinking is tough in a place where everybody agrees with everybody else, and there is uniformity of thinking. This makes it difficult for any original or wayward types to thrive. These bureaucracies look up to the top for direction. Initiative is discouraged on one hand, and at the same time even if a new direction is taken at the top. a lot of resistance can be expected to implementing it throughout the company without persistent persuasion and reminder of new facts and realities. This is true for both Wagoner and Mullaly as they face the skepticism of subordinates to new direction. Mullaly for instance has to remind his managers that large vehicles are only a small percentage of the entire global market, and if Toyota is making money in small cars so can Ford. See the link to this. Is Toyota immune from bureaucracy type behaviour throughout the company? Not really, Toyota's chairman emeritus came out of retirement in fact and went out of the way to caution its CEO and management about their complacency a year or so before. Shoichiro Toyoda personally intervened to caution against too much expansion in the US and climbing wage costs, and other risks they perceived such as the company managers in the USA appearing to be resting on their laurels. See the link to this. A lot of discussion is probably going on within these companies about the present state of affairs, and considerable anxiety for what the future will bring. It may be useful to ask the question is there something that makes it difficult for once successful organizations -now with entrenched bureaucracy and set ways -to put forward leaders with vision and foresight, till it becomes very late? The vision and foresight about where their markets and the world is heading, and the ability to move their organizations in that direction. Or to break out of old patterns of behaviour and thinking....
