Vernon Smith asks the question why when $10 trillion in losses were experienced in equities in 1999-2002 the financial system did not collapse, and in 2008 losses of $3 trillion in mortgages held by homeowners resulted in a collapse of the financial system. In the 2002 period the losses, he says, were borne largely by institutional and individual investors who largely owned the assets outright. In the 2008 crisis homeowners purchased about 90 to 100% of the housing assets on margin, and declines in value of 50% or more in the low price tier were seen for homes bought at the peak of the bubble. These losses were transmitted to banks and lending institutions. The consumption binge added to the debt of households. The result is that lending went down sharply for durable goods consumption, and this is seen in the decline of auto sales of 41% from Feb. 2008 to Feb. 2009. The collateral damage then occurs in retail and labor markets. This is similiar to how Ben Bernanke viewed the Great Depression crisis in an important paper- the inability of the financial system to perform its economic role of lending to households for durable goods consumption and to companies for production and trade. This understanding is different from the Friedman view of a contraction of the money supply, and the view that excessive speculation caused it. Bernanke's experience studying the causes of the Great Depression uniquely qualified him to address the causes of the global financial crisis of 2008....