LyrArc Article Gist
Its clear from the task force's rejection of the plan GM submitted in March 2009, that the restructuring at GM was moving too slowly, too many brands, too many dealerships, no clear idea of what the new GM should look like. And a wistful look back to the past that clouded every decision. Wagoner and his team could not leave the old GM behind and clung onto too many brands, plants, dealerships, and sales numbers that were too optimistic at every turn of the economy, even as they were lowered. The task force said GM was "far too slow" to adapt and that "a substantially mmore aggressive restructuring plan" was required. That GM was just a year ago 2008 about this time still thinking in terms of sales numbers that would match Toyota's, as the largest carmaker in the world, shows how this wistful looking back at the past may have blinded GM to all the potentially dangerous bets that it was making, wihtout realizing it. Bets that the huge gap between the US carmakers and the Japanese and the Europeans in fuel efficiency and the technologies that went with it, would not someday come to hurt GM. Bets that the numbers game could be played without huge risks, that incentives related sales couild simply be inflating the market now with bigger risks ahead. That simply relying on sales revenue to support unsustainable retiree and union costs would be another dangerous bet on unsustainable sales numbers of a16 million market. The other large industrialized societies were seeing shrinking car sales, Japan, Germany, are prime examples, where sales are nowhere what they were at the peak in the postwar recovery of these industrialized countries. See the links/groups to these two countries car markets. Had GM considered the prospect of similiar declines in the US? Even if the car sales had remained at levels much lower than 16 million without the consumer buying spree and incentives, the market would be shrinking, the sales inflation simply made the sales fall that much steeper, hitting the 40% range. ...
Its clear from the task force's rejection of the plan GM submitted in March 2009, that the restructuring at GM was moving too slowly, too many brands, too many dealerships, no clear idea of what the new GM should look like. And a wistful look back to the past that clouded every decision. Wagoner and his team could not leave the old GM behind and clung onto too many brands, plants, dealerships, and sales numbers that were too optimistic at every turn of the economy, even as they were lowered. The task force said GM was "far too slow" to adapt and that "a substantially mmore aggressive restructuring plan" was required. That GM was just a year ago 2008 about this time still thinking in terms of sales numbers that would match Toyota's, as the largest carmaker in the world, shows how this wistful looking back at the past may have blinded GM to all the potentially dangerous bets that it was making, wihtout realizing it. Bets that the huge gap between the US carmakers and the Japanese and the Europeans in fuel efficiency and the technologies that went with it, would not someday come to hurt GM. Bets that the numbers game could be played without huge risks, that incentives related sales couild simply be inflating the market now with bigger risks ahead. That simply relying on sales revenue to support unsustainable retiree and union costs would be another dangerous bet on unsustainable sales numbers of a16 million market. The other large industrialized societies were seeing shrinking car sales, Japan, Germany, are prime examples, where sales are nowhere what they were at the peak in the postwar recovery of these industrialized countries. See the links/groups to these two countries car markets. Had GM considered the prospect of similiar declines in the US? Even if the car sales had remained at levels much lower than 16 million without the consumer buying spree and incentives, the market would be shrinking, the sales inflation simply made the sales fall that much steeper, hitting the 40% range. ...
