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Lawyers Buchheit and and Gulati help Greece design a legal agreement that writes in a new collective action clause. The collective action clause ensures a 95% participation for the bond restructuring deal Greece is doing in March 2012 to cut its debt to sustainable levels. A similiar deal could be designed for Portugal says Mitu Gulati, a law professor at Duke University. Because Greece's bonds are written under Greek law, writing in a new collective action clause is a legal mechanism for achieving a meaningful debt reduction and bond restructuring deal- this is something Gulati and Buchheit figured out because of their expertise in this field. A joint paper by Buchheit and Gulati in 2010, first explored the way in which private bondholders of Greek bonds who reject a bond debt restructuring could be forced to accept the same losses as other investors who accepted the deal. They are now advisors to the government of Greece. In early 2011 there was serious discussion that the Brady Bonds debt restructuring for Latin American debt of Argentina, Mexico and Brazil of the 1980's, under which private investors traded in their old bonds for new bonds with longer duration at reduced interest rates and lower value- reflecting voluntary losses accepted by bondholders- was the approach needed for Greece, Portugal, Ireland and other eurozone countries. Then U.S. Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady took the lead- in Landon Thomas Jr., NYT, 11/30/2010. Bondholders held out throughout this period, with Charles Dallara, one of the architects of the Brady bonds restructuring, hired by European banks to negotiate on their behalf. It was only when German Chancellor Merkel delivered an ultimatum by telling Dallara "this is the last offer," during a late night meeting on Oct. 27, 2011, at EU headquarters in Brussels, was an agreement reached on serious debt reduction- in Walker, Forelle, Meichtry, WSJ, 12/30/2011. The long delay meant a worsening crisis in Greece and the rest of the eurozone. ...

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This WSJ editorial says AFL-CIO union leader Trumka's questions about the Lew nomination at Treasury are appropriate even though they come 2 years later. The questions relate to clauses in bank contracts that allow accelerated vesting of equity awards for executives who may be likely to join the government- looking towards favorable treatment of the banks by these executives that join the government. In this case it is Citicorp where Treasury Secretary Lew worked before becoming Treasury Secretary. The original Lew employment contract with Citicorp had a bonus guarantee if Lew left the bank for a "high level position with the United States government or regulatory body." The revolving door has a pernicious effect on America's regulatory system especially for financial markets and bank regulation by permitting behavious that would otherwise be discouraged or penalized.

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William Hurt plays Treasury secretary Hank Paulson in the HBO movie "Too Big to Fail," on the financial crisis of 2008. The approach HBO producers took to get the details of the story right included having actors talk to the real life figures like Hank Paulson. Hurt did a lot of questioning. Paulson was aware that his legacy would be shaped by how this story was told. Hurt came out of the discussions, including a three day visit to Paulson's home on a coastal Georgia island, saying that he did not feel manipulated. Hurt would continue to look at Paulson's actions from his own notions of value.

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Reeves says Reagan ever the imaginative politician seized on the idea of "supply side " economics of a not so well known economist Arthur Laffer. Ideas that were simple and appealing- you reduce marginal tax rates and generate higher revenues. This worked for some time with higher economic growth for a number of years, but the arithmetic of higher spending and borrowing and lower taxes would eventually lead to large deficits at the end of Reagan's term, just as price controls worked for awhile and then led to a surge in prices at the end of Nixon's term. When Reagan became President the deficit was 2.5%, when he left office eight years later the deficit was 5% of the economy. Interest payments on debt jumped to $169 billion in 1988, from $69 billion in 1981. Reeves says American politicians know so little about economics, to which it could be added, winning presidential and congressional elections is always a big part of the picture when it comes to economic policy. Which is why Nixon even with Milton Friedman as an advisor shifted to Keynesian policies of higher fiscal spending in 1971, and why Reagan turns to intuitively appealing and effective in the short term policies of having it all- higher spending, growth, and lower taxes. During the years of the two Bush presidencies and the Clinton administration the success of Reagan policies leads to a general sense as Vice President Cheney put it referring to Reagan and Treasury Secretary Baker's belief, that "deficits don't matter." Which leads us to the current situation where 2012 presidential election politics again frame the terms of the debate on deficits and budgets, only now the deficit is much higher and on a unsustainable path. ...

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Calendars released to the WSJ under Freedom of Information Act, show Treasury Secretary Geithner having 80 contacts with Blankfein of Goldman Sachs, Dimon of Chase, Parsons of Citigroup and Fink of BlackRock, from January through July 2009.

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Vikram Pandit's style at Citigroup after 4 months, thoughful, asking lots of questions, fixing the little things that actually matter a lot, like the unwillingness of some heads of divisions to sit together in the same room, some hiring decisions and new lines of reporting and responsibiity and interaction in the organization structure that call for teamwork, discussion and collaboration. The oldtimers like Krawcheck used to clear lines of reporting are now getting used to the new culture of collaborative working. His style is first to come to grips with issues and not to come to snap decisions based on intuition, such as interviewing at length and asking tough questions at length to Ajay Banga, head of Citi's international group about the extensive defaults in Citi's consumer loan business in Japan. One of his views is that only if you get the foundation right can you talk about vision. Regarding pettiness in management and small grudges, its either going to be a partnership or you're not going to be here. some of his colleagues like James Forense say that they would take substance over form, judgement over form, any day of the week. And while he does not shy away from details like expecting lower level employees to pay for sporting event tickets Citigroup earlier gave out free, and he himself rides the subway sometimes, he has made some of the bigger decisions. Among these, getting capital from outside sources by travelling extensively abroad, urging Citigroup's board to slash the dividend for the first time in 20 years, selling off 2 peripheral units that did not belong and a third Primerica on sale also. And urged by his mentor former Treasury secretary Rubin who also used a note pad and a thinking thoughtful style like Pandit's at Treasury during the Asian banking crisis and the Mexican financial crisis, Pandit has been direct and realistic. He tells Wall Street that the fate of Citigroup is going to be decided to some extent by the duration of the environment we are going through, the twin perils of the debt-market crisis and the sluggish US economy. And that for now issues like these are going to overwhelm our actions. Pandit's father was a senior executive of one of India's leading pharmaceutical companies when the family moved to New York, so he has grown up around business, and is able to ask the question quite sincerely and matter of factly of his managers at the beginning of every meeting. "What are you doing with the shareholder's money?" After which come the torrent of well thought out questions, probing deeper each time, especiually where issues are festering for a long time, and remain unresolved. ...

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Proposals for using a plan in the euro-zone, such as the Brady Plan. The Brady plan arranged for bondholders for Latin American debt to take losses of 30% in return for longer term debt instruments with lower rates, and backed by 30 year US zero coupon bonds. This helped restructure Latin American debt in the late 80's and early 90's, and helped countries in Latin America forge an economic recovery. At this time Angela Merkel from the German side is pushing for bondholders to take losses for having made risky loans, which was made part of the EU bailout plan in late November 2010. However investors in financial markets continued to push up bond yields for Belgium, Portugal, and also for Germany. There is the sense that something is needed that would require bondholders to take losses, with some compensating mechanism such as the Brady bonds. Also needed is a restructuring of debt without which euro-zone countries cannot stage an economic recovery. Ireland, Portugal and Spain can no longer devalue their national currencies as a way out of the financial crisis. This increases the urgency for coming up with a solution. Mr. Brady was asked about this at a financial markets conference recently. He said what is needed for such a plan to work, is to have a unified decision. In the Brady plan the US took the lead and agreement was arranged bringing together the bondholders and the sovereign countries. Nicholas Brady was Treasury Secretary of the US in the 1980's. Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and other countries restructured their debt, and commercal banks were able to reduce their exposure at a discount. The principal benefit to the lending banks was that they were able to exchange their claims on developing countries into tradeable instruments, and were able to get this debt off their balance sheets. The negotiations for the Brady bonds involved some form of "haircut" - meaning that the value of the bonds resulting from the restructurings was less than the face value of the bonds. All of the Brady bonds were eventually retired. By Mexico in 2003, and also by Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela....

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As Washington Post writer points out from personal experience- he is one of those who put up 15% to buy ahome inDenver at the top of the market and now has negative equity as prices drop- negative equity is one of the most serious problems facing the US economy. It has the potential to undo many of the encouraging things from the stimulus, as rising foreclosures continue to act as adrag on the overall economy. As he says about one fourth of Americans with home mortgages, or about 11-15 million people, owe more money on their homes than the market value of their homes. As Hoffman says the administration's approach has been a Band-Aid at best for a serious injury. The Obama administration set aside only $75 billion to get banks to modify loans and also made this voluntary for banks to modify loans. Treasury Secretary Geithner testified in Congress: "This is a conscious choice we made, not to start with principal reduction. We thought it would be dramatically more expensive for the American taxpayer, harder to justify, create much greater risk of unfairness." But making it voluntary means very little of this $75 billion has gone to help achieve modifications- banks had no incentives to do this. Only 31,000 permanent loan modifications have been made. Of the 750,000 temporary loan modifications made as of Dec 2009 only 4% of homeowners signing up have qualified for permanent federal relief. See the links to Martin Feldstein's proposals for this on the pages of the Wall Street Journal in 2008 and 2009 which called for aggressive program of relief for the sake of the economy. With 2.4 million Americans likely to lose their homes in 2009 according to Moody's Economy.com estimates, following the 2 million in 2009 and 1.7 million in 2008, this may be a serious mistake of the Obama administration and drag out this recovery....

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Its going to be very difficult to adopt the bad bank option in current circumstances, where the banks find their situation continually and rapidly deteriorating with renewed loss of public confidence and collapsing share prices. The efforts with the first TARP under Treasury Secretary Paulson to isolate the toxic assets of banks did not take off and had to be diverted to capital injections for precisely this reason. Banks in November and December 2008 went through a continually escalating problem situation, with losses, collapsing share prices and so on, and the government had no breathing room to develop the bad bank solution. In some cases decisions had to be made in a few days to prevent the collapse of some banking institution like Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley or Citicorp. At the same time its very clear that there can be no restoration of confidence in lending, and no recovery, without lending by banks, without a bad bank to separate these toxic assets from the banking system in the USA. The Swedish and American example in the 1990's of a bad bank, was possible because the banks were either gone bust, or under government ownership. With the banks in private hands, it is somewhere between difficult to impossible to value these toxic assets without serious problems. So nationalizing these banks becomes the only serious option, which would become more acceptable as the crisis unfolds in 2010, and it becomes clear that one way or another the government is guaranteeing these assets. Banks are in reality entirely dependent on the US government for capital and support, and it would not be wise to pretend otherwise. The safest and most direct option would be to mitigate the risks of nationalization, with prudent safeguards, and develop the bad bank option with the government in ownership of banks, in which case the bad bank option can proceed quickly. ...

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An exceptional journalism story of what happened on Sept 16 and September 17, 2008, and the aftermath, by Pulliam, Rappaport, Lucchetti, Strasburg and McGinty, when Morgan Stanley stock lost more than half its value and was at risk of collapsing. What caused the collapse in price? This article shows how the biggest names in financial institutions were buying protection with credit default swaps, and as the price of these swaps skyrocketed on Sept 16 and Sept 17, the shortselling in Morgan Stanley's shares also skyrocketed. Shortselling on Sept 17 reaching nine times the normal, with 39 million shares sold short adding to the 31 million shares sold short in the prior two days, according to trading records examined by WSJ. It was at this point, on the pleas of John Mack CEO of Morgan Stanley, the SEC stepped in to temporarily suspend short selling. It is hard to clearly isolate the shortselling that went on for protection, from the shortselling for speculation, but hedge funds were involved and some of the shortselling was done to make a quick profit. Citigroup has faced the problem of losing half the share's value in a couple of days in the week of November 17, and shortselling in Citigroup's shares contributed to the collapsing stock. See the 3 graphs setup to show the influence of credit default swaps on short selling, and the on share price for Morgan Stanley. On Monday November 24, the government announced a rescue plan for Citigroup. That the uptick rule has not been reinstated as yet, means that when one looks back at this period a few years from now it will show errors in handling this economic and financial markets crisis were made, different from that in the 1930's, but with serious consequences. ...

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Theo Lubke was head of the Financial Infrastructure Department in the Banking Supervision Group, and was a key member working for reforms in the derivatives market. He oversaw efforts at the Fed to have Wall Street centrally clear trades in credit default swaps, which helps control the risk of a firm's failure. Lubke will join Goldman Sachs as a managing director in the securities division, and will help Goldman implement the facets of regulatory reform legislation. Prior to his 15 years at the New York Fed, Lubke worked on the staff of the National Economic Council under President Clinton, and worked as an investment-banking analyst at Lehman Brothers.

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Shiller, Kashyap, Mishkin, Slaughter, Stein, Stulz, Rajan and others are part of a 15 academic economists group called the Squam Lake Group. They first met at a conference in November 2008 at Squam Lake in New Hampshire. The group has come up with a report that they hope gets the prominence of the 9/11 report. It is called the Squam Lake Report. The book will be introduced in a conference at Columbia University by Fed chairman Ben Bernanke. Some of the economists have little faith in regulators and a new Financial Stability oversight Council led by Treasury Secretary Geithner. (Stulz, Kashyap). The group sees need for better disclosure of risks of financial products, especially retirement savings products.The editor Seth Itchik sees the book as today's version of the 1938 book by Harvard and Tufts economists called "An Economic Program for American Democracy." The motivation for this effort in a field where economists have different opinions, is to build a consensus for decisive action by Congress and the government of the U.S. Two new suggestions that are not in the Congressional bills for financial reform. One is issuance of contingent convertible bonds or CoCo bonds. Banks would be encouraged or required to issue such debt which would convert into equity in a crisis. These funds would help recapitalize a bank in a crisis with no taxpayer liability. Another new proposal is to have a fraction of each year's bonus pool for banking executives to be held separately- if the bank ran into trouble, that portion of pay would be withheld from senior managers. And the group sees political aspects and lobbying making sound plans less implementable in Congress. Congress lets regulators curb pay practices and coordinate other actions which has not worked in the past and during the crisis. Congress has even in its best effort acted on only some of the things needed in its bills- this includes higher capital requirements, and compulsory "living wills" for the largest financial institutions, and the Volcker Rule. The rules for derivatives are still being negotiated by Blance Lincoln who introduced this provision, with the result being more transparency. If it is watered down it would not ensure the strict separation of derivatives trading on the capital accounts of banks that Blanche Lincoln envisaged. ...

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In a speech at the Conservative Party Fall conference British prime minister Theresa May positions her party as an advocate for the working class against establishment views. She was critical of smug views that the current situation was acceptable for working class families concerned about immigration and jobs. She also pointed out that the policies of central banks including the Bank of England hurt working class families and savers." She pointed out the development that has also happened in the U.S. economy and other European countries as the Federal Reserve and the ECB cut rates to near zero. "People with assets have got richer. People without them have suffered. People with mortgages have found their debts cheaper. People with savings have found themselves poorer." Her response she said would be to "put the government at the service of those who found themselves poorer as a result of monetary policy." This follows May's first speech at 10 Downing Street where she referred to "the burning injustice."  ...

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Simon Nixon of WSJ says even if the government took the estimated $120 billion in losses estimated by Goldman for the UK banking system. it would change public sector debt to GDP ratio for the UK from 60% to 73%, which is still better compared to other countries and does not trigger a credit downgrading. The UK has received a huge monetary stimulus and the lower value of the pound helps exports, so the situation is a mess but far from being a disaster.

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Goldman Sachs which spent $2.8 million last year on Washington lobbyists to get favorable treatment from lawmakers is increasingly having ahard time getting attention in Congress.