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The Economist points out that the last thing President Obama needs - when he has serious domestic and foreign policy goals- is another Vietnam. Just as Bush's presidency was seriously affected by Iraq, Obama's presidency it says would be seriously affected by Afghanistan. And the Economist emphasizes as General Chrystal's chief conclusion: "an insurgency cannot be defeated by aforeign army alone." It points to General Chrystal's view that success means winning the support of the people, and the loss of faith in the government of Karzai. Obama and Biden will have noted this as they have growing doubts of their own about the widespread fraud seen in the Afghan election. Ground reports from Afghanistan support this assessment about acomplete loss of support for the Karzai government. See Intelilinks.

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One US military official says that there is very little respect and regard for each other between General McChrystal and Vice President Biden, going so far as to say that both men hate each other's guts. Personal strains, and the difficulties in Afghanistan compound the differences.

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Problems that may be unfixable for the Afghan national army, and for which no increase in foreign trainers could make a difference. About 3% of the army recruits are from the Pushtun south, the main part of the country, where the Taliban are strongest. Officers from the northern areas have to use translators in the Pushtun south, a bad sign. And there is a shortage of officer talent. Gereral Caldwell who is working on training the army, says he was appalled at the emphasis on quantity not quality- the Afghan army has reached 134,000 in numbers. The ratio of instructors to recruits ranges from 1 to 80 to 1 to 466. It will cost $11 billion to maintain compared to an estimated $1 million per American soldier each year. Even if training problems are fixed, having 3% of recruits from the major Pushtun part of the country where the fighting is being done, simply makes the overall problem unfixable. See the group - Defense Department biannual report on Afghanistan, for related insight.

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General McChrystal gets the support he is looking for against the Taliban in Afghanistan, as Gates, Obama and Clinton, make the decision to continue backing the Karzai government, even though it is very unpopular and the ground reports suggest that this would be amistake. It was NATO that announced the support because the Obama administration had deep concerns about the Karzai government. The US and the UN representative Kai Eide wanted to see arunoff for the elections but the "assumption" that he would be reelected suggests the Obama administration, the UN representative, and the UK and Canadian foreign ministers in ameeting have decided to continue the war in Afghanistan on Karzai's side.

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Richard Barrett, former head of overseas counter terrorism operations of Britain and now head of the UN AlQuaeda and Taliban monitoring group, in aspeech to the Washington Institute of Near East Policy, says Al Quaeda is a diminishing threat because a new generation of Muslims who have little recollection of the events and are less interested in religion. And CIA officials say they are having greater success penetrating Al Quaeda, because of vastly improved intelligence capabilities. In terms of intelligence and capabilities, the technical colllection, intercepts are much better, and overhead surveillance is much better. The human intelligence is much better and they have fewer competent people.

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The Economist describes the fraud in the election and the odious group of warlords and crooks that Karzai has pulled together to get support for this election. If they get as reward positions in the ministries then "the war is over" according to one diplomat. And without acredible government the chances are poor for any"good outcomes." Eide, the UN diplomat in the country says ultimately this will be decided not by governments but by people sitting at thier kitchen tables making up their mind as the follow the information in the media. And the President has only 37% of Democrats with him who want to see more troops in Afghanistan in a recent poll.

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Problems with the rural development and agriculture projects conducted by USAID in Afghanistan include overspending in 2009, followed by sharp cutbacks in 2010 and 2011 as budget cuts were made. In 2009 USAID made a grant of $300 million to Arlington based International Relief and Development (IRD) to help farmers in Kandahar and Helmand improve productivity over just one year, at the insistence of Richard Holbrooke. The focus was on paying for day labor jobs to clean canals, offer subsidized seeds to encourage switching from opium poppies, distributing tractors, and building gravel roads. Because many districts of the two provinces were considered unsafe for work, much of the money was concentrated on a few districts and in one year. As a result farmers in Kandahar got more seed than they needed and they in turn sold tons of seed and tractors in Pakistan for cash. A senior program official at IRD says it wasn't realistic to pour so much money in one year. But USAID officials say overspending and poor oversight made the program seriously flawed. There was also a difference in the views of the military and USAID on the value of day jobs. The U.S. military sees this as away of protecting its efforts, of literally protecting its flanks, as this keeps unemployed youth from joining the Taliban. At the same time senior USAID officials wanted to see multiple companies bid for the next $350 millon on a follow-on project. When the USAID team of specialists again awarded it to IRD, senior offficials at USAID decided to cancel the program. The program was then redesigned in the expectation that other companies would bid for it. In the meantime USAID gave IRD 3 quarterly extensions, the last expiring June 30, 2011. The US military sees the day labor program as crucial for its military efforts, so there is kind of an impasse with USAID reluctantly giving in. IRD meantime is shutting down activites in Helmand and will do this also in Kandahar probably by the end of May, as its contract has not been renewed because of problems with the program. USAID has a high staff turnover rate of 85% a year in Kabul which complicates things with the shifting priorities of different officials. Some programs are being scaled back- a job retraining program seen as requiring $125 million over 18 months is being scaled back to $40 million. Others such as a USAID project for coordinating disparate rural rehabilitation projects for $140 million is held back because of lack of agreement with the Afghan government about how it should proceed. In parts of Kandahar USAID had found several contractors doing the same work. See the groups on Dexter Filkins, and on Commander Adams, which touch on serious development issues and the war....

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Afghan warlord of a previous era Hekmatyar is proving difficult to buyout or win over, a strategy pursued with Iraqi insurgents. Younger Taliban insurgents are even harder to convert or buyout. THis raises questions about the chances of this kind of effort succeeding in Afghanistan, especially considering the "allergy" to foreign presence or foreign boots on the ground among Afghan people and the part religious fervour plays. Religious fervour was much less of a factor with Iraqi Sunni insurgents. Add to this the terrain differences, between desert and high mountains, makin the kind of house to house searches and securing of areas extremely difficult.