LyrArc Article Gist
Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff, a senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, leads the EuroFuture Project. Here he offers his ideas of the dilemmas facing German leaders in agreeing to letting the European Central Bank take a larger role of supporting the bonds of Italy, Portugal and Spain. He says Germans are seeing a contradiction between European demands for German leadership and not wanting to be led by Germany or perceiving Germany as a hegemon. Brockhoff says Germans have never in the postwar period wanted to or learned to exercize continental leadership. He recounts the postwar period when Germans were content with the deutsche mark, and limited their expression of national pride to the deutsche mark. Giving up the deutsche mark was part of the deal for reunification of the two Germanys, a surrender of economic sovereignty for the sake of a larger integration into Europe. He says that even though the arguments are framed in terms of orthodox economics, economic nationalists who never really wanted to give up the deutsche mark are the core of the opposition to the common issue of eurozone bonds. The German position is to go back to the framework of principles for economic and monetary union and tighten the rules for spending and taxes, something that is good in the long run, but does not work in the short run with shrinking economies from austerity programs and nervous markets. The Merkel government's resolution of this crisis is to set new fiscal rules for the eurozone, and either move in the direction of letting the ECB play a larger role, or support such a move. What is not clear is whether the government will survive the next election taking on this leadership role in Europe, or a revolt in the Christian Democratic party....

LyrArc Article Gist
Spain's central bank was lauded for macroprudential supervision before the housing bubble burst. Will China's central bank and financial authorites which have managed the housing bubble upto this point face similiar problems? Can China be the sole exception even as housing bubbles burst with wide repercussions in the U.S., UK and Spain? Nicholas Lardy, of the Peterson Institute of international Economics, says urban housing stock makes up 41% of Chinese household wealth in 2011. The same figure for the U.S. is 26%. Chinese buyers invest in homes because low interest rates on savings accounts cannot keep up with inflation. Real estate investment was 13% of GDP in 2011. Home ownership is a recent development in China, only since 1990, Chinese have never experienced large price declines. Household debt as a percentage of disposable income has increased significantly in recent years, up to 53.6% in 2011 from 31.3% in 2008, according to Lardy.