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A delicate balancing act for the Federal Reserve, in not withdrawing support to the debt securitization markets in a manner that throws the economy off balance, and leads to the collapse of credit markets still again. Lee Sachs, an advisor to Timothy Geithner, Treasury secretary, says that its important to do it incrementally, where and when you think you can, and not sooner. The debt securitization markets act as a shadow banking system, they finance mortgages for homes, corporate loans, student loans, credit card debt. Before the debt crisis in 2008, banks made loans for mortgages, and then sold these loans packaged into securities in the debt securtization markets. 60% of American credit has in recent years come from this process of debt securitization. This is how the markets look at this time in September 2009. 1. A thriving private market in securities packaged out of home mortgages, collapsed from $744 billion in 2005 at the peak, to $8 billion during first half 2009. THe Fed is almost the only buyer of mortgage backed securities, with $905 billion of these government guaranteed securities purchased through mid September, 80-85% of the market. 2. The market for bonds backed by consumer debt - credit card debt, auto loans and student loans - has recovered to before the crisis. But this is only because of the government's Term Asset Backed Securities Loan Facility or TALF, which provides attractive government financing to buyers. Hyun Song Shin, a Princeton University economist, who is an expert in this area, says the big question is what happens without TALF, can the market stand on its own two feet or is it permanently hobbled. 3. The market for securities in commercial real estate loans has not seen any securties issued in two years. Overall says Robert Shiller, a Yale University economist, the security markets are dead, we are stuck in a situation where no one knows what will happen when the government gets out of these markets. The Fed will continue to support the mortgage markets till it goes from the $905 billion now to $1.25 trillion. At that point it will have to make some tough decisions, and banks are not lending, making it tougher for business. On top of this banks liquidity requirements are being increased after the G20 agreement, and Britain's FSA has already taken the initiative on this. And a further $50 billion in corporate real estate securities are to be refinanced in 2010, says CALPERS, Arnold Phillips. If there is no mechanism to address support here, these properties will default, leading to bank losses and even tighter credit. ...

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The U.S. Fed, America's central bank, barrs bank buyback of shares and limits dividend payouts to quarterly profit. The Fed does this as it warns banks they could sustain heavy losses of $700 billion for soured loans if the economy is slow to recover over several quarters, and unemployment remains high. The Fed's latest stress test for banks included the impact of the coronavirus epidemic. At this time the Fed says banks are healthy and this is protective action to keep the banks in safety.

Another sign of the changes taking place in finance and banking- swift action by the U.S. central bank leadership to stop early any potential improper behaviour of banks to do debt buybacks or dividend payout not meeting rules related to profit. 

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Panasonic's renewed focus on profitability. Panasonic's new 3 year business plan under CEO Tsuga focusses on profitability. Tsuga says "the first thing we have to do under this business plan is to get rid of the loss making businesses." Business units will be reorganized so that each business unit will do the product planning, production and sales, as opposed to the current organization which splits units by functional areas such as development and production. The changes are likely to bring the units down to 49 from 88. In a sign of the changes Panasonic set new profit targets but no revenue targets.

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Its now known that some of the money that the government used to bailout AIG is going to Deutsche Bank and Goldman Sachs, so that they can pay the hedge funds to whome they sold credit default swaps. The way it works is this. Hedge funds bet against the housing market that if mortgage defaults reach a certain level they would be paid a large amount. To do this they buy credit default swaps from banks like Deutsche Bank and Goldman. In turn Deutsch and Goldman go out and hedge the risks of selling these credit default swaps. Its hard to find someone to sell this insurance, but AIG becomes the dominant insurer for these credit default swaps. What does AIG get out of this. Only fractions of apenny for every dollar of insurance sold to the banks, less than $10 million for $1 billion of insurance. These swaps were sold in 2005, when some of these hedge funds saw risks in the housing markets excesses, and they were making the bets for an event that was a very plausible one, with very little risk to themselves. And the banks were passing on a lot of the risk for insurance on the cheap to AIG, which ends being the sucker holding a big part of the risk. What did have to gain from this, and why it agreed to sell this insurance is a mystery. Its this insurance that has caused AIG its biggest headache, to have to set aside money to pay the banks who in turn pay the hedge funds. When these pools of mortgage assets of companies like Countrywide Financial, which were created by Deutsche Bank and Goldman, called by names such as 'START' and 'ABACUS', went down in value AIG has to set aside money to pay the banks. As these assets fall in value from mid September to December 2008, AIG and by this the government which now owns 80% of AIG, paid $5.4 billion to Deutsche and $8.1 billion to Goldman under credit default swap contracts AIG has written. This adds up to $52 billion paid to all the banks that bought insurance for credit default swaps they sold and covered with AIG insurance. And this is a large part of the $170 billion of government money to AIG. Its for this kind of financial wizardry that makes little sense, and showed no sense of responsibility for the firm, that the Financial Products Group's 370 employees are to be rewarded with $400 million in bonuses, with binding contracts as reported in the Washington Post. The $165 million so widely reported in bonuses sent out recently, are only a part of the $400 million. While this is going on its surreal that on the other side Michigan is hurting , auto states in the midwest are hurting badly. And $17 billion barely makes it through in time to keep GM and Chrysler running in December 2008, and the money can be called in by the government in February 2009 leading to these companies ending up in bankruptcy. This puts the situation in new perspective, and Rattner who heads the group looking at the GM restructuring must be aware of this, when he said bankruptcy is not necessarily the best option and the loans would not be called in by the government. Its job losses in the economy, and the fragile nature of the economic outlook, and also the way in which money is being scandalously wasted in other places like AIG with no purpose, that Rattner must have in the back of his mind as he looks at money for GM restructuring and jobs for hurting workers. ...

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Prof. Jeffrey Wasserstrom of UC Irvine reviews Henry Paulson's "Dealing With China." Paulson was head of Goldman Sachs investment bank and Secretary of the Treasury 2006-2009, the period of the global financial crisis. He made 70 visits to China since his days at Goldman Sachs and calls Chinese leaders Jiang Zemin and Jinping "old friends." He established the Strategic Economic Dialogue in the Bush administration for dialogue on economic issues with China, and setup the Paulson Institute at the University of Chicago to focus on China-U.S. relations. One of Paulson's points is that China's financial system faces a day of reckoning, with large losses and many restructurings. Wasserstrom's review looks at Paulson's view of dealing with China and points to a sense that it needs updating because by the time the book is published a lot has changed with the new Jinping administration. The new administration in China is more assertive in foreign affairs, and less tolerant of both the corruption that became part of the Chinese capitalist development inside a state run one party system, and of the voices for more openness. It also has placed tight controls on the Internet. Jinping sees a constructive role for the Communist party in the future as China makes economic reforms away from state run enterprises, and is working to strengthen the party through discipline and anti-corruption initiative. The reckoning Paulson mentions, Krugman and other experts have described in other language- not as a reckoning but that China was no exception and would face the same problems that the U.S. and the eurozone faced since 2008 from financial excesses. In this sense Paulson's views and interactions with the Chinese leadership may represent another era, a period of exuberance when some of these financial excesses were being built up. Today's economic team of Jinping and Li Keqiang is more focussed on making sure the transition through a economic crisis is managed carefully, keeping in mind the risks for China considering its history, and the situation where China is still a "middle income country" with aspirations for further development to improve incomes and living standards. Their view is that tight control is needed as China makes this transition to a less state enterprise dependent, and more consumer economy, so that there is no loss of the gains made so far. A different set of skills and deft management of the economy is needed, making Paulson's views from another era less relevant. External influences such as managing the complex China-Japan relationship as both countries become more assertive are creating another dynamic in Asia, which Chinese leaders may see as requiring careful management, making Paulson's experience less relevant for a new period with new challenges. For the U.S. the economic cooperation with China now occurs with an added political dimension. Of concern for the tight control, seen as not forward looking and not bringing more constructive voices into the system, and the new complexities of carefully managing the changing U.S.-China-Japan relationship in Asia. ...

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The views of Timothy Geithner, president of the New York Fed, of Robert Steel Undersecretary of the Treasury, and of r Schwartz of Bear Stearns and Dimon of Chase JP Morgan and Ben Bernanke in answering questing at a key congessional hearing of the Senate banking Committee about the Bear Stearns collapse. The $2 a share was determined after Geithner and Paulson knew that JP Morgan was prepared to bid $2 a share, and Paulson saw the need to keep the price as low as a higher price would create the possibility of moral hazard. Dimon's view he was buying a house on fire and he had to do in 48 hours what it would take a month to do, Schwartz, view the rumors did Bearn Stearns in ans set the stage for a bank run, Geithner's view the Fed would not have lent money to Bear Stearns directly under its new policy of lending to investment banks because it felt very uncomfortable about Bear Stearns knowing what it knew at the time. Officials say that the first $1 billion in losses from Bear Stearns would be borne by JP Morgan and after the $10 a share upgrading of the Chase offer the Fed lent $25 billion to Bear Stearns/Chase to complete the deal separate from the $30 billion Fed support of the original deal. Fed disclosed that securities firms borrowed an average of $38.1 billion a day through the week ending Wednesday and direct lending to tradtional borrowerswent up dramatically to $7 billion a day up from $550 million a day the previous week and the highest level since 9/11. Ben Bernanke's view it was action necessary in the interest of the American economy, and the bailout of Bear Stearns was a bailout of the markets in general. This includes Asian markets because the pressure was to do something before Asian markets opened Sunday night....

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JP Morgan Chase disclosed that traders in the Chief Investment Office may have tried to avoid showing the full extent of losses by placing inaccurate prices on their positions. A trader named the "London whale," may have been asked by his boss to mark positions more aggressively. CEO Dimon said this has "shaken our company to the core."

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French voters turned to parties outside the mainstream left Socialist Party and the right Republican Party for the first time in a run off presidential election. The National Front's Jean Le Pen made it to the runoff in 2002, then lost to Chirac of the Republican Party who won 78% of the vote. This time the Republican Party candidate Fillon had about 20%, the Socialist Party candidate Hamon won just 6% of the vote with the rest of the socialist vote going to a far left candidate Jean Luc Melenchon who had 19.6%. The winners were Emmanuel Macron, a former Economy minister under president Hollande of the socialist Party, getting about 24% and Marine Le Pen, the daughter of Jean Le Pen of the National Front, getting 21.5%. Compared to the U.S. the situation is slightly different in France because of the very high unemployment rate for young people- younger voters supported the National Front, and people especially in rural areas in the north, north east, and the south of the country around Nice and Marseille supported the National Front. Macron's movement En Marche, centrist party drawing support from centre right and centre left without clear ideology except to renew France and pro-EU, was strong in urban areas, among more educated people, especially in Paris and the area around Bordeaux and Toulouse in the south east of the country. Fillon did not do well in some traditional Republican Party areas including Nice, with inroads from Le Pen, who defined the party around anti-immigration, closed borders, and withdrawal from the European Union. ...

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The danger signals that were missed by H-P's board and management in the disastrous Autonomy acquisition.

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Its going to be very difficult to adopt the bad bank option in current circumstances, where the banks find their situation continually and rapidly deteriorating with renewed loss of public confidence and collapsing share prices. The efforts with the first TARP under Treasury Secretary Paulson to isolate the toxic assets of banks did not take off and had to be diverted to capital injections for precisely this reason. Banks in November and December 2008 went through a continually escalating problem situation, with losses, collapsing share prices and so on, and the government had no breathing room to develop the bad bank solution. In some cases decisions had to be made in a few days to prevent the collapse of some banking institution like Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley or Citicorp. At the same time its very clear that there can be no restoration of confidence in lending, and no recovery, without lending by banks, without a bad bank to separate these toxic assets from the banking system in the USA. The Swedish and American example in the 1990's of a bad bank, was possible because the banks were either gone bust, or under government ownership. With the banks in private hands, it is somewhere between difficult to impossible to value these toxic assets without serious problems. So nationalizing these banks becomes the only serious option, which would become more acceptable as the crisis unfolds in 2010, and it becomes clear that one way or another the government is guaranteeing these assets. Banks are in reality entirely dependent on the US government for capital and support, and it would not be wise to pretend otherwise. The safest and most direct option would be to mitigate the risks of nationalization, with prudent safeguards, and develop the bad bank option with the government in ownership of banks, in which case the bad bank option can proceed quickly. ...

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Meltzer argues against a supervisory role for the Fed, at a time when Secretary Paulson is increasing the supervisory authority of the Fed as it becomes more involved in helping the financial markets recover and in doing so working with investment banks, and with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. He sees the Fed as having failed in most of the crises of recent years in exerting its supervisory authority in a timely and appropriate way. He allows for some time for the financial markets to get back to normal after which he thinks it best to return to strict capital standards which if not met would lead to management being replaced, shareholders taking losses, followed by a temporary takeover by regulators.

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THe Economist says that the efforts of banks like Chase JP Morgan, Goldman Sachs and Wells Fargo to rewrite history are wrong and dangerous. They are wrong because there was acomplete collapse of confidence by December 2009 and these banks benfitted from state guarantees and government efforts to help the banks without which Goldman, and Morgan Stanley and other banks would be in serious difficulty or in danger of collapsing. It is dangerous because it is being used to distort the process of putting in place the right compensation incentives to avoid overleveraging and risk taking, putting in place prudent regulation, and taking all the right steps to prevent a future banking crisis, with the argument that this should apply only to the weaker banks. It is dangerous on two other points. The banking regulations should apply to the entire banking industry, and especially on banks that are too big to fail. These banks now are content to leave the toxic assets on their books where they are and consider government efforts to purchase these toxic loans and securoities or otherwise resolve these assets in some kind of good bank-bad bank scheme, as unnecessary. All this is happening even as the banks themselves remain poorly capitalized, even after raising funds in the capital markets recently, and remain very dependent on the government. The danger is that this may make everyone complacent in the event of a developing new storm....

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The U.S. Senate votes 92-2 in near unanimity to pass a bill on opioid addiction, for prevention, treatment and recovery. This comes as the U.S. faces a opioid addiction crisis in 2016. It increases funding by 47% for the efforts, with funding approval to be voted on separately.

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Information provided by experts suggest that the government plans including the public-private partnership with $1 trillion committment to absorb the bad assets in financial institutions, offered as a general solution without specifics by Treasury Secretary Geithner, will be inadequate to cope with the growing bad debt. Nouriel Roubini at New York University says his analysis suggests that the USA financial institutions are already insolvent. The bad debts of banks he says now surpass bank assets. Roubini has been ahead of the curve in his estimates in 2008, and is respected for his prescient remarks about growing credit problems. In his latest report he says that total losses by American financial institutions and the fall in market value of the assets they hold will reach $3.6 trillion , up from his previous estimate of $2 trillion. Of the total he says American banks face half of this or $1.8 trillion, with the rest borne by other financial institutions in the United States and abroad. Mr Posen an economist at the Peterson Institute agrees. He says the liabilities of of American financial institutions far exceed their assets. The only qualification of this says Posen is whether this should be seen as a temporary panic, or whether the economic climate will improve and the value of bank assets recover from depressed values. Raghuram Rajan, of the University of Chicago graduate business school, agrees that if the banks had to sell these assets today at distressed prices then they are insolvent, but if there are calmer times say in ayear or so and values recover then banks may get anew lease on life. So much of this depends on market psychology, market confidence and the economic climate improving. The only problem here is that as happened in 2007 and 2008, the recognition, awareness and action has fallen behind the speed and accelerating manner of the downturn. The Bush administration, Congress, and the American public support, have all been lacking in providing the vigorous action needed, compared to the speed with which the crisis hit in the October 2008 to January 2009 period. The transition between administrations added to this effect. The total lack of any Republican support for the Obama administration's effort continues this effect. Now the Geithner plan with few specifics for a public private partnership for tackling the bad debt, and the lack of action on a bad bank solution with government takeover of certain banks as needed, continues this pattern. The constricted credit meanwhile continues to hit business with an additional hit from dropping sales, leading to layoffs across all industries, which simply worsens the housing crisis and growing foreclosures. So all across the spectrum government action is at worst very late as in the slow response to foreclosures, where the $50 billion proposed now should have come in early 2008, and the banks halting foreclosures and modification efforts proposed now should have come in early 2008 as proposed by Bair and Feldstein. And at best government is just catching up to the credit crisis as with the Fed and FDIC efforts to contain and stabilize it, with inconsistent results and the collapse of some financial institutions like Lehman Brothers. The lack of consensus in Congress and the inexperience of the new administration, means more valuable time will be lost in crafting an effective response in the manner of the bad bank solution. What all this means is that the overall response in 2009 as in 2008 will also lag behind, and the opportunity for a decisive solution is slipping away even as the cost of that solution is climbing, putting it further and further beyond reach. See the link to Hiroko Tabuchi's article titled In Japan's stagnant decade, Cautuonary Tale for America, February 12, 2009, NYT. Tabuchi touches on just this point, that the American experience in 2007-2009 is just like that in Japan where the response lagged the problem in strength and effectiveness till 2003, after years of wasted effort....