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The maximum that can be paid out to executives in upfront cash for bonuses is 20% under the rules set by the European Union starting in 2011. And the amount of time that at least 40% of an EU banker's bonus must be deferred is 3-5 years. The US has not set up similiar rules restricting up front cash bonuses to prevent executives from taking excessive risks. During the 2008 financial many banking executives collected huge bonuses by taking excessive risks, even though the banks suffered huge losses after the departure of the executives. Now the SEC, the Federal Reserve and other government agencies in the US are reviewing the rules. Projected pace of Wall Street profits in 2010 are 28.7 billion for 2010, and the fear is for a repeat of the situation in 2008 as the US has no rules similiar to the EU. Britain's Financial Services Authority passed similar restrictions recently. The Dodd-Frank legislation for financial reforms requires the pay related regulations to be set by April 2011. That legislation specifically prohibits any bonus plan that "encourages inappropriate risks" at financial firms with more than $1 billion in assets. The view of the European Union's financial services commissioner, Michael Barnier, is that not enough has ben done in this area in the US, and doing nothing is to ignore the right lessons from the financial crisis....

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Lack of meaningful reform of credit rating agencies by 2014, 6 years after the 2008 financial crisis.

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Sheila Bair leaves behind a much stronger FDIC. William Isaac, a former FDIC chairman says she has had a positive effect on the agency by raising its profile and energy level. Under the Dodd-Frank financial reform legislation FDIC now has the powers to take over large complex financial institutions that are in serious trouble. Mr Gruenberg, who succeeds Ms Bair, has worked closely with her at FDIC. Jim Wigand, heads the new Office of Complex Financial institutions at the FDIC. One of the powers given by the legislation is for FDIC to have its examiners at financial firms to go over operations, providing backup supervision to the Federal Reserve and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. According to FDIC officials analysts should be in place at financial firms the FDIC oversees during the next 12 months. The FDIC is also working on a rule requiring banks with assets larger than $50 billion and other large nonbank financial firms to provide a "living will," a plan that would help regulators speedily and cleanly wind down a firm in a future financial crisis. In March 2011 the FDIC approved a draft rule requiring firms to submit these plans, along with regular updates and reports on the firms' current credit exposure. Ms. Bair says the proposal will be completed in August. Bair has also put in place FDIC managers with considerable experience who can continue the work of strengthening the regulatory system she started in 2006. In her work at FDIC Bair has performed a remarkable public service at a difficult time in the nation's history....

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By the time NYSE began the switch to becoming a technology company it was too late, says one expert. Other stock exchanges such as the Frankfurt Stock Exchange switched entirely to electronic trading even as the NYSE clung to old ways. All the time the trading floor of the NYSE was losing trading volume, handling only 20% of all trading volume in NYSE-listed stocks in 2012, down more than 40% from 2007, according to analysts. NYSE's Liffe, European derivatives business that came from the merger with Euronext in 2007 alone could be worth about $6 billion, close to the market capitalization of NYSE Euronext. Liffe was one of the main reasons NYSE was attractive to ICE. NYSE CEO Niederauer and the Board sensed the danger if NYSE remained by itself, according to people informed about discussions. The feeling was NYSE would fall further behind in a few years and lose control over its future. This created a new urgency to the talks with ICE, a doable merger from a regulatory perspective because there was not much overlap in the businesses. Niederauer's personal relationship with Sprecher of ICE provided the catalyst to move ahead and work out details such as headquarters locations in Atlanta and New York City, and sharing of management roles with Niederauer reporting to Sprecher. In his letter to employees Niederauer made it clear that ICE was acquiring NYSE. ICE started with electricity trading in Atlanta, embraced technology and electronic trading as its foundation, and took advantage of the opportunities in using technology to meet the requirements set by the Dodd Frank legislation for derivatives and futures trading....

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The New York Times reports from the comments of current and former members of the Chase Chief Investment Office (CIO), that risk officers at Chase were ignored when they raised issues about the complex trades made by trader Iksil. Iksil's trades had the support of his manager Mr. Macris, and Ms. Drew who was in charge of CIO. The comments also indicate that at one point Mr. Macris brought in a Risk Officer with whom he had worked closely for many years. Risk Officers are supposed to be independent and their concerns seriously heard, with the authority to halt trades that pose excessive risks. Which made this kind of cozy behaviour in the CIO trading offices in London cause for alarm. These reports also say Mr. Braunstein, the new CFO at JP Morgan Chase, did not strengthen controls after he assumed office in 2010. Bank officials disputed this. The New York offices did not fully grasp the complex trades being made in the CIO London offices, and upper management let the CIO operate pretty much on its own, especially with CEO Jamie Dimon's confidence in Ms. Drew's management of the CIO. This led to another gap in the process of risk management. Dimon had other priorities and distractions, from problem mortgages coming with the acquisition of Washington Mutual, pushing back aginst financial regulation after the 2008 crisis, stress tests and others. At the same time the U.S. Federal Reserve, regulators, and Treasury's coordinated effort to merge failing banks with other larger banks- because of the lack of the process of unwinding failed banks provided later under Dodd-Frank legislation- created mega financial banks. Unlike what the U.S. under Treasury Secretary Rubin pushed for in the case of S. Korea during a banking crisis in 1997, Treasury under Geithner and Fed officials did not push for unwinding of failed financial institutions such as Countrywide and Washington Mutual in 2008-2009 Chase's own portfolio of assets under the CIO, increased by an astounding amount from $76 billion in 2007 to $356 billion in 2011. Even if Ms Drew had managed CIO well before, managing a portfolio of this size is most likely to have presented a whole set of new challenges and problems for which the CIO office was not prepared. Similiar concerns were raised by other Fed officials such as Fed governors, Hoenig and Fisher, who raised the issue that such mega-banks posed unacceptable risks and were too big to manage. Pressures to increase investing profits, growing complacency, relaxing risk management controls, led to the situation where a single trader Mr. Iksil, who had only joined the bank in 2007 according to other reports, could create large losses. This follows a situation at UBSin 2011, where a novice trader made bets that resulted in large losses....

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Banking regulation in the U.S. after the Dodd-Frank legislation differs from banking regulation rules proposed by the Independent Commission on Banking in Britain. Britain has a much bigger financial sector relative to the size of its economy than the U.S., posing larger systemic risks. The commission in Britain is proposing structural changes that would separate investment banking from deposit taking at banks. Banks would have separate balance sheets for these two activities- and operate them as separate subsidiaries- even though they are part of one holding company. This means it would be harder to raise money cheaply for risktaking in investment banking. Under the Volcker Rule in the U.S., banks investment banking and deposit taking would not be separated in a structural separation- there would still be one balance sheet- only banks ability to trade with their own capital and run hedge funds would be constrained. Some banks have spun off trading operations in the U.S. and the the rules banks have to follow have not been clearly defined. Too big to fail is still a problem under current American regulation, though its effects are mitigated to some extent. As one expert puts it, its hard to regulate the banks because too much money is involved and the banks have the money and the lawyers to prevent or dilute new rules. The argument made by the banks in Britain is that universal international banking provides a public benefit and efficiencies. But John Vickers, the former chief economist of the Bank of England, and chairman of the Independent Commission on Banking, has a different view. He said recently, "it seems quite hard to identify and quantify real efficiencies as distinct from purely private gains."...

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Joseph Stiglitz describes policies and programs of the Obama administration that favor banks and avoid a government takeover of over leveraged and badly managed banks in the U.S. President Obama's policy transfers financial assets to banks on highly favorable terms even though some of the banks made bad decisions and highly overleveraged assets creating the 2008 global financial crisis. The policies avoid a government takeover of banks, policies which the U.S. aggressively pushed for in other countries such as S. Korea during the 1997 financial crisis with Rubin, Summers and Geithner at Treasury. These policies would come under strong criticism because it rewarded risk taking and kept in place an incentive system that led to such behaviours- creating "heads I win, tails you lose" psychology. It also delinks the performance-reward relationship that is the basis of free enterprise in western economies. A problem that would be left from the crisis and the Obama administration's response to it is "Too-Big-To-Fail," with banks larger than before. The FDIC and U.S. Fed's plans for banks to have living wills for an orderly windup under Dodd-Frank legislation only goes a part of the way in tackling this problem. In the U.S., and in Britain, France, Germany, Switzerland, the related problem of high bonuses continues into 2014, with RBS bank in Britain one of the egregious examples and highly unpopular with the British public. The lack of similiar government help to homeowners, advocated by Reagan economic advisor Martin Feldstein and FDIC chairwoman Sheila Bair from the beginnings of the crisis stands in sharp contrast to the response of the Obama administration. See the links for Barr, Feldstein and Hoenig. In an ultimate irony from the crisis handling much of the damage from foreclosures was done to minorities which supported the administration. ...

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The $2 billion losses at Chase highlights the need for completing the Volcker Rule with language that prevents banks engaging in risky trading activities. Former FDIC chairman Sheila Bair says precise language is needed to clarify the defiinition of hedging after the losses by a single trader's complex hedging bet in London. Individual traders have too much authority in existing trading arrangements to make complicated bets in finanial markets. Large losses were incurred by Swiss bank UBS when an individual trader in London made risky bets in 2011, raising all sorts of questions about the bank's risk management systems.

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Reilly cautions on over reliance on living wills to reduce systemic risk in the U.S. financial system.

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The American Treasury Secretary who handled the 2008 financial crisis, Henry Paulson, gives the new US financial reform legislation an incomplete grade. His main concern is that the too-big-to fail risk in the US banking system continues, and without clear rules a lot depends on the regulators. He does not see higher capital requirements doing much to ease that problem, and sees another crisis in a few years as inevitable. Former SEC chief, Harvey Pitt, gives it an F for failure or an I for Incomplete. He sees it as a boon for lawyers, because it is not clearly written and leaves so many loopholes, to a degree that is simply astounding. He says it does nothing in the way of preventing another crisis. Does nothing for transparency, nothing for monitoring and action by regulators, all factors that led to the crisis of 2008. Nouriel Roubini gives it a C+, because it does little to fix the reasons why securitization failed and caused the crisis, and in this way will keep credit creation and expansion in a weak state. He sees this financial reform bill as a failed effort that is laying the ground for the next crisis, with little action in the "too-big-to-fail" area, a huge dilution of what former Fed Chairman paul Volcker had advocated in the Volcker rule, and no real impact on the risky trading of derivatives. Bill Gross of PIMCO gives his frank assessment in no uncertain terms. A D+ for this bill. It shows how lobbyists for the banks still control Congress he says. It would have been better to let Paul Volcker take charge completely, than to have the lobbyists dilute the critical reform proposals. Simon Johnson gives it the lowest passing grade at MIT, a B. The only large change he says, is the Kanjorski Amendment, which give federal regulators the authority to breakup the large banks. But he cautions that it may require another crisis for the regulators and Congress to "get it," and do what they should be doing....

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Gretchen Morgenson of the Times distills key insights from 633 page report by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. Morgenson points to the role of the Federal Reserve in Washington and New York in being as she describes it, defiantly inert and uninterested in controlling the mortgage bubble even when it had grown to enormous proportions.The problem now is that the same Fed has received more regulatory powers under the Dodd-Frank law. The same Fed repeatedly did not exert its authority on predatory lending. Page 94 of the report cites a total of only three institutions referred to prosecutors by the Fed from 2000 to 2006. Page 164 shows why there have been so few prosecutions for mortgage fraud from the bursting of the mortgage bubble. William Black, a former fraud investigator and professor at the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law, says the FBI has received virtually no assistance from the regulators, the banking regulators and the thrift regulators. The report contains some outrageous comments by one of the key players in fueling the mortgage bubble, Angelo Mozilo of Countrywide Financial. Morgenson describes him as a lender that roped unsuspecting borrowers into poisonous loans. Mozilo says in an interview on page 105 that his company prevented "social unrest" by providing loans to 25 million borrowers, many from minority groups. Never mind that this wave of poisonous loans has clogged the arteries of the nation's financial system, and resulted in foreclosures for millions of homeowners, creating a troubled housing market that hobbles the economy. Neil Barofsky, special inspector general of the Troubled Asset Relief Program, sees further bailouts ahead. He said in a report to Congress in late January 2011: "Unless and until an institution like Citigroup is either broken up, so that it is no longer a threat to the financial system, or a structure put in place that it will be left to suffer the full consequences of its own folly, the prospect of more bailouts willl potentially fuel more bad behaviour with potentially disastrous results." ...