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The WSJ editorial says Gen McChrystal may bring the qualities of flexibility and imagination, and intellect, the way General Petraeus did to the war in Iraq. It says Defense Secretary Gates did well with President Obama to bring achange of leadership to the American effort to bring security to the Afghan people from the Taliban militants. It was the leisurely way the NATO effort proceeded under Gen. McKiernan in building the Afghan army- the only remaining institution that commands confidence in the country - that WSJ faults for having gone on too long. The other institutions like the corrupt police, and the failing government of Hamid Karzai, along with the spread of opium farming in the south have led to further deterioration in security.

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An inherent division between the two sides about the merits of a large scale involvement- as advocated by a tactical military man McChrystal and the limited involvement advocated by Vice President Biden considering the lack of a reliable Afghan partner - have now spilled out into the open after a compromise was patched together about a year ago. That compromise involved sending more troops but with a deadline for withdrawal set for July 2011. Now as the war reaches a stalemate -as a war of this type in the mountainous terrain of Afghanistan, and as ordinary Afghans see no particular interest in either side in this war, was largely expected to turn out into- the frustration has spilled out into the open. General McChrystal, in an interview with Rolling Stone magazine this Spring, made comments with disdain for Vice President Biden, and an aide to McChrystal called National Security Advisor James Jones , a clown.

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The Paris based think tank International Council for Security and Development says in a report that the Taliban now have apermanent presence in 72% of the contry and are now encircling the capital Kabul, and attacking 4 roads leading to the capital. This will certainly make things difficult for Obama as he takes office in January as the economic crisis will take a lot of attention while at the same time additional troops and military support will come into an Afghanistan that is mostly in the hands of the Taliban and with Kabul region in danger.

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Ann Marlowe has completed her sixth embed with American troops. She is a visiting fellow of the Hudson Institute. Her views from the ground are that without good governance the American effort there seriously risks failing. She is very concerned that the current administration is not taking good governance seriously. There should be alternatives to the Taliban and to the Karzai government which has failed to win public support.

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Questions raised about the capabilities of the Afghan army and police force following the U.S. withdrawal.

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Friedman made a similiar point before the presidential election in the US about Obama's inexperience and using the Afghan war to burnish his credentials. See the link to Friedman. Here Congressman Wilson is shown as using Tip O'Neill's and Democrats opposition to the Reagan support for the contras in Nicaragua as the good fight and the use of the support of the "good" war against the soviets in Afghanistan to ward off accusations from Republican right of weakness against the Soviet Union's expansion.

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Kevin Maurer looks back at 15 years of covering Afghanistan since 2004, and asks was it worth it.  The conflict has cost 145,000 lives for the U.S. period of the war alone. Not counting the war in which the Russians were involved in the decade before the U.S. involvement. In fact the Russian involvement in Afghanistan was costly enough to hasten the collapse of the Soviet Union and bring Gorbachev to power to unwind the war and make the changes that led to the collapse of the Berlin Wall.  2400 U.S. servicemen dead and 20,000 Americans wounded. The cost to the U.S. is $737 billion for this war, according to a report in 2018 from Brown University's Costs of War Project. Just as the Soviet Union showed the damage from this war the U.S. has seen the cost of this war and foreign entanglement in another war that started accidentally with international interventions in the Iran-Iraq region as a cost that was borne with consequences. This includes the neglect of infrastructure and the damage to the middle class prosperity built up in the 1950's and 1960's after the Second World War. The U.S. got into this war with 9/11 attacks on New York City. By 2010 what began as a war fought by a few Special Operations teams turned into a war with troop levels reaching 100,000. Presidents Bush and Obama both failed to end the war by winning it. In 2014 finally combat operations stopped and American troops mainly conducted anti-terrorism operations and trained Afghan forces. In recent years the war has gradually disappeared from the national discussion in the U.S. and is barely talked about. President Trump wants to end the war even if it means talking to the Taliban and negotiations directly with the Taliban are ongoing.  One result of this war is the aversion to costly international entanglements and the highly unpopular nature of the conflicts. There are serious costs of the conflict in terms of neglected domestic priorities including infrastructure, loss of U.S. technological edge in key industries, and the competition from China, an the investments in health, education, services that were not made, the increase in inequalities and the diminishing of the middle class. The global financial crisis of 2008, the result of faulty banking, added an economic dimension through the loss of middle class savings in the U.S., worsening the financial situation of the middle class in the U.S.    ...

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Gen. Matttis, the U.S. Defense Secretary has completed a strategy review on U.S. presence in Afghanistan. The U.S. policy is now set to put in more troops to support the additional 3900 American troops to advise the Afghan Army authorized in June 2017, as it fights both the Taliban and the Islamic State affiliate in Khorasan, Afghanistan. Two differences from the policy of the Obama administration are the increased focus on Pakistan's border with Afghanistan, the Haqqani network, and other related matters which are coming under increased review so that sanctuaries are shut down. Lt. Gen. McMaster, the national security advisor, headed the governance, anti corruption review in Afghanistan during the Obama administration. This is now the focus of the Trump administration- to ask the Afghan government for improvement in these areas in return for aid. Other changes are to secure the support levels of NATO countries in the effort, so that the U.S. is not shouldering the burden alone. Gordon, Schmitt and Haberman cite the report of Gen. Nicholson, head of the American forces in Afghanistan to the U.S. Congress. This report shows deterioration in the fight against the Taliban and Islamic State. As of Nov. 2016 the areas under Afghan government control dropped 15% to 57% since 2015. About 8,400 American troops are part of the 13,000 troop international force in Aghanistan, supporting the Afghan military. An addition 2,000 troops are in counterterrorism missions.   ...

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Britain's conditional support for increasing troop levels in Afghanistan. The conditions are, France and Germany add troops, The finding of a partner in the Afghan government that will "take the initiative against corruption, and put the decision till after the a British general election.

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Dexter Filkins of the NYT says not only is democracy a fragile thing, but there are fundamental questions about the wisdom and the direction of the American led project here. But he does'nt go onto take this further, better to let the readers decide for themselves from the statement of the Chairman of the Independent Election Commission that the result will be the same. Then is the whole thing a charade? Abdullah was foreign minister in Karzai's government. What are the choices in this election, when the government of which he was a part of commands little support and is widely perceived as corrupt and ineffective, and which doesn't control much beyond Kabul, if he Abdullah now becomes part of it? This is why Filkins sees this as merely a project and amisconceived and badly executed one, if not an unmanageable one to begin with.

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See the piece by Paul Pillar because it says something at the heart of the problem- one of the biggest paradoxes in the rationale for the counterinsurgency. And it is this: the Pakistan government you are trying to help is assisting the forces that threaten it. At the heart of this paradox is the fact that the Pakistan government, military and intelligence services are not all acting together and there are clandestine and some open elements in each of these institutions that support the Taliban. And the official elelments also are hedging their bets and are willing to make adeal with the Taliban if necessary.

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Problems with the rural development and agriculture projects conducted by USAID in Afghanistan include overspending in 2009, followed by sharp cutbacks in 2010 and 2011 as budget cuts were made. In 2009 USAID made a grant of $300 million to Arlington based International Relief and Development (IRD) to help farmers in Kandahar and Helmand improve productivity over just one year, at the insistence of Richard Holbrooke. The focus was on paying for day labor jobs to clean canals, offer subsidized seeds to encourage switching from opium poppies, distributing tractors, and building gravel roads. Because many districts of the two provinces were considered unsafe for work, much of the money was concentrated on a few districts and in one year. As a result farmers in Kandahar got more seed than they needed and they in turn sold tons of seed and tractors in Pakistan for cash. A senior program official at IRD says it wasn't realistic to pour so much money in one year. But USAID officials say overspending and poor oversight made the program seriously flawed. There was also a difference in the views of the military and USAID on the value of day jobs. The U.S. military sees this as away of protecting its efforts, of literally protecting its flanks, as this keeps unemployed youth from joining the Taliban. At the same time senior USAID officials wanted to see multiple companies bid for the next $350 millon on a follow-on project. When the USAID team of specialists again awarded it to IRD, senior offficials at USAID decided to cancel the program. The program was then redesigned in the expectation that other companies would bid for it. In the meantime USAID gave IRD 3 quarterly extensions, the last expiring June 30, 2011. The US military sees the day labor program as crucial for its military efforts, so there is kind of an impasse with USAID reluctantly giving in. IRD meantime is shutting down activites in Helmand and will do this also in Kandahar probably by the end of May, as its contract has not been renewed because of problems with the program. USAID has a high staff turnover rate of 85% a year in Kabul which complicates things with the shifting priorities of different officials. Some programs are being scaled back- a job retraining program seen as requiring $125 million over 18 months is being scaled back to $40 million. Others such as a USAID project for coordinating disparate rural rehabilitation projects for $140 million is held back because of lack of agreement with the Afghan government about how it should proceed. In parts of Kandahar USAID had found several contractors doing the same work. See the groups on Dexter Filkins, and on Commander Adams, which touch on serious development issues and the war....

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The government of Hamid Karzi released Mr Dastagir from jail 2 months ago even though he was aTaliban commander in an area near Turkmenistan. This fuels feeling among ordinary Afghan people that the corrupt or criminal can get themselves out of jail. In this case the tribal elders who advocated his release may themselves have faced threats from the Taliban and argued for his release. He was killed in a US pinpoint bombing raid.

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Lakhdar Brahimi who was special representative of the UN secretary general for Afghainistan from October 2001 to December 2004 and was present when under UN auspices Afghan political representatives met to build anew after the US defeated the Taliban. He says it was a mistake then no to try to atract those in the Taliban movement and other political groups in Afhanistan that could have been brought into the new political setup and administration to build a broader base of support. And the Taliban did not surrender to anyone when it was defeated so the same mebers of that movement could simply resurface. Also no peace can be achieved in Afghanistan without the cooperation and support of Pakistan its neighbor and with tribes. sharing land on both sides of the border. Brahimi says he bitterly regrets not having advocated more strongly 2 suggestions made by the UN in early 2002. The first to reach out to those members of the Taliban who were willing to join the political process and second to deploy the ISAF outside of Kabul with increased strength. He also believes the war that happened in Iraq after the Afghan peace effort may have falso fundamentally altered the views of people in the countryside and in border areas of neigboring Pakistan about perceptions of the US and NATO....