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Robert Pape of the University of Chicago political science department points out the facts that show an increase in suicide bombings and roadside bomb attacks witrh asharp escalation as the foreign troop presence increased. He quotes Gen McChrystal's own report, " the increase in firepower and force protection have severely damaged the International Security Assistance Force's legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan people." In this respect he says McChrystal's request is not bold enough because with further escalation on the ground even more troops than he has requested would be required. THe numbers he gives are- neglibible roadside bombings after 2001, then as US and foreign troops increased 782 in 2005,1,739 in 2006, 2000 in 2007 and 3200 in 2008, all focussed on western targets not Afghan forces. He says the approach of buying support is used by the Taliban, and the US needs to allocate more resources and money to this effort. The switch would be gradual to fewer ground troops as they are seen as foreign occupiers, and America would maintain its military presece but differently avoiding the large forces that would only increase resistance to foreign occupation as its perceived in Afghanistan....

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US differences with Pakistan are based on two different perspectves that are not reconcilable. Recent events and the relationship between the US and Pakistan's army chief have confirmed that this is not going to change. US sees militants and Taliban inside Pakistan as havens for the short term as the US disengages from Afghanistan, whereas Pakistan's army sees them as useful elements in Pakistan's security interests in relation to India for the long term. Whe Kayani met with Obama in Washington, he handed Obama a 13 page document showing Pakistan's strategic perspective and emphasizing the gap between short term US interests and Pakistan's long term interests. The Wikileaks cables show Kayani discussing with US officials a possible removal of President Zardari and his preferred replacement. This made Kayani, normally reticent, to rant for hours on the irreconciliable differences between the US and Pakistan with a group of Pakistani journalists. He described Pakistan as the US's "most bullied ally," and said the frames of reference of the US and Pakistan regarding regional ssecurity "can never be the same," according to news accounts. And added that "the real aim of US strategy is to de-nuclearize Pakistan." Holbrooke and Admiral Mullen had hoped to reverse "a trust deficit" between the two sides. But this has not happened. General Petraeus is taking a tougher attitude and patience is thin on both sides. According to a Kayani friend, air marshal Chaudhry, Kayani is always asking Petraeus what the strategic objectives are in Afghanistan. US officials say they have given up on changing Kayani's thinking and that Kayani has told them: "I don't trust you." Kayani's position makes sense when one looks at the strongly anti-American public in Pakistan. Pakistani military and intelligence officials say a campaign against militants inside Pakistan incites domestic terrorism and uproots local communities. And by following Pakistan's own interests and frames of reference Kayani sends signals that win esteem among the Pakistani public. Opinion polls now show the military held in higher esteem than the Zardari administration. This puts the US in a no-win situation in Afghanistan with no clear objectives for the long term. This leaves the US in a time of tight budgets stretched thin to meet the needs in other defence areas that need attention, such as modernization of forces, trouble spots such as Korea, Iran and elsewhere, and resources needed for modernization of US infrastructure and supporting new technologies and industries. The lasting solutions that will take time, careful thought and preparation would be to integrate South Asia as a whole into an economic zone, extensive infrastructure building, and bring India and Pakistan closer through diplomacy and negotiations. See the articles by Richard Haas and others on the need to redirect resources. ...

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Questions raised about the capabilities of the Afghan army and police force following the U.S. withdrawal.

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The Afghan Army in operations in Chak District, Wardak province as the U.S. prepares a complete withdrawal from Afghanistan. The withdrawal plan leaves a large role for the Afghan Army.

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Azam Ahmedjan provides this insightful account of how the Taliban in 2015 has changed. It is no longer the old Taliban the U.S. faced following 9/11 attacks. The aging leadership in Patkistan no longer has the same level of control in Afghanistan. The older Taliban leadership inside Afghanistan has been killed in fighting with American led forces and drone strikes, leaving younger, less disciplined and fractured groups inside Afghanistan. This is the Taliban the American supported government faces. Most importantly the expectations of the Afghan people have changed. This makes it harder to negotiate a peace agreement with fractured Taliban groups on the ground. It also creates new opportunities for integrating Afghanistan into the fabric of South Asian society, as people in India and Pakistan are eager to see modernization, building of infrastructure, education, healthcare, and better standards of living after years of conflict.

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The Saudis fear a blowback from a military push by the US against the Taliban. Pakistan sees a push by the USA leading to Taliban concentrating in the Baluchistan part of Pakistan.