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How Obama's new selection for Fed governor, Daniel Tarullo- who taught banking law at Georgetown University- is shaking things up at the Fed. He is in charge of regulation of the banking system at the Fed. He has instituted a review of bank review practices and supervision at all of the regional Federal Reserve banks. With many banks failures in the south, the Atlanta Fed came in for serious review, and regulators from outside the area were sent to the Atlanta Fed. Tarullo did not hesitate to make new appointments for serious oversight, as regulators had simply become lax. Tarullo has brough in economists to take a fresh look at how the banking system would perform in the event of another crisis, and what action needs to be taken. This compares to individual bank examiners having alimited perspective what damage the overall banking system could do with lax regulation. He has also asked the Fed regulatory staff to look closely and hard at the troubled commercial real estate loans and toughen regulatory measures. Welcome and overdue as this is, in another banking crisis this could be too little too late. Congress has weakened regulatory reforms proposed by the Obama administration, and the Obama administration itself has not the will to address the tough issues raised by the banking crisis. Both have buckled under pressure from the lobbying of the banking industry, and the close connections between some banking executives and the administration. This has raised the level of urgency felt by Tarullo, Volcker, Mervyn King and some in the financial industry itself, with the issue of "too big to fail" and breaking up the larger banks into smaller ones, moving to the top of everyone's agenda. With the simple fact that if banks were "too big to fail" before the crisis, then they are much bigger now, and the question of what action must be taken shoved aside as too big to tackle....

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FactSet Research Systems shows that of 13,339 ratings of U.S. listed companies 96% were buy, hold or overweight. Only 4% were sell or underweight. Mike Mayo describes the difficulties he faced giving true ratings of banks that reflected loan and other problems- in over 2 decades as a bank analyst- in his book "Exile on Wall Street." A significant culture change is required, says Mayo, for the hundreds of analysts who do the ratings to perform their function of providing proper scrutiny of companies. The clout of banks in the American capitalism of today also works to the severe detriment of the economc system to perform the way it should. He says the U.S. should look to the Financial Services Authority in Britain for the kind of actions that are needed for the financial sector supervisory officials. He points out that the FSA fired many of its existing staff and looked for new talent, at the same time increasing the salaries and benefits so that regulatory supervisors were not looking for opportunities in the private sector....

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Joseph Stiglitz describes policies and programs of the Obama administration that favor banks and avoid a government takeover of over leveraged and badly managed banks in the U.S. President Obama's policy transfers financial assets to banks on highly favorable terms even though some of the banks made bad decisions and highly overleveraged assets creating the 2008 global financial crisis. The policies avoid a government takeover of banks, policies which the U.S. aggressively pushed for in other countries such as S. Korea during the 1997 financial crisis with Rubin, Summers and Geithner at Treasury. These policies would come under strong criticism because it rewarded risk taking and kept in place an incentive system that led to such behaviours- creating "heads I win, tails you lose" psychology. It also delinks the performance-reward relationship that is the basis of free enterprise in western economies. A problem that would be left from the crisis and the Obama administration's response to it is "Too-Big-To-Fail," with banks larger than before. The FDIC and U.S. Fed's plans for banks to have living wills for an orderly windup under Dodd-Frank legislation only goes a part of the way in tackling this problem. In the U.S., and in Britain, France, Germany, Switzerland, the related problem of high bonuses continues into 2014, with RBS bank in Britain one of the egregious examples and highly unpopular with the British public. The lack of similiar government help to homeowners, advocated by Reagan economic advisor Martin Feldstein and FDIC chairwoman Sheila Bair from the beginnings of the crisis stands in sharp contrast to the response of the Obama administration. See the links for Barr, Feldstein and Hoenig. In an ultimate irony from the crisis handling much of the damage from foreclosures was done to minorities which supported the administration. ...

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The House of Representatives just passed a bill to stem foreclosures and stabilize house prices by having the government through the Federal Housing Administration reinsure upto $300 billion of problem loans. The bills backers estimate 1.5 million foreclosures could be prevented by this bill but the Congressional Budget Office estimates only about 500,000 foreclosures can be averted this way. Under this bill lenders would have to writedown their loans to 85% of current value of the house. Borrowers pay a fee for the insurance and give up any share in future price appreciation to the government. According to the Congressional Budget Office the cost to the government is modest about $1.7 billion over years. The reason for the limited effectiveness of this bill is that it is voluntary, not much government money is extended. Many of the comments in the blog on this article as is the case with other articles on help to homeowners facing foreclosure show the widespread idea that its a bailout of irresponsible decisions by homeowners and mortgage companies who made the loans. This may be the reason why so little has been done in this regard and the limited government money extended even in plans put forth by Congressional Democrats like Barney Frank. Feldstein who is a former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors under Reagan has taken a different approach focussing on homeowners who may see the rational decision is to walk away from homes where they have no equity in their homes as prices drop by 20% and for government to prevent a wave of foreclosures in this manner. The danger is if not much is done there could be a downward spiral in home prices as foreclosure reach a new high in 2009. Last year according to Economist's charts foreclosures were averaging more than 100,000 a month now they are averaging more than 200,000 a month, this would take it from 1.5 million foreclosures in 2007 to 2.5 million in 2008. According to the Economist 9 million people owe more than their house is worth, the homeowners who have negative equity, and if they were to foreclose at the rate of 2-3 million a year and accelerating as the economy deteriorates, this could be enough to start a downward spiral. At that point a new President and Congress would have to take drastic action with a substantial amount of the government's money. In that kind of crisis not much thought would be given to the cost because like the financial meltdown that was feared during the Bear Stearns crisis the fears of a global severe economic crisis would make action necessary on many fronts of which housing would be one....

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Mark Hulbert lists the quality stocks with low P/E ratios, little debt, high return on equity, and long records of earnings growth spanning long periods that limit volatility after the emerging markets crisis of 2014. He adds a cautionary note on the idea of quality stocks by saying P/E ratios matter, that quality stocks at a high price are a bad investment and at extraordinary prices are a extraodinarily bad investment, citing the Nifty Fifty stocks of quality in 1972 that lost value in the stock market slide in 1973. He takes quality stocks Disney, Procter & Gamble, Johnson & Johnson off the list of quality stocks because of high P/E ratios, a critical criteria. Hulbert's list for financial quality companies and their P/E ratios in Jan. 2014: AT&T telecom 9.4, Aflac insurance 9.1, Allstate insurance 10.9, Apple computer and telecom 12.7, Bank of Nova Scotia 11.0, Chevron oil 10.0, Cisco computer hardware 12.2, IBM technology 11.7, Royal Bank of Canada 11.5, Wells Fargo banking 11.5. These P/E ratios compare with the S&P 500 P/E of 17.3....

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Abut 3 million homeowners are expected to default on their mortgages in the 30 months ending in mid 2009, and two thirds of this or 2 million will go into foreclosure, according to Moody's Economy.com. So what led to all this which eventually hit the financial markets in the U.S., and also to a lesser degree in Europe, through the opacity of the mortgage securities created from bad mortgages with falsely tagged triple AAA ratings that ended up in the assets of banks and investment firms? The motivations of each group were perverted as things unfolded. When the packagers of securties were not responsible for what they were doing they pursued profit before ethical behaviour and all sorts of securities were created. As these packagers were allowed to shop for ratings the ratings companies gradually lowered their standards to attract business. Politicians failed in the free market atmosphere of the Republican Bush administration and Republican led Congress. Senator Bachus and Congressman Frank introduced legislation during the later period of the bubble but failed to draw support to curb the bad lending. Republicans blocked a new antipredatory lending law in North Carolina from being enacted for the country from 1999 onwards. And Bush without realizing the ramifications prodded HUD to push Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to require higher percentage of loans to go to low income borrowers. Fannie and Freddie in turn met this requirement by increasing the demand for these subprime loans by buying the mortgage securities, which the packagers of these securities backed by subprime mortgage loans and incorrectly rated AAA by conniving ratings agencies were happy to supply. It was a sad situation with a happy -everyone could say the were bringing home ownership and the American dream to low income people, and business was signing up for this ride with short term gain in mind. And in all this financial innovation lost its legs as packaging these securities and constructing new investment vehicles like the conduits were being used in perverse ways. The basics of labeling something correctly was torn apart. You could not turn a subprime loan to low income borrowers or a loan without documentation to flippers and speculators into something different by simply labeling it as AAA. What the confidence in financial innovation in the American system did was help spread these securities all over the globe, where they were held with confidence by towns in remote parts of the Scandinavian north country as well as financial centres in Europe and Asia. At the state level politicians in California saw this as one of the state's star industries and protected it from legislation to curb bad lending, as most of the big lenders were based in California. Due to a strange set of affairs the Department of Corporations was left with the tasks of oversight of mortgage lenders in the state. It was concerned more with issues like protecting senior citizens from financial scams and was not staffed to meet the supervisory role of a huge mortgage lending business. When it comes to the Fed's role Greenspan also took the laissez fairre stand of not interfering with free markets, even when a lot of the bad lending was obvious and one Fed Governor Gramlich was pushing for better lending standards. The Fed supervisory role was over banks and banks were required to follow lending standards, but most of this lending had shifted to mortgage brokers and financial companies which were beyond the supervision of the Fed. Had the Fed extended its supervision to mortgage affiliates of the banks this could have increased the level of supervision and made a difference. But state regulation mechanisms in California by Department of Corporations show that the regulatory mechanism did not take into account the realities of mortgage lending and how it had changed. ...

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Michael Gerson was a policy advisor to Geroge W. Bush when Bush announced the PEPFAR program to fight AIDS in Africa. Here he reflects on its lessons. He recalls visiting sub-Sharan Africa and finding only about half a million people being treated out of about 30 million afflicted with the disease. About 14 million orphans had already resulted from AIDS, life expectancy had declined by 20 years, and in whole villages only grand parents and grand children were to be seen, says Gerson. The support came from Rep. Hyde, Rep Barbara Lee, Senators Frist and Kerry- in 4 months after the announcement in a State of the Union address the law was signed. Bush said: "a work of mercy beyond all current international efforts to help the people of Africa. This comprehensive plan will prevent 7 milion new AIDS infections, treat at least 2 million people with life extending drugs and provide humane care for millions of people suffering from AIDS and for children orphaned by AIDS." By late 2005 PEPFAR and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria had treated 800,000 people, and by 2012 this had increased to 5 million....

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Deutsche Bank has lost two thirds of its share value and its leverage is extraordinarily high with total assets at 56 times tangible equity acccording to Morgan Stanley. Progress is being made but not enough say analysts, and raising capital now is better than waiting longer and doing that with a downward spiral in its shares. The loss announced January 14, 2009, of $ 4.8 billion euros for 4th quarter 2009, reflects a loss across all of the bank's businesses, and is a warning sign of the need to raise capital with greater urgency.

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Feldstein's thoughts in April 2009, on Treasury's Public-Private Investment Plan. First, he says this plan will only remove $500 billion of impaired assets. The banks he says now own $3 billion of residential mortgages, $1.5 trillion of corporate real-estate loans, and $1 trillion of consumer debt. Not all of this is impaired but the banks will have to sell much more than $500 billion to regain confidence in their solvency. And with one third of all residential mortgages exceeding the value of the houses, and thie many homeowners under water, likely to default, the negative feedback loop of foreclosures begetting falling prices begetting foreclosures, threatens the whole effort to shore up the defences. If no workable solution is executed quickly to prevent this then even larger pools of mortgage debt will be impaired irretrievably. Feldstein suggests that the Obama administration seriously look at his plan suggested in March 2008 to provide government loans at low rates of interest like 1- 2% for 20% of the principal amount of the mortgage and then reduce the mortgage principal by 20%, thus keeping millions of homeowners above water. But this needs to be done quickly. All voluntary efforts have failed and have become asmokescreen for banks and lobbying groups with support from Congress to make it appear that this problem is being addressed. Thirdly Feldstein says that if banks sell these impaired mortgage assets at a loss- say 40-60 cents on the dollar on the upside with government and the FDIC picking up alot of the risk and financing for private investors under the new plan- they will now have to show the loss whereas they could have previously shown these assets at unrealistic price levels but still not taking losses. This might push banks into insolvency, so banks will need more injection of capital by the government to make this possible. What are the risks in this situation? Without an effective plan to prevent the negative feedback loop of foreclosure waves and falling houseprices, the quantity of impaired assets will simply grow larger. In effect even if some private investors take out some of the impaired assets from the banking system, it is possible that a new set of assets equal to or larger than these assets that are taken out are added to impaired assets in the banking system as house prices fall steeply from new foreclosures. That only means the economy is in the same hole as before, or in a slightly larger one, even with all the well intentioned steps. At some point the private enterprise argument has to be seen in the correct light. It is not that there is any argument that private enterprise can function better or far superior, it is only that the banks as private enterprises are in such an enormously stressed situation that the bank executive's cannot execute a way out of this mess. ...

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David Stockman, director of the Office of Management and Budget under Reagan, is interviewed by Tom Keene. Stockman says the US has $52 trillion of debt on a $14.5 trillion economy, a ratio of 3.6 times GDP. Historically, before 1980, it has been around 1.6. This debtification of the US, he says, is the major problem facing the US today. Stockman sees little or no economic growth in the next 5 to 10 years, as debt reduction progresses.

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John Taylor challenges Ben Bernanke's defence of why he and Greenspan at the Fed kept interests rates too low for too long thus helping create the housing bubble. Bernanke ignored the Taylor rule which at the time would have called for increasing interest rates, using forecasted inflation which turned out to be too low rather than actual inflation as the Taylor rule would call for, and which had been used says John Taylor in the previous 20 years for proper central bank interest rate policy actions.

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Basel 2 got its start in 1999 in the midst of the Asian banking crisis. By 2004 financial regulators had come up with a set of rules for Basel 2. The idea was to make banking safer and reduce unsafe lending. It makes lending safer by requiring banks to match the size of their capital cushion to the riskiness of their loans and securities. Because banks are in such a precarious state with amny risky loans and securities the implementation of Basel 2 in the USA in 2009 would mean that the banks have to set aside an even bigger capital cushion and this would mean an even lower lending for capital needs of business than otherwise in a lending environment that is already constrained, thus making the economic conditions worsen. Critics point to this to show their concern that this would be a good thing but at the wrong time leading to a bad result. But Basel 2 is so far along that its likely to be implemented especially since the current crisis is partly a result of extensive leveraging and not enough capital has been set aside to account for higher risk for loans and securities. Basel 2's plus point is that it requires more shareholder capital for riskier loans a bank makes, and its shareholders who are first on the hook in a default protecting depositors and tapayers and creating an incentive to lend with due diligence and carefully. In the current situation though once a credit crisis has started its extremely difficult to get more money from shareholders. European countries have implemented Basel 2 starting in January 2008 and no adverse effects on credit have been seen. But the US credit crisis much worse and is expected to worsen in 2009 so the timing for Basel 2 is sure to cause concern. Regulators can ease up on implementation of Basel 2 if this is the case. Note that these regulatory rulebooks are always a work in progress as for instance Basel 1. Under Basel 1 financial firms were not required to have capital backing up lines of credit if they were for less than 1 year, so banks decided to game the system by issuing short term lines of credit and rolling them over. And banks learned to get the loans off their books so they were not required to have capital to back these loans by securitizing the loans. Basel 2 also uses mark to market acccounting which would put more pressure on securties prices in times of distress. But Stefan Walter of the Federal reserve Bank of New York who is secretary general of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision says theree are built in stabilizers such as letting banks estimate their risks on average using historical data and lets national regulators use their own judgement as to what is acceptable. Note that a research paper by greenlaw of Morgan stanley Hatzius of Goldman Sachs , Kashyap of the University of Chicago, and Song Shin of Princeton Unicersity, 4 leading economists, released feb 29, states that highly leveraged financial institutions reduce their lending by $10 for every $1 of capital they lose. by this estimate bank lending could be down by as much as $900 billlion from the $90 billion in mortgage loans losses that have been seen. ...

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Efforts being made to convince the Spanish government of Mariano Rajoy to accept IMF aid to recapitalize its banks. The IMF released information showing Spanish banks would need to raise at least 37 billion euros or $46 billion to prevent a worsening of the banking crisis. The report was released before the meeting of EU finance ministers on June 9-10 to persuade the Spanish government to accept IMF aid. The eurozone bailout fund was given powers in 2011 to make loans to governments for the purpose of recapitalizing banks, with conditions and terms set for the financial sector not for the government's spending plans. According to people aware of the discussions taking place in the European Commission and the IMF, one option is to have the European Banking Authority and not the IMF oversee the program. This avoids the usual stigma of accepting aid coming from the IMF with strict conditions attached including restrictions on the government's fiscal plans.

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Story about a Quant's life, this a math smart kid, Peter Muller, who worked for a risk analysis firm called Barra Inc in Berkeley, California, and later joins Morgan Stanley to help set up its Quant trading business. "Pairs trading" is one of the strategies Quants have used in the past in which two stocks which have a strong historical relationship provide clues as to how to short one and by another betting that the historical relationship will assert itself. "Statistical Arbitrage" is a more complex version of this and Muller's specialty was in this field at Morgan Stanley's Process Driven Trading Group (PDT). This Group produced profits from trading of about $3.5 billion in ten years upto 2006. This group now contains about $6 billion of Morgan Stanley's own money and accounted for 7.2 % of Morgan Stanley's net income with profits of $540 million in 2006. In the two weeks prior to August 9, Morgan Stanley's PDT lost about $500 million as the mortgage crisis broke out and put a wrench in the normal workings of the Quant's strategy and the fact that there are so many Quants operating with computerized trading may have added to the problem. the PDT has since recovered some of its losses. And its by no means certain that this has shaken Morgan Stanley's continued pursuit of income from Quant trading operations. The story thats told about Peter Muller is interesting as he tries everything to find happiness leaving his job for a while and playing his own music on albums and in the streets of Barcelona and New York city subway stations to soothe his restless soul and still comes back to his old job. All this happens while he is still 43. ...

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In the current situation where the "too big to fail" problem for banks has only worsened since the crisis with the remaining banks even larger after mergers, and no dividing wall between speculative trading in securities and the utility banking of collecting deposits and making loans, the country depends on regulators to do the job of supervision. Regulatory reforms have faced resistance from the banking industry and the reforms have been watered down in Congress. It is in this environment that Patrick Parkinson takes on the job of head of bank supervision at the Federal Reserve. He will work with Daniel Tarullo, the Fed governor who heads the committee of governors overseeing bank supervision. But he is also one of the old faces at the Fed when the Fed failed in its role of bank supervision. From 1993 to 1998 he was the top staff advisor to the Fed chairman, for matters considered by the President's Working Group on Financial Markets.

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After the huge crisis the debate about capitalism. What went wrong, and importantly what did not go wrong. Not in the sense of more punditry to place the blame but to ask questions to have a better grasp of the fact and better understanding of the twists and turns of the last decade, the complexities, the frailties, the errors of judgement, and the failings, and the outright falsehoods and ethical breaks. So that the good things are not lost for instance the individual initiative and the bad things are corrected and measures put in place to prevent recurrence and minimize damage. Has the model of anglo-saxon capitalism failed? Actually some specific things failed, deregulation at a time when banks and markets were behaving irresponsibly and without any restraint internal or external, credit ratings agencies failed, financial institutions failed in performing their first line of business which is to finance investment in the economy not in housing and mortgages, and American consumerism failed in that value of saving disappeared and abundance of debt brought American savings to zero, leaving little for investment in the economy and infrastructure except by borrowing from other countries. And living on illusions and not on sound basics the leadership failed thinking that free enterprise and technology and productivity improvements somehow allowed a country or group of countries to live way beyond their means, and a tendency to excess in the popular mood of the country, excesssive consumption, excessive and profligate use of energy which sent trillions of dollars overseas over decades, and excessive expectations of the lower classes for housing and goods beyond their means, all played a part. What did not fail is the freedom to trade, the fall of "barriers to intercourse" between nations, that produced gains on a big scale so that computer and cell phone technology developed in one part of the world quickly spread around the world and the innovations and technology developed in one country spread producing benefits all over the world. It created amood of optimism in developing countries whose incomes rose especially where countries encouraged growth as in China, India, Russia, Brazil, Eastern Europe and pulled hundreds of millons out of poverty. With China, America and Germany in effect shipped technology goods in return for lower value added goods like textiles and shoes, to help China industrialize, and American consumption played a useful part until things reached an extreme and the system was abused by forgetting the basics and allowing excesses and failing to respect ethical responsibilities. Regarding regulation excessive regulation and red tape has proved to be bad as in the license Raj in India which stifled private initiative and new enterprise till it was abandoned in 1990, and no one in India is calling for more regulation. What is bad is to abandon good common sense and to rely on the illusion that no regulation is needed to run a complex financial system like we have today, a laissez fairre libertarian philosophy that was rampant in the Bush administration and in the country's leadership in the Bush years. As a result an underfunded SEC failed to deliver on its basic mission and responsibility, and the lack of a centralized regulatory authority with powers and funding to meet the challenges of modern finance as for instance ineffective derivative regulation under the CFTC, simply aggravated things further. ...

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Questions about the true cost of the Obama health care legislation and the assumption that the legislation cuts the deficit by billions of dollars. This WSJ editorial says one has to look at this closely, and not merely look at CBO projections, which may be based in a certain context and not reflect the true costs, especially because many accounting gimmicks and use of numbers to present a particular picture is taking place. The information this editorial cites is that: it uses 10 years of taxes to fund six years of subsidies, Social Security and Medicare revenues are double-counted to the tune of $398 billion, a new program funding long-tem care frontloads taxes but backloads spending, and the assumption of an automatic 25% cut to physician payments that Congress is unwilling to authorize. Rep. Rand Paul has tried to present an alternative view which needs to be studied just as closely, because of the enormous impact of a jump in spending at a time when the public finances are fragile. WSJ also cites the work of Richard Foster, the chief Medicare actuary, as an alternate perspective of how things could turn out, Doug Holtz-Eakin, and Eugene Steuerle. It calls for common sense in evaluating programs, entitlements, defense or other government spending. They not only cost money, but costs escalate over time as history has shown over decades, till they eventually are discovered to be not affordable unless the middle class is willing to dig deeper into its finances to pay for them. Alternate perspectives from a range of informed opinion, Howard Dean, Martin Feldstein, and the head of Harvard's Medical School show that the issue needs to be looked at closely and carefully and cannot be something in which CBO numbers can be trusted to tell the whole story. Especially when common sense, history, and informed opinion across a spectrum of thought advises caution, and fragile public finances also suggest caution. Howard Dean, former Governor of Vermont, says the health care bill is not real reform, and may do more harm than good. He says in a Washington Post article, December 17, 2009, the Obama health care bill does not insert competition into insurance markets, does not significantly reduce costs, and does not improve the delivery and use of health services. It was he says done with a political calculus and crafted for votes not real reform. Jeffrey S. Flier, Dean of the Harvard Medical School, gave the Obama health reform bill an "F" grade, saying in a Nov 18, 2009, WSJ article, that it was disingenuous to call this reform, Congress and the White House were simply deceiving the public. He said the bill will accelerate US health care spending, postpone most of the major health care problems, expecially the ones that drive cost, including the "fee for service" system and delivery of health care. He says in his discussions with economists and other health care leaders the opinion was unanimous that the bill will accelerate health care spending. He cites Massachusetts as an example, where access to care was expanded under the same dysfunctional system, and spending went up, and it doesn't work. Feldstein, who in early 2008 suggested proactive solutions to the mortgage debt crisis which were never adopted, says that the Obama health care law means higher taxes in the long run to pay for the $1 trillion cost of health care for the uninsured group over 10 years. Feldstein says that the Obama plan is to cut Medicare to cut spending, and will reduce the amount of medical services, as reduced spending comes from fewer services, not reducing payments to providers. And he asks if the cost reductions are weighted too heavily towards reduced services and not reduced payments to providers ,would this result in large cuts to services to affect the quality of healthcare for the 85% of the American people who are accustomed to a different pattern of healthcare. ...

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Jesse Eisinger compares the public criticism and the response of two executives of major American banks- Dimon of JP Morgan Chase and Blankfein of Goldman Sachs. He says Dimon may come out looking better with his reputation in much better shape because of the changes he made at JP Morgan Chase after realizing that he had made faulty judgements. Dimon has now set the goal of putting JP Morgan ahead of the other banks in its risk management and working with regulators. Blankfein is seen as making only minor changes in the culture at Goldman and having overcome a wave of public criticism without significant change in the way the company does business. In the process Dimon will have learned more from the financial crisis and make improvements that will be good for JP Morgan in the future, an opportunity that Blankfein is seen as missing.