LyrArc Article Gist
The problem of information providers is linked to the problem of the recipient of the information- the common man in America. For the common man in America these are distant places with strange cultures and manners of living, remote from his everyday existence in an industrialized country. Why should the common man in America care if a small fraction of GNP and a trained military with advanced equipment will be sufficient to deal with situations in remote places. A fast growing economy between 1950- 2000 could also absorb the costs of local conflicts. The reason the common man in America should care is that the economy is expected to grow slowly, so that poor information leading to poor decisions on allocating limited and declining resources for different local conflicts- a war in Iraq costing 1 trillion dollars, and a war in Afghanistan 1 trillion dollars- can compromise future economic security, investment in America and overall defense needs. Especially when money wasted with poor decisions cannot be retrieved or put back in the Treasury, and creates future problems....

LyrArc Article Gist
Recruiting in the Afghan army from predominantly Pastun areas in the south and southeast is way down, almost nonexistent. For Kandahar, Helmand, Oruzgan, Zabul, Paktika, and Ghazni provinves with largely Pashtun people, the numbers show they make up 17% of the population and contributed only 1.5% of new recruits to the army since 2009. Kandahar and Helmand with 2 millon people contributed about 1200 recruits, or less 1% of 173,000 new recrutis since 2009. The northern provinces make up a large number of the new recruits, with Kunduz having a population of 900,000 and contributing 16,500 recruits. There are about 42% Pastuns in the population and a similiar number of Pastuns in the Afghan army, but most are from the northern or northeastern provinces where the insurgency has been weaker. One third are from one northeastern province- Nangarhar. The reason for this is fear of the Taliban finding out that that a young man has enlisted in the south and retaliation against the enlistee or his family. The lack of a southern Pastun presence in the army makes the army more of a northern institution. With withdrawal of American and NATO forces by 2014, this leaves Afghanistan deeply divided between the northern and southern regions. The southern region Pastuns have a significant presence across the border in the northern part of Pakistan, and the southern Pastuns draw support and resources from this region. Removing the foreign presence shifts the balance towards the southern Pastuns and Pakistani Pastuns in the largely mountainous country of this region. This is why the project in Afghanistan requires the support of all factions and ethnic communities in the South Asian region to succeed, setting aside differences and animosities of the past. D. Mahmood Khan, a member of parliament in Kandahar says ordinary Afghans in Kandahar see the Afghan government of Karzai collapsing in a week or two without foreign support and sense a much stronger Taliban....

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Kristof reminds readers of the NYT that the more that the British acted to suppress the American insurgents, the more that fueled the insurgents fighting the British. After all the land they were on was theirs they felt and not Britain's. The same is true for the $0 million Pastuns on both sides of the border, the Afghan side and the Pakistan side. He says Americans are not sensitive enough to nationalism abroad. The war in Afghanistan is costing $60 billion ayear. Adding another 40,000 troops will cost $10 billion, enough to send 2 million disadvantaged children to a solid preschool, or could be as high as $40 billion extra, which over 10 years would pay for almost half of health care reform. Kristof doesn't see the 40,000 troops doing enough to change the picture much, except increasing support for Taliban as the American footprint grows as foreign occupiers. He mentions that standard counterinsurgency ratios of troops to civilians would require 650,000 troops including Afghans.

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This WSJ editorial calls the ISI and Pakistan army's playing both sides of the game- acting as an ally of the U.S. and supporting the Taliban- unacceptable. The editorial points to the Taliban and its leader Mullah Omar running the operations out of Quetta, in Baluchistan. And the Taliban faction loyal to Jalaluddin Haqqani having sanctuaries in North Waziristan and the tribal regions of Pakistan. Al Quaeda's No. 2 Ayman al-Zawahiri, it says, could very well be in Pakistan in some compound in the manner of bin Laden.

LyrArc Article Gist
Some of the ideas of Richard Holbrooke that have never been disclosed before on the conflicts in Pakistan and Afghanistan are disclosed by Kristof of the Times. Holbrooke believed the Obama administration's military approach to the conflict would not work. He worked hard to build a diplomatic solution similiar to the Dayton accords that he helped negotiate for the ethnically divided Yugoslavia. He earned the respect of Pakistanis in working for a long term solution to problems in the region.

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Aghhanistan peace talks with the Taliban in Kyoto, Japan in June 2012.

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Information that suggests a shrinking role for Al Quaeda, even as the Taliban concentrating on local issues grows in Afghanistan.